A STUDY OF <u>SAṄKHĀRAS</u> IN EARLY BUDDHISM

by

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A Study of Saṅkhāras in Early Buddhism

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A study of *saṅkhāras* in early Buddhism

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ABSTRACT

Saṅkhāra is one of the least explored and most obscure terms in the philosophy of Buddhism. Our main purpose in this study is to find out what *saṅkhāra* is in the teachings of the Buddha, on the basis of the primary sources, *Sutta*, *Abhidhamma* and *Aṭṭhakathā*, and if possible, as a minor interest, to discover whether there is a satisfactory English equivalent.

An attempt was made to start the quest by going through the only published dissertation on *saṅkhāra*, by Schumann in German, and the writer was encouraged to explore deeply into the matter as Schumann was unsuccessful in coming to grips with the highly complex and subtle theory of *saṅkhāra*.

Having reviewed the writings of numerous scholars in the field of Buddhism and related studies, an attempt has been made to pick out essential contexts where *saṅkhāra* appears, in the four *Nikāyas*, *Khuddakanikāya*, *Abhidhamma* and *Aṭṭhakathā*. Then we tried to explore the relationship of *saṅkhāra* with other concepts such as *kamma*, *cetanā*, *paṭiccasamuppāda* and *dhamma*, which appear to overlap with it in meaning.

It has been observed that the Buddha used the term in the sense of denoting a continuing force resulting from an action but without any substance or soul or entity. Thus we have causes and effects but no continuing entity, its effect is not the cause itself but nevertheless results from it. A chapter is devoted to the clarification of this question of an 'agent' in relation to the concept of *saṅkhāra*.

Then, analysing the contexts reviewed earlier, we have tried to determine whether the dozen or so distinct usages of saṅkhāra found in the sources imply that the term has more than one meaning, or whether a single concept can be understood to underlie them all.

We have concluded that saṅkhāra as condition is the basic meaning, the other contexts or special meanings being mostly particular conditions or sets of conditions. We found that there are two main aspects, momentum and the bringing together of physical or mental principles as combinations, or both in respect of reproducing a previous event in a new context.

After considering possible English equivalents such as force, energy, integration and preparation, it appears that the term saṅkhāra might better be left untranslated, following Sir Charles Eliot's proposal, due to its complexity and to avoid misrepresentation.

But the term saṅkhāra was in the Indo-Aryan language prior to the advent of Buddhism. The Buddha using the same language (disregarding dialects) added a new meaning and used the term in a new sense. In the Vedic tradition a priest may act as an agent to prepare (sam+kṛ) a new body in the next world. In Buddhist theory in the absence of an agent the saṅkhāras acting as non agential forces are the preparation for rebirth. If it is necessary to find an English equivalent, the word 'preparation' is in a way adequate to convey that something is integrating or unifying from a combination of principles. We could follow the Pali texts in simply using the old word 'preparation' and in understanding it in a new way.

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CONTENTS

	Preface	iii
	Introduction	1
1.	The problem of *saṅkhāra* and the importance of its solution	8
2.	Period prior to the Buddha and non Buddhist schools	37
3.	*Saṃskāra* in the *Abhidharmakośa*	52
4.	First four *Nikāyas*	66
5.	*Abhidhamma* and *Khuddaka*	91
6.	*Aṭṭhakathās*	127
7.	*Saṅkhāra*, *Kamma* and *Cetanā*	151
8.	*Saṅkhāra* and *Paṭiccasamuppāda*	166
9.	*Saṅkhāra* and *Dhamma*	176
10.	Is there an agent?	187
11.	Analysis	219
	Conclusion	272
	Abbreviations	275
	Selected Bibliography	277
	Appendix A	286
	Appendix B	292
	Appendix C	293

PREFACE

My interest in Buddhism goes back for many years. However it was only after hearing the inspiring speech given by Professor A. K. Warder at the inauguration of the Canadian Buddhist Vihāra Society in 1974 that I became really enthusiastic about engaging in serious academic research on Buddhism. I chose the field of Buddhist philosophy since I saw that, in addition to being most interesting, it provided great scope for original and necessary research. With the encouragement of Professor Warder I entered the M.A. programme at the University of Toronto and wrote a thesis on saññā recognition (perception).

After this I became a doctoral candidate with Professor Warder as my supervisor. I decided to study saṅkhāra, a term fundamental to Buddhism. Very little research has been done on this term in comparison with its importance to Buddhism. There is no book in English devoted to it and it appears that there is no consensus among previous scholars about the meanings of saṅkhāra.

In working on this Ph.D thesis I have enjoyed Professor Warder's unqualified support and assistance. He has gone out of his way to provide me with the benefit of his meticulous scholarship and unparalleled knowledge of Buddhism. I shall always be deeply grateful

for his kindness in patiently suggesting revisions and improvements to innumerable drafts of each chapter.

Of course the final responsibility for the thesis and especially for all its shortcomings is mine alone.

I must thank Professor Milton Israel, Director of the Centre for South Asian Studies, for making a much more pleasant environment to complete my research work. Professor N.K. Wagle was helpful in many ways and always available. Professor A.L. Basham read a draft of the thesis, as a result of which I added chapter 10 attempting to answer the question whether there is an agent in Buddhist philosophy.

Gratitude is also due to the Robarts Library. I have relied heavily on its collection of books and its interlibrary loan service and also thanks due to my wife Indra and my friend Dr. George Gibbons for typing and proof reading.

INTRODUCTION

The teachings of the Buddha recorded in the Pali *Tipiṭaka* of the Theravāda tradition and in parallel texts of other schools appear to have contained strikingly original ideas at a time when many philosophical systems, such as those of the Ājīvakas, the Nigaṇṭhas or Jainas and the Lokāyatikas, were competing for popularity in India. Since the teaching of the Buddha in some instances was quite contrary to the other teachings of the same period it is natural that he used new means of expression or attached new ideas or meanings to existing words. Buddhist usage thus became quite different from that of the Brahmanical or Vedic traditions.

Saṅkhāra is one old word which the Buddha used in a new sense. The Vedic tradition prior to the Buddha used the term in its Sanskrit form *saṃskāra* and the verb *saṃ+kṛ* in the sense of putting together, making good, making ready in the context of preparing a sacrifice. More rarely it is used for preparation of a new body after death by means of a ritual carried out by priests (*brāhmaṇas*). But the teaching of the Buddha adopted the term *saṅkhāra* to denote what is transmitted from one life to another on the basis of one's own good or bad actions in a previous life.

Many modern scholars have attempted research from a philological perspective and tried to find a European

equivalent. Their efforts have been useful in exploring possible equivalents and showing what the problems are, yet after a century or more we find no consensus; thirty scholars have put forward as many different meanings. How can we hope to solve a problem which has baffled so many experts in the field?

In the first place many investigators have adopted a purely philological or historical-linguistic approach, neglecting the synchronic relations of saṅkhāra with other items in the system of the Buddha's language. In the second place many of them were not interested in philosophy and did not probe into the philosophical aspects of the use of language. It may be observed that the study of Buddhism as a whole has proceeded more slowly than the study of the languages used by Buddhists and many fundamental ideas, such as the question of a 'soul' and the nature of nibbāna, have remained controversial. By taking advantage of the gradual progress in Buddhist philosophical studies we may find ourselves in a better position to tackle this problem than were our predecessors.

But what we require is much more than that: we wish to determine from a philosophical point of view what the concept saṅkhāra is in the teaching of the Buddha and what purpose it serves in relation to the basic

tenets of Buddhism, namely what unhappiness is and how to seek the cessation of unhappiness. The present writer attempts to answer that question. Sankhāra is the fourth group. Also sankhāra is one of the links of the paticcasamuppāda. The second context of sankhāra involves transmigration or rebirth. This has proved difficult to understand and some have mixed sankhāra with Brahmanical or Vedic tradition and imagined a permanent entity going from one life to another. But the Buddha unambiguously explained his basic position as that everything is anicca (impermanent), dukkha (unhappiness) and anattan (no soul). Beyond or contrary to these three characteristics, any suggestion is non-Buddhist. All sankhata dhammas are anicca, dukkha and anattan. Thus these three are very important in the discussion of sankhāra.

The above three characteristics themselves indicate that there is no permanent entity passing from one life to another since everything is impermanent except the final emancipation of nibbāna. Except for the teachings of the Buddha most other Indian systems are committed to the idea of a soul. Moreover, the teachings of the Buddha became a direct threat to the other philosophical systems which advocate norms such as divine rules: accept what is taught without question or opposition.

The teachings of the Buddha are based on the fact that, while the Tathāgata shows the way, it is up to the disciple to make an effort.

<u>Tumhehi kiccam ātappam akkhātāro Tathāgatā</u>

<u>Patipannā pamokkhanti jhāyino Mārabandhanā</u>

There is no person or self involved. It is a misconception to give the designation of a person to the five groups in the ultimate sense. If there is no person everything is a mass of conditions. Then there is a question as to why in the *Tipitaka* there is constant use of the pronouns such as he, she, etc. This has been explained on the basis of two truths, namely: ultimate truth (*paramattha sacca*) and conventional truth (*sammuti sacca*).

When the Buddha or his disciples used a pronoun to identify somebody, it was being used in the sense of conventional usage to denote a temporary situation. The *Tipitaka* stresses the point that because of this (condition or cause), this (effect) comes to be, and that there is no permanent being. All the eighteen schools of

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1. Dh. verse 276

Buddhism have accepted that the Tipiṭaka should be read in the light of the two truths.[2]

Conventionally, according to the accepted norms of society and the use of language, it is necessary to use terms such as 'he', 'you' to identify people. But in the ultimate sense there is no person.

Once a bhikkhu asked the Buddha, 'who eats the consciousness food?' The Buddha replied that it is not a sound question - and he does not say 'eats'. But if the question were properly formulated it should have been asked 'of what' is the consciousness food. The consciousness food is the condition of rebirth in the future.[3] If we can solve the problem of saṅkhāra we can perhaps understand the Buddha's whole doctrine of conditioned origination and the attainment of nibbāna.

In this thesis there are eleven chapters. The first chapter indicates the previous research that has been done on the subject of saṅkhāra. Attempts have been made in chapter 2 to trace the usage of the term in the Vedic tradition and the other philosophical systems which existed prior to and after the time of the Buddha. Afterwards in chapter three an attempt is made to discuss how Vasubandhu sees the term saṃskāra in the Abhidharmakośa.

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2 Warder, A.K. Indian Buddhism, p. 150

3 S. II. 13, See also Indian Buddhism p. 119

In chapter four all the relevant contexts in the four *Nikāyas* of the *Suttapiṭaka* have been given so that the researcher may formulate a correct opinion on what *saṅkhāra* is. The writer has given a paraphrase bringing out the essential points instead of translating every passage, as the present work is not intended for a general reader. The writer confined himself to the Theravāda texts and the *Abhidharmakośa* of Sarvāstivādins. In fact it does not appear that the other schools differ very much from Theravāda in their use of the term *saṅkhāra*. The question will be touched on in the final analysis in chapter eleven.

As the second layer of Theravāda tradition , in chapter five contexts from the *abhidhamma* and some of the *khuddaka* texts are given. Since *abhidhamma* shows a considerable amount of systematization, without going into more detailed discussion the contexts are simply provided in a nutshell. A reader will realize that the usage of the term *saṅkhāra* is increasingly restricted in the more philosophical texts of Pali.

As the third layer of literary development of the Theravāda tradition the contexts from the *aṭṭhakathās* are given in chapter six. In this chapter the main focus is on the commentaries of Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa since he is said to have translated the original Sinhalese *aṭṭhakathās* into Pali. Here the term *saṅkhāra* has an even more restricted sense than in the *sutta* and *abhi-*

hamma and there is a more comprehensive and coherent exposition of its ramifications.

The theory of kamma in Buddhist philosophy is very close to the theory of saṅkhāra. Kamma represents the action from the mano, kāya and vacī and this will be discussed in chapter 7.

Chapter 8 is perhaps the most important, Here the relations of saṅkhāra and paṭiccasamuppāda are discussed. Both reflect the Buddha's discovery of the cause of human suffering and the solution that he taught for its eradication. Chapter 9 on dhamma provides an explanation of why saṅkhāra in some sense is equivalent to dhamma if not one and the same thing. We deal with the question of whether or not there is an agent in the teaching of the Buddha in Chapter 10. In order to prove that there is no agent but that what appears to be an agent is nothing but impersonal elements, we have discussed the two truths, and three characteristics. Finally before the conclusion a survey of what has been discussed on the basis of Sutta, Abhidhamma and Aṭṭhakathās will be presented, with the emphasis on how the term saṅkhāra has been used in two shades of meaning and contexts in the philosophy of Buddhism.

CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM OF SAṄKHĀRA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS SOLUTION

Many modern scholars in the east and the west have attempted to explain the term saṅkhāra as used in the early Buddhist texts. But their conclusions are not entirely satisfactory as the term is complex and difficult to understand without going into the depth of its philosophical usage. There is no consensus and sometimes it appears that the word has several different meanings.

In her book Buddhist Psychological Ethics (translation of Dhammasaṅgaṇi, first published in 1900) Mrs. Rhys Davids stated that:

> 'Here I must leave the Buddhist philosophy of mind and theory of intellection. We are only at the threshold of its problems, and it is hence not strange if we find them as baffling as, let us say, our own confused usage of many psychological terms -- feeling, will, mind -- about which we ourselves greatly differ, would prove to an enquiring Buddhist. If I have not attempted to go into the crux of the saṅkhāraskandha [sic] it is because neither the

> Manual nor its Commentary brings us any nearer to a satisfactory hypothesis'.[4]

The above passage shows that she was rather puzzled by the complexity of the saṅkhārakkhandha.

Generally in the Pali canon, saṅkhāra appears as a khandha among the five khandhas. It is a condition (paccaya) for consciousness in conditioned origination, which is an original conception of the Buddha and the basis of the philosophy. Also it is found in the various levels of meditation. In such expressions as 'all saṅkhāras are impermanent' saṅkhāra again appears to be a central concept of Buddhism and it is of paramount importance to find its precise meaning in order to understand the teachings of the Buddha. Moreover, related to saṅkhāra we have the pair saṅkhata/asaṅkhata, where the latter is equivalent to nibbāna. Although the term is thus fundamental to the teachings, its interpretation is somewhat difficult.

It is evident on the basis of the secondary sources that many writers have attempted to explain what saṅkhāra is without giving full consideration to the concept as it occurs as a central point in the whole system. In

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4 Buddhist Psychological Ethics p. lxxxix

other words they have not related it to the other terms of the system.

Previous Research on Saṅkhāra

There is only one substantial monograph written on *saṅkhāra*. That is *Bedeutung und Bedeutungsentwicklung des Terminus Saṅkhāra im frühen Buddhismus* by Hans Wolfgang Schumann. Inaugural dissertation, Bonn, 1957 (in German).

Schumann discussed the interpretations of twenty two scholars and in order to make it more complete we have added another fifteen scholars. See appendix A.

Schumann classifies the interpretations by various scholars in four groups with reference to *saṅkhāra* as a *paccaya* which for some reason he calls *nidāna*.[5]

(A) *Saṅkhāra* means act itself and *saṅkhāra* is identified with *kamma*. This view is held by Wassiljew and Geiger (numbers 7 and 21 on the list). Wassiljew translates *saṅkhāra* as 'Handlung'.[6] Geiger usually translates *saṅkhāra* as *kamma*.[7]

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5 Schumann, p.45

6 *ibid*. p.45

7 *ibid* p. 46

(B) *Saṅkhāra* precedes *kamma* and means 'will'. Schumann associates his own theory with this group. Others who hold this view are: Hardy and Beckh (numbers 1 and 10 on the list). All *saṅkhāras* have qualities which control the arising etc. of the *dhammas*, according to von Glasenapp (number 8 on the list). This is partly copied from Stcherbatsky. Schumann thinks that Frauwallner comes under this group.

(C) *Saṅkhāra* is a presentation, representation (Vorstellung), (mental) prefiguring or a representation of future existences. This meaning is used by Franke (number 5 on the list).

(D) *Saṅkhāra* consists of tendencies or dispositions following the act (*kamma*). This view is held by Oldenberg. Following this, Pischel and Keith think that the meaning is the same as in Sāṃkhya theory.

Among the scholars listed in group II (from 23 - 37) T. W. Rhys Davids, Ñyanatiloka Bhikkhu, and Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu are adherents of category B and D or both, according to the writer's opinion. Generally, Stcherbatsky thinks that *saṅkhāra* is volition or energy, and he belongs to category B.

Schumann's research is confined to the _Tipiṭaka_ and some Sanskrit sources prior to the advent of the Buddha which he examined in order to trace the earlier development of the term _saṅkhāra_. The literature prior to the Buddha did not satisfactorily contribute to his understanding of _saṅkhāra_. The body of the thesis and the conclusion do not show any indication of a deep understanding of the concept on the basis of the _Tipiṭaka_. His major points are as follows.

(a) He gives the German word 'Absicht' as a translation for _saṅkhāra_ in all its contexts.[8] This may be translated as 'intention' in English.

(b) He seeks a verb equivalent to _abhisaṅkharoti_ meaning to intend and to produce rebirth (p.35). But that seems to suggest that his translation intention' is unsatisfactory. This seems obvious because of its implication _saṅkhata/asaṅkhata_ = intended/unintended. He maintains that there is no verb equivalent to _saṅkharoti_ in western languages.[9]

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8 Schumann, p.14

9 Schumann, p. 35

(c) He attaches particular importance to the evidence that *saṅkhāra* is a synonym of *cetanā*.[10]

(d) The 'identification of *saṅkhāra* with its object' goes so far that the compound *āyusaṅkhāra*, intention of life, acts as a substitute for simple life (*āyu*). Schumann thinks that *āyu* here has no meaning,[11] but here *āyu* is equivalent to span or duration of life and *saṅkhāra* is that which causes it.

(e) He maintains that in the Pali canon four meanings (really contexts) have been identified for the word *saṅkhāra*, namely, as a *khandha*, as a *paccaya*, independently of these as an unphilosophical term (free usage) and as the object produced by action (equals all five *khandhas*).[12] One of them (at least) has two subdivisions (internal and external).

Schumann had difficulty in finding a proper western equivalent for the Pali verb *abhisaṅkharoti*. He wanted to convey the following two specific meanings in one western word: (a) intent to action, (b) action to

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10 *ibid*. p. 30

11 *ibid*. p. 55

12 *ibid* . p.90 and cf. 84 ff for the details

affect the next life. To begin with Schumann made a mistake by using intention (Absicht) for the term saṅkhāra. The term intention does not apply to rebirth because there is usually no intention to be reborn. The inadequacy of the word is shown by Schumann's own statement that he himself was not satisfied with his chosen word.[13]

On the other hand as soon as he introduced the word 'intention' he should have realized that a subject is also implied. It is a primary fact in the teachings of the Buddha that there is no agent or activator of different mental states. In other words subjectivity is an illusion and there is only objectivity. A saṅkhāra is an objective event.

Schumann thinks there is a historical development of saṅkhāra as follows: (p. 84 ff.)

(i) The earliest meaning is that saṅkhāra as one khandha refers to emotion or affect (the psychological point of view).

(ii) Then saṅkhāra as a paccaya (condition) is a later development out of khandha and the

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13 Schumann p. 45

meaning changes to intention. It then has to be combined with the theory of *kamma*.

(iii) *Saṅkhāra* is used freely in the sense of 'intention'. Schumann thinks there is no special philosophical sense.

(iv) *Saṅkhāra* as the *saṅkhata* (in a general sense) he considers a later development out of *saṅkhāra* as *paccaya*. Moreover he thinks it applied first to the five *khandhas* as a person and secondarily to what he wrongly calls 'extrakhandhic' objects, by which he means not *nibbāna* but external sense objects.

Schumann tries to establish a historical development of the term *saṅkhāra* without providing supporting evidence from *sutta*, *abhidhamma* and *aṭṭhakathā*. His main argument is that the pre-Buddhist sense is similar to his number one, then the peculiar Buddhist sense starts as number two, from which three and four then develop. If there is any evidence in the Pali it may be the fact that the *Mahānidāna sutta* does not give *saṅkhāra* as a *paccaya* and the *Nidāna saṃyutta* adds *saṅkhāra* to its twelve *paccayas*. But this point has been missed by Schumann.

It has been said that Schumann used the German word Absicht for saṅkhāra, meaning intention. He coined the word erabsichtet for saṅkhata. In order to show that the antonym of saṅkhata is asankhata, he coined a new word unerabsichtet to avoid translating it as 'unintended'. If the antonym of saṅkhāra is unintended then the meaning of asaṅkhata indicates nibbāna as an unintended goal.

II

Rune. E. A. Johansson in The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism devoted a chapter to the term saṅkhāra under the title The Dynamic Act. His major points are as follows.

(a) He made a compound with three words namely 'thing-constituting-process' for the term saṅkhāra.

(b) He gives four meanings of saṅkhāra; namely, perceived things, mental contents, activities and dynamic process.

(c) He used saṅkhara in (a) in the sense of the Pali sentence sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā.

(d) He classified vitakka, vicāra, pīti, etc., as in the category of mental contents and the

three *saṅkhāras*; namely, *vacī*, *citta* and *kāya* as in the category of activities.

(e) He says that the impression that the central meaning of *saṅkhāra* is dynamic is confirmed by its use as signifying magical power. In such cases the strengthened form *abhisaṅkhāra* 'super *saṅkhāra*. and the corresponding verb *abhisaṅkharoti* are usually preferred.[14]

(f) He states that *abhisaṅkhāra* can be seen as a stronger form of *saṅkhāra* but the types of processes referred to may not be very different. Perhaps all *saṅkhāras* were felt to have a touch of magic at that time.[15]

III

Th. Stcherbatsky

(a) He contends that the elements of existence were regarded as something similar to energies (*saṃskāra* = *saṃskṛta dharma*) rather than to substantial elements.[16]

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14 Johansson, p. 45

15 *ibid*. p. 46

16 Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic I* p. 5

(b) Since the energies never worked in isolation but always in mutual interdependence according to causal laws, they were called synergies or cooperators (*saṃskāra*).[17]

(c) He states that the analysis by early Buddhism discovered a world consisting of a flow of innumerable particulars, consisting on the one side of the affects of the five senses and on the other side of simple awareness accompanied by feelings (*vedanā*) ideas (*saṃjñā*) and volitions (*saṃskāra*) whether good volitions or bad ones.[18]

(d) Since all the physical and mental elements established by the pluralism of early Buddhism were admittedly interrelated elements or cooperating forces none of them could be viewed as ultimately real.[19]

(e) He states that 'The definitions of the will (*cetanā*) and of the force (*saṃskāra*) are indeed the same, 'what produces the manifestations (*abhi-saṃskaroti*) of combining elements

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17 *ibid*.

18 *ibid*.

19 Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic V.I* p.8

(*saṃskṛtam*)': it is a 'concerted agency'. Since all forces are agencies acting in some combination with other elements, we may in rendering this conception, for the sake of expediency, safely drop the word 'combining' and use 'forces' alone. There are some indications that originally there was only one *saṃskāra* in the Buddhist system, the will, and that gradually a whole catalogue of them was developed, some of the elements being entered into this group rather forcibly, with excuses. The most typical forces are the four forces of origination and decay, etc., which accompany every other element in life. Some details concerning them will be given in the sequel. In general all elements may be divided into substances and forces (*dravya* and *saṃskāra*). The forces are then divided into mental faculties, with the will as chief among them and non-mental (*citta-viprayukta*) forces, among which the origination and decay forces are the most typical. But even these latter forces are sometimes given a certain amount of substantiality (*dravyatopi santi*). The word and conception *saṃskāra* performs a conspicuous

part in all Indian philosophical systems. It usually means some latent mysterious power, which later on reveals itself in some patent fact. It sometimes is identified with the 'unknown' (*adṛṣṭa*) conceived as a force *sui generis*. Since every philosophy is bu. a search for the hidden reality as opposed to the patent surface of life, the importance of the conception of a *saṃskāra* is quite natural.[20]

(f) In describing sense perception he equates *vāsanā*=*saṃskāra*=*karma*=*cetanā*.[21]

(g) He asserts that 'a further feature of the Buddhist theory of causation consists in the contention that a thing never produces anything alone. It is followed by a result only if it combines with other elements which are therefore called co-factors (*saṃskāra*). Therefore the term dependent origination becomes synonymous with the term combined origination (*saṃskṛtatvam*).[22]

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20 *Central Conception* p. 20-21

21 *ibid*. p. 163

22 *ibid*. p. 127

IV

I.B.Horner

(a) She translated the term saṅkhāra as inherent habitual tendencies. They effect and synthesise (abhisaṅkharoti) the groups of grasping with the possible exception of the rūpa or kāya.

(b) When saṅkhāra occurs in the context of paṭicca-samuppāda she translated it as 'kamma formations' or formations,[23] following Oldenberg and Geiger (Gestaltungen).

(c) When the term saṅkhāra appears in compound with kāya, vacī and citta or mano she translates it as 'activity' with the exception of āyu-saṅkhāra. Then she rendered the meaning as 'properties'.[24]

(d) She believes that in the Saṅkhāruppattisutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the term saṅkhāra has been used in the unusual sense 'purposeful intellection'.[25]

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23 Horner, I.B. - The Middle Length Sayings I p. xxiv

24 ibid. p. xxv

25 ibid. Vol. III p. 139

V

Nyanatiloka Bhikkhu

(a) He translated *saṅkhāra* as 'Zusammengesetztes or Schwungkraft, Bildung, zum Dasein fuhrende Tatenbildung, Geistesbildungen'. He used the term '*karma* formation' for *saṅkhāra* as a *paccaya* and mental formations for *saṅkhārak-khandha*[26] when writing in English.

VI

A.K. Warder

(a) Professor A. K. Warder in his major work on Buddhism used the word 'force' for *saṅkhāra* consistently throughout the book.[27] In his *Introduction to Pali* he says:

> *saṃkhāro*: force, energy, activity, combination, process, instinct, habit (a very difficult word to find an exact

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26 Schumann, p.2 cf. Nyanatiloka - *Guide Through The Abhidhamma Pitaka*

27 Warder, *Indian Buddhism* p. 86

equivalent for; 'force', with a restricted technical sense attached to it, is probably the best. saṃkhāro means the force, or forces, manifested in the combination of atoms into all the things in the universe, in the duration of such combinations -- as in the life-span of a living being -- and in the instincts and habits of living beings, which are to be allayed by the practise of meditation (jhāna). It is one of the five basic groups (khandha) of kinds of things in the universe: matter, sensation, perception and consciousness being the others)[28]

(b) He used the word "synthesised" for saṃskṛta[29] and "unsynthesised" for asaṃskṛta.[30]

(c) He states that the Rajagirikas and Siddharthikas are said to have held that principles are not conjoined with other principles and that mental

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28 Warder, Introduction to Pali - p. 277

29 Warder, Indian Buddhism - p. 401

30 ibid. p. 344

principles (*caitasikas*=the forces) do not exist.[31]

(d) Professor Warder's introduction to Venerable *Ñāṇamoli's* translation of *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, *The Path of Discrimination*, gives a more precise description of *saṅkhāra* as follows:

> *Saṅkhāra*, which often is synonymous with *dhamma*, and its past participle and adjective *saṅkhata*, seem to have no satisfying English equivalents.

Commenting on Ñāṇamoli's equivalent he says that - 'formation' and 'formed' are possibly less likely to be misunderstood than 'determination' (Scheme 1). A *saṅkhāra* is something like a particle of energy, a force (IB) conditioned and conditioning. Though dynamic, it shows the aspect of constancy, which here means endless repetition according to the regularity of nature. The *saṅkhāras* are sometimes synonymous with all *dhammas*, but sometimes the term appears in a restricted sense for one of the aggregates, that of the forces which operate in the stream of conscious-

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31 *ibid*. p. 328

ness. The etymology indicates a 'putting together' or 'synthesis' (cf. 'synthesised' in IB) and the earliest (pre-Buddhist) recorded usages a making ready or making perfect, but this does not clarify the technical sense in Buddhist philosophy. Mahānāma as we have seen makes a category of the 'synthesised' or 'formed', which is equivalent to all the dhammas. The most obscure use of saṅkhāra in Buddhist philosophy is as the condition for consciousness in the sequence of conditioned origination, where it is said to mean the forces of the body, speech and thought (IB 114). This should mean the forces of all previous actions, acting on the stream of consciousness, but the formulation is different. The most important point about these three is that they are meritorious or demeritorious or imperturbable (S ii 82).[32]

32 Ñāṇamoli, Path of Discrimination pp lxii- lxiii

VII

F. L. Woodward

(a) He used effort for saṅkhāra with the prefix sa.[33]

(b) 'In this case, monks a certain one plans planned bodily actions joined with harm...[34] planned action of speech, planned action of thought joined with harm'(kāyasaṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti savyāpajjhaṃ).

VIII

Venerable Ñāṇamoli

(a) In his translations of the Visuddhimagga and the Paṭisambhidāmagga he used the word formation for saṅkhāra.[35] For saṅkhāra with kāya, vacī and citta he used body, verbal and mental formation throughout the translation. He used

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33 Gradual Sayings - translation of Aṅguttaranikāya Vol.II p. 160

34 ibid. p. 238

35 Ñāṇamoli, Path of Purification Vol. I p. 296

the term formation for *saṅkhāra* consistently and determination for *saṅkhāra* in some other translations.

IX

G.P. Malalasekera

(a) There are three instances of the term in *A Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*. The late Dr. G. P. Malalasekera translated the term as follows.

In the *Saṅkhata sutta* he used the word conditioned for *saṅkhata*. In the *Saṅkhāra* sutta he states that some people accumulate acts of body, speech and mind that are discordant, others those that are harmonious, yet others those that are both discordant and harmonious.[36] In the *Saṅkhāruppatti sutta*, the 120th *sutta* of the *Majjhima nikāya*, it is stated that a monk who possesses the five *saṅkhāras* (plastic forces) of faith, virtue, learning, munificence and wisdom, if he cultivates and develops them, can be reborn in any condition or world

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36 Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names* p. 982

he may desire and that he can even thereby win *nibbāna*.[37]

Various dictionaries attempt to give English equivalents and possible meanings of the term *saṅkhāra*.

The Pali Text Society's *Pali English Dictionary* states that the term is one of the most difficult terms in Buddhist metaphysics. For the blending of the subjective-objective view of the world and of happening, peculiar to the East, is so complete that it is almost impossible for occidental terminology to get at the root of its meaning in a translation.[38]

Among the many possible translations The Pali Text Society's dictionary offers the following: preparation, get up, coefficient (of consciousness as well as of physical life cp. *viññāṇa*), constituent, constituent potentiality (pl), synergies, cause, combination, composition, aggregate, life element for *āyu-saṅkhāra*.

The next class of meanings includes the following: essential conditions, antecedents or synergy (co-ordinated activity), mental co-efficients.

In the *Critical Pāli Dictionary* under *abhisaṅkharoti*, *saṅkhāra* appears to be translated as 'potential energy'[38a], and *asaṅkhata* as 'not prepared.'[38b]

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37. *ibid.*
38. *Pali-English Dictionary* of PTS, p.664.
38a *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, Vol.1, p.374.

38b *ibid.* p.491

X

In his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary Edgerton thinks that the usage is technically specialized and translates saṅkhāra in the plural as 'pre-dispositions', the effect of past deeds and experience as conditioning a new state.[39]

XI

Erich Frauwallner

Frauwallner believes that the term saṅkhāra, for which he has given as German equivalent 'Gestaltungen', has different meanings. He gives the past participle as 'Gestalt'. These two terms in German can be translated into English as 'formation' and 'formed' respectively. According to him saṅkhāra means everything that has arisen or become, that has sprung out of a cause and it is subject to impermanence. Also it means 'something that is put in or a condition of readiness which further influences and operates'.[40]

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39 Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary p. 542

40 Frauwallner p. 201

He asserts that a wish to be born again will ultimately lead to a rebirth and that inclination towards good or bad is called formation towards good or bad (*puññābhisaṅkhāra*, *apuññābhisaṅkhāra*) and affects the consciousness in the next birth. According to Frauwallner, passages are found in which *saṅkhāras* are defined as the six masses of the impulses of the will (*als die sechs Massen von Willensregungen=ṣaṭ cetanākāyāḥ*) which direct themselves to the six objects of the sense organs, an idea which is taken over in the later 'Dogmatik')[41]

XII

Etienne Lamotte in his *Histoire Du Bouddhisme Indien* discussed the Buddhist concept of *saṅkhāra* and translated it as *formations*, similar to the English word 'formation'. He says suffering does not result only from the painful bodily or mental sensations which can affect us. It is inherent in all the *formations* (*saṅkhāra*); that is, in all the psycho-physical phenomena of existence. There entities continually appear and disappear. Being transitory, they are unstable and are

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41 *ibid*. p. 202

linked to suffering. They do not constitute an I, nor do they pertain to the 'I'.[42]

His translation of the phrase Avidyāpratyayāt saṃskārāḥ is 'the karmic formations are conditioned by ignorance'. Also he states that they are actions of body, speech and thought.[43] They are voluntary actions, morally good or bad. When he was discussing the five khandhas he used the word volition for saṅkhārakkhandha[44].

XIII

Louis De La Vallée Poussin

For the term saṃskāra, La Vallée Poussin used the phrase l'état d' acte in French.[45]

According to La Vallée Poussin saṃskāras are the statement (account) of actions in the previous life. The series of previous lives, in as much as it makes actions good or bad, etc., that is what is meant by saṃskāras.[46]

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42 Lamotte p. 29

43 ibid. p. 39

44 ibid. p. 40

45 ibid Vol. 2 p.84

46 La Vallée Poussin, vol.2,p.63

He further states that a fool not understanding that conditioned origination is merely *saṃskāras*, that is conditioned *dharmas* (*saṃskṛta*), generates belief in the self (*ātman*) and the ego and he performs actions in respect of body, speech and mind. These actions are *saṃskāras* resulting from ignorance (*avidyā*).[47]

The attachment groups *upādānaskandhas* are called *saṃskāras*, are so called because they condition the conditioned, that is to say because they create and determine the five groups (*skandhas*).[48]

He asserts that the whole of mental elements or principles (*caittas*) under *viprayuktā dharmāḥ* are included in the *saṃskāraskandha*. According to him, sensation (*vedanā*) and recognition (*saṃjñā*) each constitutes a separate group (*skandha*) and the other principles are included in the *saṃskāraskandha*.[49] The unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) does not correspond to any concept and it is not included in any group (*skandha*) as it is neither matter nor sensation. The distinction of past does not exist in respect of unconditioned (*inconditionné*).

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47 *ibid*

48 La Vallée Poussin, vol 4, p.80

49 *ibid* vol. 1 p. 40

He states that according to one opinion the unconditioned, which is the termination of the groups is neither a sphere (*āyatana*) nor an element (*dhātu*).[50]

XIV

Sir Charles Eliot

In his *Hinduism and Buddhism* Sir Charles Eliot says that *saṅkhāra* means compounding, making anything artificial and elaborate. It may be literally translated as synthesis or confection, and is often used in the general sense of phenomena since all phenomena are compound.[51] He mentions the three *saṅkhāras* body or deed, word and thought. According to Sir Charles, in later literature the *saṅkhāras* become a category with fifty two divisions and these are mostly mental or at least subjective states. The starting point is contact (*phasso*) and then follow sensation, perception thought, reflection, memory and a series of dispositions or states such as attention, effort, joy,torpor, stupidity, fear, doubt, lightness of body or mind, pity, envy, worry, pride etc.

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50 *ibid* vol. 1.p.42

51 Eliot p. 188

His contention is that as European thought does not class all these items under one heading or in other words has no idea equivalent to sañkhāra, it is not surprising that no adequate rendering has been found, especially as Buddhism regards everything as mere becoming, not fixed existence and hence does not distinguish sharply between a process and a result —— between the act of preparing and a preparation. Conformations, confections, syntheses, co-efficients, tendencies, potentialities have all been used as equivalents but he proposes to use the Pali word as a rule.

'In some passages the word phenomena is an adequate literary equivalent if it is remembered that phenomena are not thought of apart from a perceiving subject: in others some word like predispositions or tendencies is a more luminous rendering because the sañkhāras are the potentialities for good and evil action existing in the mind as a result of kamma.'[52]

XV

Edward J. Thomas

In the History of Buddhist Thought, E.J. Thomas when discussing the conditions of the conditioned

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52 Ibid. p . 189

origination translates *saṅkhāras* as 'aggregates'.[53] He believes that *saṅkhāra* includes everything that may come into the mind, permanent qualities like memory, ideas, good and bad impulses or dispositions as well as unconscious habits.[54] As the second member of the conditioned origination he translated *saṅkhāra* as aggregates, syntheses, compounds, potter with wheel and pots [sic] and he says that *saṅkhāra* gives no idea of the meaning.[55] Further he says that the *saṅkhāras* are chiefly conscious and unconscious manifestation of will. They were probably intended to include all the states of mind distinct from the other *khandhas* as well as forces or traits of the individual outside consciousness.[56] Following Vasubandhu he says *saṅkhāras* are consequently divided into (1) *saṅkhāras* associated with consciousness (2) those not associated with consciousness.[57]

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53 Thomas E.J.p . 59

54 *ibid* p . 61

55 *ibid* p . 70 & p. 162

56 *ibid*

57 *ibid*

The above fifteen Pali scholars and the Pali English Dictionary (Stede) have attempted to give the meaning and the English equivalent of the term saṅkhāra. It is evident that there is no consensus among the scholars on an English equivalent for the term saṅkhāra. I.B. Horner and Nyanatiloka Bhikkhu used term 'karma formation'. Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu, E. Frauwallner and Lamotte used the term 'formation'. The others used different English equivalents.

This shows that it is difficult to translate into English. But our concern is based on the fact that the term saṅkhāra is highly important to the understanding of the philosophy of the Buddha. If there is no suitable word or group of words to convey the meaning accurately, this poses a major obstacle for the understanding of philosophical discussions.

In order to find a suitable equivalent in English the various contexts in which this term appears in the sutta, abhidhamma and aṭṭhakathā have to be explored and the following chapters may prove useful in finding a solution to the issue in question.

CHAPTER 2

PERIOD PRIOR TO THE BUDDHA AND NON-BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

Before an attempt is made to discover how the term saṅkhāra is used in the time of the Buddha and by later Buddhists it may be useful to examine in what context the term is used by pre-Buddhist thinkers in the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, etc. In Sanskrit literature before the time of the the Buddha the root kṛ with the prefix sam is found in many passages. In the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā men are said to have prepared (saṃ...akran)[58] ambrosia. The past participle is also found. In one passage the two Aśvins are described as not injuring a well-prepared sacrifice (na saṃskṛtam pra mimito).[59] In this context saṃskṛta is used in the sense of 'prepared'. The Śatapathabrāhmaṇa carries various meanings as follows:

> Tā vā etāḥ Ṛtvijām eva dakṣiṇā anyaṃ vā eta etasyātmānaṃ saṃskurvanty. etaṃ yajñam ṛṅmayaṃ yajurmayaṃ sāmamayam āhutimayaṃ so 'syāmusmiṁ loka ātmā bhavati tadye mājījananteti tasmād

58 Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, 3.35.8

59 ibid. 5.76.2

rtvigbhya eva daksinā dadyān nānrtvigbhyah[60]
Indeed these fees to the priests prepare another self (body) for him. This is the sacrifice consisting of rc, yajus, sāman and oblations. This (sacrifice) is his self in the next world. Therefore he thinks: 'they (who) created me'. Therefore he should give fees just to the priests and not to those who are not priests.

atha tad vasatkrte juhoti. esa vai vasatkāro ya esa tapati sa esa mrtyus tad enam uparistān mrtyoh samskaroti tad enam ato janayati sa etam mrtyum atimucyate yajño vā asyātmā bhavati tadyajña eva bhūtvaitan mrtyum atimucyata eteno hāsya sarve yajñakratava etam mrtyum atimuktāh.[61]
Now in that he makes an offering after the sound vasat that sound vasat is itself the one which shines. It is death. It purifies (samskaroti) him after death and causes him to be reborn from it. He escapes from that death. Surely the sacrifice becomes his

60 Śatapathabrāhmana, IV.3.4.5

61 Śatapathabrāhmana, XI .2.2.5

> self. Therefore through becoming the actual sacrifice he escapes from that death. By this means indeed all his special sacrifices escape from that death.

In the above two contexts in the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa we find the idea of preparing a new body (ātman) in a future life, by means of a sacrifice. This comes close to the Buddhist context where saṅkhāras produce a new body in rebirth. Priests or Brāhmaṇas are responsible for saṃskṛ everything. Besides preparing, offering, there are contexts where saṃskṛ means constructing (an altar), completing, putting together.

In the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa there is a passage describing the fire (altar) (agni) as an animal and as constructed complete and entire (sa eṣa paśur yad agniḥ. so' traiva sarvaḥ kṛtsnaḥ saṃskṛtaḥ).[62] The term saṃskṛtaḥ is used in the sense of constructed. This meaning is found in another passage as follows: How does that fire altar of his become constructed complete and entire in every brick? (Katham asyaiṣo' gniḥ sarvaḥ kṛtsnaḥ iṣṭakāyāṃ iṣṭakāyāṃ saṃskṛto bhavatīti).[63] The gerundial form saṃskṛtya is also to be found. There is a reference to

62 Śatapathabrāhmaṇa VIII. I.4.3

63 ibid. VIII.1.4.5.

ascending to the same world after completing it (*imam eva tal lokaṃ saṃskṛtya samārohan*.[64] The word *saṃskṛtaḥ* is used to denote the accomplishment of a task in a passage that may be translated as, 'This whole altar has now been finished' (*atraiṣa sarvo' gniḥ saṃskṛtaḥ*).[65] In the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* the root *kṛ* with the prefix *saṃ* is also used in a verbal form meaning to restore or to put together.

> *atha yad agnā utsādayati, ātmānam evāsyaitat saṃskṛtya śiraḥ pratidadhāti*.[66]
>
> Now after he places it on the altar, he puts together the body of the fire altar and reunites it with its head.[66a]

In a different passage the root *saṃskṛ* in the form *samaskurvan* is used in the meaning of reviving.

> *etad va enam eṣyantaṃ purastad annena samaskurvan etābhir āhutibhiḥ*.[67] They revived him going in front with these offerings.

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64 *ibid*. VIII.2.1.1.

65 *ibid* VIII.6.2.1.

66 *ibid* IX.2.1.22   66a following Eggeling part IV.p.188

67 *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* IX.2.2.4.

> *taṃ yatra devāḥ samaskurvan tad asminn etavā vīryam adadhuḥ*.[68]
>
> As the gods revived him, they strengthened him with this (offering).

In addition to the *Ṛgveda* and the *Brāhmaṇas*, some of the *Upaniṣads* also make use of the verb *saṃskṛ*. Thus in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the gerund *saṃskṛtya* is used to describe the purification of butter in the course of purification of a sacrifical offering (*āvṛtājyaṃ saṃskṛtya, puṃsā nakṣatreṇa manthaṃ saṃnīya juhoti*).[69] In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* the verbal form *saṃskaroti* is used with the meaning of imagine (perform in one's mind).

> *tayor anyataraṃ manasā saṃskaroti brahmā*.[70]
>
> The priest performs one of those two with his mind.

Also in this *Upaniṣad* one finds the verbal from *saṃskurvanti*. Here the context is that it is the custom of the demons to have no faith and to make no sacrifices. They decorate the bodies of those who have died. The verb *saṃskṛ* is used in the meaning of decorating.

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68 *ibid*. IX.4.2.16

69 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, VI.3.1.

70 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, iv.16.2

> *asurāṇām hy eṣopaniṣat pretasya śarīram bhikṣayā vasanenālaṅkāreṇeti saṃskurvanti*.[71]
> They decorate the body of the one who has died with what they have received by begging, with garments and ornaments.

In the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad* the *adhvaryu* priest makes ready (*saṃskaroti*) his self which is connected to the offering and which is comprised of actions(...*tad etad aiṣṭikaṃ karmamayam ātmānam adhvaryuḥ saṃskaroti*..).[72] From the above quotations it is clear that the authors of this literature previous to the time of the Buddha used the verb from which *saṃskāra* is derived in various ways as a finite verb and as a past participle and gerund and having the general sense of 'prepare'.

II

In the later philosophy after the time of the Buddha the term *saṅkhāra* has been used in very diverse meanings. In the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* it is stated that

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71 *ibid*. VIII 8.5.

72 *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad*, II.6

Saṃyoga-vibhāgavegānāṃ karmma samānam.[73]

'Action is an independent cause of conjuction, disjunction and impulse.'

This means that action produces conjunction or disjunction or impulses (i.e. 'inertia' = continuing motion), the last in an ongoing process until the substance is obstructed by some obstacle or brought down by gravity.

A later passage mentions *saṃskāra* specifically as follows:

Nodanādādyamiṣoḥ karmma, tat-karmma-kāritāt ca saṃskārād uttaraṃ, tathottaram uttaraṃ ca.[74]

'The original action of the arrow is from impelling (shooting), the next is from the inertia (*saṃskāra*) produced by that action and similarly the next and the next.'

Praśastapāda's commentary on the Vaiśesika sūtra explains:

Saṃskāras trividah: vego bhāvanā sthitisthāpakaśca.[75]

Vega is an impulse produced from the 4 elements and the action of the mind. *Bhāvanā* is the development from the effect of experience on the soul and appears as memory. *Sthitisthāpaka* represents elasticity or returning to its original shape after being distorted as in a solid substance such as a bow, branch, horn, bone, etc. after being bent.[76]

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73. Vs. 1. 1. 20

74. *ibid.* V.1.17

75. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 646

76. A later manual, Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṃgraha* copies this explanation. Foucher, p. 82; Also see Warder's *Outline of Indian Philosophy* p. 112

Patañjali in his Yoga Sūtras employs the term saṃskāra in the sense of some kind of mental disposition.

viramapratyayābhyāsapūrvah saṃskāraśeṣo'nyaḥ.[77]

Here Patañjali states that when all the states of mind cease only the saṃskāras remain.

Vyāsa's commentary on this states that this kind of mental state is called asamprajñata samādhi. This state is achieved only when there is no object for concentration or when the mind is free from objects.

When the yogins acquire insight they suppress new saṃskāras.

tajjaḥ saṃskāro' nyasaṃskārapratibandhī.[78]

'The saṃskāra produced from that obstructs other saṃskāras.' Patañjali demonstrates that when yogins suppress saṃskāras, at a later stage saṃskāras are produced again in an ongoing process.

pariṇāmatāpasaṃskāraduḥkhair guṇavṛttivirodhācca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ.[79]

Everything is unsatisfactory to the wise because of unhappiness from the consequences, worry and the saṃskāras and also because of the opposition of qualities and actions.

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77. The Yoga of Patañjali by Yardi, 1. 18

78. ibid. 1. 50

79. ibid. 2. 15

The commentary to the above statement indicates that there is a feeling of happiness due to attachment . Similarly everyone hates objects which cause unhappiness.

Vyāsa continues with his commentary stating that there is no enjoyment without possible harm to another. The enjoyment of objects is therefore called ignorance. When the senses are calmed and there is no necessity to go after objects, there is happiness. But if due to restlessness one goes after objects for enjoyment there is unhappiness. Continued enjoyment of senses does not lead to renunciation. As a matter fact it increases attachment. Then what is the unhappiness of samskāras? Experience of pleasure and unhappiness will increase the accumulation of more samskāras resulting from action. Those who suffer from the bad influence of their own deeds should try to attain correct knowledge of self by giving up the mistaken notion of ' me ' and 'mine,' etc. Ignorance is the root cause of unhappiness and sorrow; wisdom is the cause of eliminating ignorance.

In discussing nirodhaparināma Patañjali stresses the importance of samskāra. He states that nirodhaparināma is the transformation of the mind which becomes suppressed by the condition of nirodha in the interval between those samskāras which are disappearing and those which are coming into being (vyutthānanirodhasamskāayor abhibhavaprādurbhāvau nirodhakṣaṇacittānvayo nirodhapariṇāmaḥ).[80]

80. The Yoga of Patañjali, 111 .9

In the next *sūtra* it is stated that from the impression of *nirodhapariṇāma* there is peace (*tasya praśāntavāhitā saṃskārāt*).[81] In a later *sūtra* of Patañjali's, *saṃskāra* has a connotation similar to that which we find in Buddhist texts:

> *saṃskārasākṣātkaraṇāt pūrvajātijñānam.*
>
> By observation of the *saṃskāras* there is understanding of earlier lives.

The commentary tries to explain what is meant by *saṃskāras* in the *sūtra*. It says that *saṃskāras* are of two kinds. First are those appearing as *vāsanās* causing memory and fetters. Second are those due to the fruition of good and bad actions done in previous lives. In this instance Vyāsa introduced an appropriate narration from Bhagavān Jaigīṣavya, which proves what is best for getting rid of unhappiness. Bhagavān Jaigīṣavya is supposed to have acquired knowledge of ten cycles of creation. Because of his advanced attainment his intellect has not been clouded. He also experienced the unhappiness of hell and animal lives and on numerous occasions he enjoyed the pleasure of the divine world and as a human being. But Bhagavān said that all these are nothing but unhappiness. Finally he said that the state of desire is nothing but unhappiness. When the desire which produced unhappiness is removed, the contentment is said to become pleasant without restriction.

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81. *ibid.* III. 10

82. *ibid.* III. 18

In the following passage Patañjali deals with certain difficulties relating to cause and effect.

<u>jātideśakālavyavahitānām</u> <u>apy</u> <u>ānantaryam</u> <u>smṛtisaṃskārayor</u> <u>ekarūpatvāt</u>.[83]

Although separated by class, place and time there is a continuity of memory and <u>saṃskāra</u> because of having a single form.

Here the commentary states that, although one may have been born as a human being, on several occasions one may be born as an animal. The point here is that although there is separation in different births there is no break in the relation of cause and effect.

As <u>saṃskāra</u> is connected with memory, it suggests a similar mental disposition having a similar nature. While a <u>yogin</u> tries to control his mind in the world of reality, there is a tendency to incline towards illusion. In between these states there arise other conditions or ideas from the <u>saṃskāras</u> (<u>tacchidreṣu</u> <u>pratyayāntarāṇi</u> <u>saṃskārebhyaḥ</u>).[84]

83. <u>ibid.</u> IV. 9

84. <u>ibid.</u> IV. 27

Vyāsa comments that sometimes it generates such thoughts as 'I', 'mine', etc. in the controlled mind. These thoughts are coming from the previous saṃskāras. This kind of thought will come to mind until one eliminates ignorance.

An important early Saṅkhya text is the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In one passage it is said that, when dharma, etc. cease to act as causes on account of the attainment of complete understanding, the puruṣa continues in embodied form through the influence of the saṃskāras. This process is compared to the spinning of a wheel (through inertia) which continues to move on account of accumulated momentum after the initial pressure has stopped.

> saṃyagjñānādhigamād dharmādīnāṃ akāraṇaprāptau tiṣṭhati saṃskāravaśāt cakrabhramivad dhṛtaśarīraḥ.[85]

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85 The Sāṅkhyakārikā, LXVII

A more recent Sāṅkhya text ascribed to an ancient saint Kapila declares that all the saṃskāras are contained in consciousness (tathāśeṣasaṃskārādhāratvāt).[86] Furthermore it states that one retains bodily form as long as one has even a minute trace of saṃskāras (saṃskāraleśatas tatsiddhiḥ).[87] Kapila maintains that a single saṃskāra causes experience but that there are not separate saṃskāras one for each experience (ekaḥ saṃskāraḥ kriyāniḥpravartako natu pratikriyaṃ saṃskārabhedā bahukalpanāprasakteḥ).[88] This is to counter the objection to the concept that a liberated person may retain a body and continue to live in the world since the prior saṃskāras are destroyed at liberation.

Thus it is clear that in the philosophical and religious literature of the period before and after the time of the Buddha the word saṃskāra and words derived from the verb saṃskṛ were used in various meanings. In the Vedas the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads different forms of the verb saṃskṛ are employed to denote such actions as preparing and putting together. Later

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86 The Sāṅkhya Aphorisms of Kapila, II.42

87 ibid.

88 ibid. V. 120

writers such as Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda, Patañjali, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and Kapila use the term *saṃskāra* either in the sense of inertia or in an apparently similar sense with reference to consciousness. Patañjali's writing tends to imply that *saṃskāra* denotes something in this world, in the previous world and in the next world. He uses the system of Yoga to identify the manifestation of the *saṃskāras* and to provide a means for their suppression.

Saṃskāra is also found in other non-philosophical meanings; for example, in certain Brahmanical rituals. There the term is used in the sense of purifying or consecrating, especially with respect to some of the major events of life such as birth, marriage and death. Some rituals may be performed even before a child is born in the interests of an auspicious and successful birth. The *Manusmṛti* mentions twelve of these important *saṃskāras*.[88a] *Saṃ+kṛ* and its derivatives in Sanskrit are further used for preparing food, decorating pots, correcting a calculation, perfecting language, polishing gems and other non philosophical shades of meaning deriving from its original sense of doing something properly or making it right or preparing it. Though none of this has any direct bearing on the technical

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88a *Manusmṛti*, 2.26

sense in Buddhism it is interesting as a background of the general sense of _saṃskāra_ in the language.

More could be added as similarities of usage and differences, between Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions: is there a special Buddhist usage or is it the same as the non-Buddhist? There seems to be a general sense of on-going impulse or energy or propulsion, but the precise technical senses are determined by other concepts in the given tradition, such as the assumption of a 'substance' or 'soul' or alternatively of impermanence.

CHAPTER 3

SAMSKĀRA IN THE ABHIDHARMAKOŚA OF VASUBANDHU

We have already examined the way in which the term saṃskāra was used prior to the advent of Buddhism and in the non- Buddhist traditions.

Before proceeding to the Theravāda texts in Pali, we should look at another Buddhist tradition. The Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu will serve as a useful compendium of a Buddhist school using Sanskrit. In this chapter we are not trying to become involved in controversial discussions over the date of Vasubandhu, the reasons for distinguishing Vasubandhu the Vijñānavādin from the Sautrāntika Vasubandhu and so on.[89] The date of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is usually taken to be the middle of the 5th century A.D. We are merely concerned here with saṃskāra in the Abhidharmakośa as a Buddhist source independent of the Theravāda.

In the Abhidharmakośa and its bhāṣya, Vasubandhu appears to have treated the concept of saṃskāra in the same way as that of the Suttapiṭaka of the Pali canon. There are a few exceptions, asaṃskṛta, etc.

89. Warder, Indian Buddhism. pp. 444-445

The analysis of saṃskāra in the Abhidharmakośa will be based on the following six headings:

1. as a general term saṃskṛta
2. as a pratyaya
3. as a skandha
4. āyussaṃskāra
5. vitarka and vicāra and cittasaṃskāra
6. asaṃskṛta

I

As a general term saṃskṛta

Everything in the entire world is called saṃskṛta dharmas as opposed to asaṃskṛta dharmas. According to Vasubandhu all the saṃskṛta dharmas are born with saṃskṛta characteristics (sarvaṃ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇaiḥ).[90] They are birth (jāti), change of what remains (sthiti), old age (jarā) and impermanence (anityatā).[91] These four characteristics are common to almost all the schools of Buddhism. The Aṅguttaranikāya gives the same three characteristics as uppāda, vayo and thitassaaññathatta.[92]

There are seventy-two saṃskṛta dharmas out of the seventy five dharmas recognised in the tradition and three asaṃskṛta.

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90. AK. II . 23

91. ibid II . 45

92. A.I.152

According to Vasubandhu, 'the _saṃskṛta_ _dharmas_ are the five groups of matter etc.' (_Te_ _punaḥ_ _saṃskṛtā_ _dharmā_ _rūpādi_ - _skandhapañcakam_). Then the _Bhāṣya_ adds that ' these _saṃskṛta_ _dharmas_ are the groups of matter (_rūpa_), sensation (_vedanā_), recognition (_saṃjñā_), _saṃskāra_ and consciousness (_vijñāna_). They are made _kṛta_ by conditions (_pratyaya_) which have come together(_sametya_) and arisen together (_saṃbhūya_). For there is nothing which is produced by a single condition (_pratyaya_). There is no contradiction with respect to future (_dharmas_) on account of their having the same nature just like milk and fuel.'[93]

The second half of the _kārikā_ 7 states that, 'They themselves are time and the subject matter of discourse. They are possessing the possibility of release and have conditions' (_Tā_ _eva_ _adhvā_ _kathāvastu_ _saniḥsārāḥ_ _savastukāḥ_). According to _Bhāṣya_, ' These _saṃskṛta_ are time (_adhvan_) as they are past, present and future or since they are devoured by impermanence. Discourse (_kathā_) is sentence. The subject matter of the discourse (_kathāvastu_) is said to be _saṃskṛta_ from an understanding of the significance of discourse together with its meaning. For otherwise the _Prakaraṇa_ book would be contradicted. '' The bases of the subject matter of the discourse are comprehended by the eighteen _dhātus_.'' _Niḥsāra_ denotes possibility of release; that is, the extinction of everything that is _saṃskṛta_.[94]

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93. Ak. I. 7

94. _ibid._

Further the Bhāṣya states that 'Thus these saṃskṛta dharmas are said to be having release. They are said to be possessed of condition (vastu) since they have a cause (hetu). Indeed the Vaibhāṣikas declare that the word vastu means hetu. These expressions are synonyms of saṃskṛta dharmas.' [95]

The term saṃskṛta in the Abhidharmakośa is equivalent to saṃskāra.[96] Commenting on this point Yaśomitra states that the saṃskāra becomes saṃskṛta when the saṃskāra shows its appearance.[97]

In the Abhidharmakośa all the saṃskṛta dharmas are classified under three major schemes: skandha, āyatana and dhātu. This classification is common to almost all the schools of Buddhism.

As in the Pali Tipiṭaka, saṃskṛta dharmas are classified as upādānaskandhas (attachment groups). In this connection, Vasubandhu gives three reasons as to why these are called upādānaskandhas: (1) they originate from passions (kleśa), (2) they are governed by passions, (3) they give birth to passions.[98]

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95. Ak.I.7

96. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism. p.22

97. ibid.

98. AK. I. 8

2

as a pratyaya

Vasubandhu explains conditioned origination (pratītya samutpāda) as: from the appearence of this, this will follow (asmin sati idam bhavati).[99] In the previous section we saw Vasubandhu's conception of samskrta dharmas. That these dharmas in concert (samskrtatva) condition the others is called pratītya-samutpāda. All the samskrta dharmas of the past, present and future are regarded as the pratītyasamutpāda as well as pratītya samutpanna dharma, as both have the same characteristics (traiyādvikāh sarve samskrtā dharmāh pratītyasamutpādah ata eva ca pratītyasamutpannā iti na kaś cid viśesah).[100]

The kārikās 20 - 37 describe conditioned origination as consisting of twelve links in detail with the second link being sanskāra. In the Abhidharmakośa, Vasubandhu elucidates karma as volition (cetanā) and it is a voluntary action (cetayitvā karanam). According to Vasubandhu cetanā is a mental action and it is one kind of karman, which is mental as opposed to physical.[101] Vasubandhu has three karmans, kāya, vāk, and manas. Perhaps, cetanā is the same as citta karman.

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99. AK. III. 18, 28, see also, Stcherbatsky, p.28

100. AKV. p. 291

101. ibid. III.21

However, there is no mention of saṃskāras. Again Vasubandhu has puṇya as karman not as saṃskāra.[102] This is certainly different from the Theravāda formulation. This concept of karma comes under saṃskāra in conditioned origination. Vasubandhu was of the opinion that saṃskāra in the pratītya samutpāda is previous actions.[103]

3

as a skandha

We saw in section 1 of this chapter that there are five skandhas described by Vasubandhu and the fourth menber is saṃskāra-skandha. All the saṃskṛta dharmas are grouped as skandhas and saṃskāraskandha is other than rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, and vijñānaskandha.[104] According to the Bhāṣya saṃskāraskandha is said to be the six volitions because they are important saṃskāras. Volition is important in the abhisaṃskaraṇa because it has the nature of actions. The Bhagavant stated that it (saṃskāra) conditions the conditioned (abhisaṃskaroti).[105] The eighty thousand dharmaskandhas are either vāk or manas and are included respectively in rūpa and saṃskāra.[106]

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102. AK. p.227

103. ibid. III.21

104. AK.I.15

105. ibid. p.10

106. ibid. I.25

According to the *bhāṣya* on *kārikā* 27, other *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus* should be included in the same manner taking into account their characteristics. Then of the five *skandhas*, namely *śīla*, *samādhi*, *prajñā*, *vimukti* and *jñānadarśana*, the *śīlaskandha* is included in the *rūpaskandha*. The remainder are included in the *saṃskāraskandha*.[107] This seems different from Theravāda.

4

āyussaṃskāra and *jīvita saṃskāra*

There is an interesting discussion in the *Bhāṣya* under *jīvitendriya* on prolonging the *jīvita saṃskāra* of the Buddha by using his supernormal powers. The Buddha is said to have prolonged his *jīvita saṃskāra* for three months only as he had taught the *dhamma* completely and there was no reason for him to stay on.[108]

The Buddha declared that meditating with four supernatural powers he could live till the end of a *kalpa*.[109] Then, Vasubandhu shows four situations in respect of *āyus saṃskāra* and *jīvita-saṃskāra*.

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107. AK. p.28

108. *ibid.* pp.43-44

109. *ibid.*

1. Why does the Arhant extend his āyussaṃskāra? There are two reasons. The first one is to benefit others and the second one is to seek longer duration of the śāsana.
2. Why does the Arhant reject āyussaṃskāra? His prolonging of his life would have no benefit to others and he himself would be tormented by disease (roga).
3. Who and where are the Arhants who accept or reject āyussaṃskāra? In the three dvīpas, in man and in woman, among human beings, the prematurely liberated Arhant who has attained the dhyāna of the prāntakotika stage.
4. What is the difference between saṃskāras of ayu and saṃskāras of jīvita? For some teachers there is no difference. For some the term āyussaṃskāra means the life that is the fruit of action of a previous birth. (pūrvakarmaphala). The term jīvita saṃskāra means the life that is the fruit of action of this life (pratyutpannakarmaphala).[110]

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110. AK. pp 43-44

According to Vasubandhu the *āyussaṃskāra* is the basis (*ādhāra*) of heat or warmth (*ūṣman*) and of consciousness.[111] Then the *jīvitendriya* is *āyus* in three spheres of existence (*traidhātuka*). At the time of arising in three existences the *āyus* is determined (*āvedha*). The time that one remains in a given existence is called *āyus*.[112]

Similarly when the *āyus* is exhausted then life comes to a close and death occurs. The *Bhāṣya* states that when *āyus* is exhausted merit does not have any power (*sāmarthya*). When both *āyurvipāka* and *bhogavipāka* are exhauste , death occurs as the *āyus* is exhausted.[113] The Buddhist position on this subject is quite clear. The duration of the motion of the arrow is determined at the beginning, but it will be subject to change on the way by any external cause.

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111. AK.II.45

112. *ibid.* pp73-74

113. *ibid.*

5

Vitarka and vicāra and cittasaṃskāra

In the Pali Tipiṭaka, vitakka, vicāra and cittasaṅkhāra are discussed in respect of the three saṅkhāras, kāya, vacī and citta. But in the Abhidharmakośa, it appears that Vasubandhu was interested in vāksaṃskāra and cittasaṃskāra only. Even these two are not very clear. Vasubandhu's definition of vitarka and vicāra is vitarkacārāvaudāryasūkṣmate.[114] **That is vitarka is gross and vicāra is subtle.** According to the Abhidharmakośa vitarka does not exist at the second dhyāna, thereafter vicāra does not exist either (dhyānāntare vitarkaśca vicāraścāpyataḥ param).[115] Vasubandhu says that 'others' quote the Sūtra for vāksaṃskāra vitarkavicārāḥ.[116] This suggests that he does not like this very much or perhaps, he did not find it in his Sūtras.

Vasubandhu gives ten dharmas and states that they are present in every moment of the mind. They are: (1) sensation (vedanā), (2) volition (cetanā), (3) recognition (saṃjñā), (4) desire (chandas), (5) contact (sparśa), (6) discernment (mati), (7) memory (smṛti), (8) attention (manaskāra),

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114 . AK 11. 33

115 . ibid. 11.31

116. ibid. p. 51

(9) **determination** (adhimukti), (10) concentration (samādhi). In this context the **Bhāṣya** states that volition is action of the mind (manas) which is cittābhisaṃskāra.[117] The volition is an action of the mind which synthesises a thought. Vasubandhu seems to avoid the definition of kāya, vāk, and cittasaṃskāra altogether in terms of breathing, vitarka, vicāra and vedanā and saṃjñā as **if he finds them unsatisfactory.**[117a] **When he mentions** the definition of vāk, he discusses it as 'others' quote this.

6

Asaṃskṛta

The Abhidharmakośa shows that there are three asaṃskṛta elements (dharma) and that they are not included in the five groups (skandhas) as they are lacking such characteristics as breaking (rūpana). The asaṃskṛta elements **are ākāśa (space),** pratisaṃkhyānirodha (extinction through **understanding) and** apratisaṃkhyānirodha (**extinction not through understanding).** Ākāśa is eternal and it is neither covered by anything nor itself covers anything (tatrākāśam anāvṛthiḥ).[118]

Pratisaṃkhyānirodha is liberation through **understanding of the four truths.** Apratisaṃkhyānirodha is **cessation** through complete **obstacle to arising (through failure of the condition).**

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117. AK. II.24 117a. cf. pp 72-73 below

118. ibid. I.5

(utpādātyantavighno'nyo nirodho' pratisamkhyayā).[119] Also these asamskrta dharmas are pure (anāsravā).[120] According to the nature of space (ākāśa) it does not obstruct matter (āvṛnoti). Conversely, space is not obstructed by matter (āvriyate).[121] As stated above in the first section on samskrta, the characteristics of samskrta are not found in the asamskrta dharmas.

Thus asamskrta forms part of the dharmadhātu.

On the question of asamskrta dharma the schools of early Buddhism are not unanimous. The author of the Abhidharmakośa believes in three asamskrta dharmas as discussed above as opposed to the one asankhata dhamma advocated by the Theravādins and the Vātsiputrīyas, and that is nirvāna only.

In summary, the Abhidharmakośa has touched upon the various samskāras that have been discussed in the Theravāda tradition. Although certain samskāras are not mentioned in the Abhidharmakośa, that does not mean those samskāras do not exist according to the Abhidharmakośa. The Abhidharmakośa has mentioned only the samskāras that need to be mentioned in connection with the particular dharma that is being discussed.

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119. AK. 1. 6

120. Ibid. 1.5

121. ibid.

Also, one should not expect to have all the samskāras included in a short treatise like the Abhidharmakośa. The position in respect of samskāras is that the entire phenomenal world is classed as samskrta dharma and the antonym is asamskrta dharma and it is nirvāna. In the twelve links of pratītyasamutpāda, the second member represents what has been done in the previous birth and serves as a connection between the previous action and the consciousness of the present birth. The two concepts, cetanā and karma are included in the discussion on samskāra as pratyaya in conditioned origination.

The samskāraskandha has been discussed in terms of a skandha to include everything other than the four skandhas, rūpa, vedanā samjñā and vijñāna. These five skandhas represent the entire corpus of samskrta dharmas. The āyussamskāras and jīvita samskāras have the same meaning and it has been said that life has come to an end when the āyussamskāras have been exhausted.

The discussion of vitarka and vicāra and cittasamskāra in the Abhidharmakośa is not quite the same discussion we found in the four Nikāyas and in the Abhidhamma and it seems vāksamskāra as vitarka and vicāra is not accepted. They are known as held by 'others.' Kāyasamskāra as breathing and cittasamskāra as vedanā and samjñā seem not to be known or to be rejected. The other set of three samskāras, punya etc., is also missing here but similarly replaced by punyakarman, etc. Thus samskārapratyaya seems to be explained as two sets of karmans, one of which includes cetanā. Thus the samskāra which is a condition is an action(karman) (which has been done).

It appears that the Sarvastivāda and Sautrāntika traditions had a very similar sūtra basis to Theravāda with saṃskārapratyaya, cetanā, karman and so on. There are peripheral variations regarding the three saṃskāras. They seem here to be eliminated in favour of simply karman (which includes cetanā). In fact the Abhidharmakośa is a dharma oriented text rather than a saṃskāra oriented text, like most Abhidharma works.

Vasubandhu makes it clear that in the final analysis, saṃskāras are considered as a pratyaya which represents the previous actions (saṃskārāh pūrvakarmaṇaḥ).[122] The Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu mostly shows the same doctrinal traits as those of the Theravāda tradition as portrayed in the Pali Tipiṭaka.

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122. AK. III.21

CHAPTER 4

FIRST FOUR NIKAYAS

In the *Tipiṭaka* the term *saṅkhāra* and cognate expressions appear in many forms and combinations, as a noun, adjective, verb and as a verbal derivative. The antonym *asaṃkhata* is also found. In addition *saṅkhāra* sometimes occurs in the middle of a compound; for example, *vīmaṃsā-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ*.[123] Since the term appears in various forms and in various contexts it is very difficult to find an appropriate equivalent in English. The term *saṅkhata* is cognate with *saṅkhāra* and appears as an adjective throughout the *Tipiṭaka*. It is the past participle of the verb *saṅkharoti*.[124] We shall review the contexts and apparent shades of meaning, beginning with what seem to be the most general or wide in reference.* A certain amount of overlapping is inevitable among the passages.

I

As a general term, *saṅkhāra* had been used in the *Tipiṭaka* to denote everything other than *nibbāna*. Thus *nibbāna* is permanent and everything else is impermanent

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123. D. III. 77

124. M. I. 163

* The full Pali passages are mostly given in Appendix C in the usual sequence of the texts.

and what is impermanent is described in a single term saṅkhāra.

After the demise of the Buddha, Sakka, the king of the gods, says in a stanza in the Mahāparinibbāna sutta that all saṅkhāras are impermanent (aniccā sabbe saṅkhārā), that they have the nature of arising and then ceasing (uppādavayadhammino); and that their cessation is blissful (uppajjitvā nirujjhanti tesaṃ vūpasamo sukho).[125]

The Buddha advised the monks on several occasions and particularly beside a sick person that a monk should abide seeing nothing attractive in the body (asubhānupassī kāye viharati), be conscious of the disgusting nature of food (āhāre paṭikūlasaññī), conscious of how distasteful is the whole world (sabbaloka-anabhiratasaññī), and see impermanence in all saṅkhāras (sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānupassī) and his inner being should be well established in the recognition of death (maraṇasaññā kho pan' assa ajjhattaṃ supaṭṭhitā hoti).[126] The Buddha's main intention was to show the sick person that there is nothing in this world attractive, everything

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125. S. I. 200, cf. D. II. 157, which has vata in place of sabbe

126. A. III. 143

is impermanent and it is not worthwhile to have further desire in this world, as this would of course result in another life full of suffering.

According to the teachings of the Buddha there are four defilements (āsava). They are sensuality (kāma), rebirth (bhava), speculation (diṭṭhi) and ignorance (avijjā). When these four defilements are exhausted all saṅkhāras are well seen with right understanding to be impermanent, as they in fact are (idha bhante khīṇāsavassa bhikkhuno aniccato sabbe saṅkhāra yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya sudiṭṭhā honti).[127] It appears that the term saṅkhāra in the earliest phase of Buddhism was used as a general term to cover the things of life. When the Buddha was attaining mahāparinibbāna he uttered the words 'O Bhikkhus, I declare to you that saṅkhāras are transitory, work out your liberation with diligence". (Bhikkhave āmantayāmi vo vayadhammā saṅkhārā appamādena sampādethā ti).[128]

In the Tipiṭaka not only the life or the activities connected with consciousness are said to be saṅkhāras but also material things such as cities and buildings are kinds of saṅkhāras. The Buddha refers to as many as

127. A. V. 175

128. S. I. 158

eighty thousand cities, eighty thousand palaces, etc. in the Mahāsudassana sutta. Then he tells Ānanda to see how all these saṅkhāras are past, ended and passed away (sabbe te saṅkhārā atītā niruddhā vipariṇatā).[129] Also the Buddha says to Ānanda that these saṅkhāras are impermanent (aniccā), transitory (addhuvā) and untrustworthy (anassāsikā).

According to the Mahāsudassana sutta a city is a saṅkhāra. In what sense is a city a saṅkhāra? It appears to be so in connection with human activities, but from other sutta contexts we see that besides being built by human beings, cities may also be said to stand ready for new generations to be born in them as a result of their actions. All these cities are part of the glory of king Sudassana, expressed in some sense as his own saṅkhāras. This is taken as a good example to show that at one time the king and the people lived together in glory, but now the king is not to be seen and his kingdom is not to be seen and thus there is no permanence anywhere. Ordinary people are not even aware that such a kingdom ever existed. That is the reason why the Buddha emphasized that one should not imagine permanence in any phenomenon, and should live in harmony and

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129. D. II. 198

patience.[130] Even in the last year of the Buddha, his repeated message was that all _saṅkhāras_ must grow old, that one should work out one's liberation with diligence and that the Tathāgata would pass away at the end of three months. (_vayadhammā saṅkhārā appamādena sampādetha_ .... _ito tiṇṇam māsānam accayena Tathāgato parinibbāyissati_).[131]

Just before the _parinibbāna_ the spirits in great numbers came close to the place where the Buddha lay; some of them lamented, but others who were free from passions asked what was surprising in this, because _saṅkhāras_ are impermanent. (_aniccā saṅkhārā_, _taṃ kut'ettha labbhā ti_).[132] It is a general tendency for those who have not seen the world as it is to cry and lament when dear ones are departing, but there is no reason to be unhappy, as impermanence, unhappiness and decay are the basic forces of the _saṅkhāras_ (_yaṃ saṅkhārā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā_.[133]

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130. A. III. 442

131. D. II. 120

132. S. III. 28

133. _ibid_

II

In the previous section we have discussed the concept of *saṅkhāra* in relation to all phenomena and its basic significance. Now we turn to a more fundamental aspect of *saṅkhāra* which eventually becomes the central point of this thesis.

Saṅkhāra is described as volition (*cetanā*) in the *Tipiṭaka*. In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* the Buddha put a direct question: 'O Bhikkhus, what are *saṅkhāras*?' The Buddha explained them as six bodies of volitions (*cha ime bhikkhave cetanākāyā*): volitions (or will) for sights, volitions for sounds, for smells, for tastes, for touches and for mental elements. From the arising of contact there is arising of *saṅkhāra* (*phassasamudayā saṅkhārasamudayo*); from the ceasing of contact there is ceasing of *saṅkhāra* (*phassanirodhā saṅkhāranirodho*). The way to the ceasing of *saṅkhāra* is the Noble Eightfold Path.[134]

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134. S. III. 60

III

In the various levels of concentration (*samādhi*), certain *saṅkhāras* fade away. The main purpose of concentration as discussed in early Buddhism is to withdraw one's thoughts from distraction and try to attain onepointedness, that would lead to the attainment of the four stages of meditation. In the various levels of concentration, *saṅkhāras* fade away. The fading away of *saṅkhāras* is gradual. The Buddha said that speech (*vācā*) is a *saṅkhāra*, and when one attains the first stage of meditation it ceases. On attaining the second stage of meditation one's applied thought (*vitakka*) and sustained thought (*vicāra*) cease. When one attains the third meditation one's pleasure (*pīti*) ceases. When one attains the fourth meditation one's inbreathing and outbreathing (*assāsapassāsa*) cease,[135] implying that the breathing becomes very low and faint. This is an exercise that the Buddha taught both his disciples and the laity to practice in order to achieve mental calm. The Buddha himself practised this exercise very often and notably just before the enlightenment and before the final *parinibbāna*. It is significant that as we have discussed above, at the first level one's speech ceases, at the second level one's applied thought and sustained

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135. S.IV.216-217

thought cease, and at the fourth level one's inbreathing and outbreathing cease. In the case of the third stage, exceptionally, there is no mention of _saṅkhāras_. In the analysis of this thesis these three specific levels are important as they relate to three _saṅkhāras_. They are:

vacī saṅkhāra

citta saṅkhāra

kāya saṅkhāra

The next five levels are higher in nature and more difficult than the first four. The last five meditations are as follows:

1. At the sphere of infinity of space recognition (perception) of matter ceases.
2. At the sphere of infinity of consciousness, recognition of the sphere of infinity of space ceases.
3. At the sphere of nothingness, recognition of the sphere of infinity of consciousness ceases.
4. At the sphere of neither recognition nor non-recognition (neither perception nor non-perception) recognition of the sphere of nothingness ceases.
5. At the cessation of recognition (_saññā_) and

sensation (vedanā), recognition and sensation cease.[136]

IV

So far we have discussed the contexts where the term saṅkhāra appears in a more general sense. But it is apparent that saṅkhāra is also used in a more specialised sense as one of the conditions of conditioned origination. The fundamental idea of conditioned origination is that the principles work together in concert. There are twelve links in conditioned origination and all of them are called saṅkhata dhammas. The second link of conditioned origination is called saṅkhāra (avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā).

In the Aṅguttara Nikāya the Buddha explained to the monks that conditioned by ignorance there is saṅkhāra (avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā) and conditioned by saṅkhāra there is consciousness (saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇam).[137] This formula is considered as the starting point of each individual life. That is, due to ignorance saṅkhāra comes to be, and due to saṅkhāra consciousness comes to

136. S. IV. 216-7

137. A. I. 177

be. When consciousness enters the mother's womb, there is conception. If by any chance there is no ignorance, there is no *saṅkhāra*, no consciousness and thereby no conception. This whole concept of conditioned origination is based on the formula 'this' being, 'that' becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that is not, from the ceasing of this that ceases.[138]

It is clear that when *saṅkhāra* ceases then consciousness ceases (*saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho*).

In the analysis of conditioned origination, the Buddha in a question and answer form asked the Bhikkhus what *saṅkhāra* is. Then the Buddha himself replied, "O Bhikkhus, there are three *saṅkhāras*."[139] They are:

1. *kāya saṅkhāra*
2. *vacī saṅkhāra*
3. *citta saṅkhāra*

Conditioned origination is a discovery of the Buddha. More precisely conditioned origination is discovered by fully awakened Buddhas whenever one appears. In the *Samyutta Nikāya* Gautama Buddha who appeared in the sixth century B.C. declared that there had been a fully enlightened Buddha named Vipassin and

138. S. II. 27-28

139. S. II. 4

he also had realized conditioned origination in the same way as he himself did.[140] The Buddha using an ocean simile explained to the monks that when the ocean is swelling or when tidal waves start, the rivers, lakes, etc. swell. Similarly ignorance makes saṅkhāra swell and thereby causes consciousness, sentient body, contact and all other links of the conditioned origination to swell.[141] When the ocean ebbs, it makes great rivers ebb and lakes ebb. Similarly ebbing ignorance makes saṅkhāra ebb and then makes consciousness ebb and so on.[142]

One link is connected with the next and any kind of tampering with one link has a similar effect on the next. Since there will be a lengthy discussion on conditioned origination in chapter 8, we will continue to emphasize here only the passages relevant to our main discussion on suttas.

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140. S. II. 7

141. S. II. 119

142. S. II. 119

V

It has already been stated that all principles in this world are classified into five major groups (khandha) namely; matter (rūpa), sensation (vedanā) recognition (saññā), saṅkhāra and consciousness (viññāṇa). These five are called five aggregates and they are also saṅkhata principles (saṅkhata dhamma). In the previous section we have discussed in brief the saṅkhāras and conditioned origination and we saw that the twelve links of conditioned origination show that conditioned by ignorance, there are saṅkhārā and conditioned by saṅkhārā there is consciousness. That is the beginning of the condition for a sentient body. This is another example in support of the argument that all principles are included in the groups and in favour of the concept of no soul in Buddhism.[143]

At the time of the Buddha, the wanderer Vacchagotta had the view that the five groups matter, etc., are the self and the self has matter, or matter is in the self or the self is in matter.[144] The Buddha explained

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143. S. III. 46

144. S. IV. 394 - 397 (See appendix B)

to Vaccha that he was wrong. And when Vaccha asked him what were the disadvantages of having an opinion of matter as having self, etc. the Buddha replied that he had seen matter, sensation, recognition, saṅkhāra and consciousness and their origination and cessation. On the cessation or exhaustion of all conceit of an ego or the concept such as soul or mine, then a person is freed.[145]

VI

Apart from the major contexts in which saṅkhāra appears in the Tipiṭaka, there are some otner contexts which suggest more restricted senses. In the Tipiṭaka the expressions bhavasaṅkhāra, āyusaṅkhara and jīvita-saṅkhāra are found in a few places.

We saw in the previous sections that the five groups are called saṅkhāras and bhavasaṅkhāra (span

145. S. IV. 397

of existence) is the duration of time that a person may live.[146]

In the Aṅguttara Nikāya we found that bhavasaṅkhāra is one of the ten conditions inherent in the body. Others are cold, heat, hunger, thirst, evacuation, urination, discipline of body, discipline of speech, discipline of living and rebirth.[147]

When the Buddha was at Vesālī, he said to Ānanda that on the basis of one's psychic powers one may live on for a full life span or even for an aeon. However, Ānanda is said to have missed the point. If he had asked the Buddha to live longer for the benefit of the many, the Buddha might have decided to live longer using his psychic powers. Since there was no invitation, since the Buddha had completed the teachings, he entered the final extinction (parinibbāna) when his bhavasaṅkhāra

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146. tulaṅ atulañ ca sambhavaṃ bhavasaṅkhāram avassaji muni ajjhattarato samāhito abhindi kavacam iv' attasambhavan ti. (A. IV. 312)

147 sītaṃ uṇhaṃ jighacchā pipāsā uccāro passāvo kāya-saṃvaro vacīsaṃvaro ājīvasaṃvaro ponobhaviko bhavasaṅkhāro (A. V. 88)

had been exhausted.[148] The two terms _bhavasaṅkhāra_ and _āyusaṅkhāra_ appear to be synonyms. This is quite evident from a passage in the _Mahāparinibbāna sutta_. There the Buddha said to Ānanda that when the Tathāgata consciously and deliberately rejects his _āyusaṅkhāra_ the earth quakes and trembles and is shaken violently.[149]

It appears that both _bhavasaṅkhāra_ and _āyusaṅkhāra_ refer to the actual age of the Buddha's life and _jīvita-saṅkhāra_ refers to the Buddha's physical and mental components.

In the _Mahāparinibbāna Sutta_, the Buddha said to Ānanda when Ānanda asked him whether the Buddha left instructions about the order, that he (the Buddha) had grown older, was turning eighty years of age, and was like a worn-out cart. This imagery is used to show that the body of the Buddha was really worn out and his journey had come to a close.[150]

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148. A. IV. 308-311

149. D. II. 108

150. D. II. 100

'"I

The terms saṅkhata, asaṅkhata a-ₑ important expressions cognate with the term saṅkhāra. In discussing the world of phenomena we used the term saṅkhata dhamma and the antonym is asaṅkhata. There is only one asaṅkhata principle and that is nibbāna.[151]

The five groups matter, sensation, recognition, saṅkhāra and consciousness are all saṅkhata principles.[152] Also they are impermanent, no-soul and conditionally

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151. dve imā, Ānanda, dhātuyo: saṅkhatā ca dhātu asaṅkhatā ca dhātu. imā kho, Ānanda, dve dhātuyo yato jānāti passati, ettāvatā pi kho, Ānanda, dhātukusalo bhikkhū ti alaṃ vacanāyā ti. (M. 111. 63)

152. saṅkha... rūpaṃ saṅkhataṃ rūpan ti yathābhūtaṃ na pajā... saṅkhataṃ vedanaṃ. saṅkhataṃ saññaṃ. saṅkhate saṅkhāre. saṅkhataṃ viññāṇaṃ saṅkhataṃ viññāṇan ti yathābhutaṃ na pajānāti. (S.111.114)

arisen.[153] The three characteristics of the *saṅkhata* principles are arising, passing away and changeability. Then the characteristics of *asaṅkhata* principles are non-arising, non-passing away and non-changeability.[154]

Also, as to the question of whether or not the world is eternal, the Buddha's contention was quite clear. Whatever has become is *saṅkhata*, has arisen conditionally and is impermanent.[155]

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153. *sukhā pi kho Ānanda vedanā aniccā saṅkhatā paṭicca-samuppannā khaya-dhammā vaya-dhammā virāga-dhammā nirodha-dhammā*. (D. 11. 66)

154. *tīṇ' imāni bhikhave saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni. katamāni tīṇi?*
uppādo paññāyati vayo paññāyati ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññāyati. imāni kho bhikkhave tīṇi saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni ti.
tīṇ' imāni bhikkhave asaṅkhatassa asaṅkhatalak-khaṇāni. katamāni tīṇi? na uppādo paññāyati. na vayo paññāyati na ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññāyati imani kho bhikkhave tīṇi asaṅkhatassa asaṅkhatalak-khaṇāni ti. (A. 1. 152)

155. A. V. 187

VIII

So far we have discussed the term _saṅkhāra_ in terms of its various usages and its application. We note two classifications of _saṅkhāras_ in the _Tipiṭaka_. According to the four _nikāyas_ there are three _abhisaṅkhāras_; namely, merit (_puñña_) demerit (_apuññā_) and the imperturbable (_āneñja_). Also there are three _saṅkhāras_ namely mental (_citta_), body (_kāya_) and speech (_vacī_). The last three _saṅkhāras_ _kāya_, _vacī_ and _citta_ have been discussed in the previous section in this chapter in relation to their ramifications. This is part of the discussion of _paccaya_.

IX

There is a separate section in the _Samyutta_ _Nikāya_ that deals directly with the term _asaṅkhata_. This deals with what _asaṅkhata_ principles are and what way leads to the state of _asaṅkhata_.

In order to achieve the state of _asaṅkhata_ the Buddha taught one to eliminate lust (_rāga_), eliminate

hatred (dōsa) and to eliminate illusion (mōha).[156] The way leading to the destruction of lust, hatred and illusion is to practise mindfulness relating to body (kāyagatā sati ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmī maggo).[157]

Although it is recommended to practise mindfulness relating to the body in this paragraph, other passages continue to state that there are different stages to follow depending on one's ability. They are insight (vipassanā), meditation, etc.[158] on the whole Noble Eightfold Path.[159] In general the idea that the Buddha advocated is to practise meditation starting with mindfulness relating to the body and continuing with other meditations. This is the basis of the path promulgated by the Buddha for the benefit of all beings, that is, the Noble Eightfold Path.

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156. katamañ ca bhikkhave asaṅkhataṃ. yo bhikkhave rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave asaṅkhataṃ.
katamo ca bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmī maggo. (S.IV. 359)

157. S. IV. 359

158. S. IV. 362

159. S. IV. 365

X

The term *kamma* (action) is used in the *Tipiṭaka* in two major contexts. One is that due to certain actions (*kamma*) done in the previous birth, certain fruits can be seen in the present life. On the other hand due to the actions done in this life, fruits will be seen in this very life and in future lives to come.

Kamma is a general term for normal actions. But when it comes to a philosophical discussion on early Buddhism, we are referring to *kamma* in two contexts as has been stated above. More precisely, *kamma* refers to the action that has strong volition (*cetanā*). Supposing someone has wrong view, wrong thinking, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong effort, wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration, wrong knowledge, wrong release, he carries out bodily action according to the

wrong view for fulfilment and[160] similarily the actions of speech and actions of mind. All these wrong actions from the three doors a man performs are conducive to what is unpleasant not profitable and to painfulness.[161]

Continuing on the same topic *kamma*, the Buddha said to the monks that if a person plans harmful bodily actions, actions of speech and actions of mind, he will eventually be born into a harmful world. Once a person is born in that kind of harmful world, he has to undergo the harmful results. He will feel pain just like being

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160. *micchādiṭṭhikassa bhikkhave purisapuggalassa micchāsaṅkappassa micchāvācassa micchākammantassa micchā-ājīvassa micchāvāyāmassa micchāsatissa micchāsamādhissa micchāñāṇassa micchāvimuttissa yañ c' eva kāyakammaṃ yathādiṭṭhisamattaṃ samādinnaṃ yañ ca vacīkammaṃ.. yañ ca manokammaṃ yathādiṭṭhi-samattaṃ samādinnaṃ yā ca cetanā yā ca patthanā yo ca paṇidhi ye ca saṅkhārā sabbe te dhammā aniṭṭhāya akantāya amanāpāya ahitāya dukkhāya saṃvattanti. taṃ kissa hetu: diṭṭhi hi bhikkhave pāpikā.* (A. V. 212)

161. *ibid*

in purgatory. The Buddha described this as a dark deed and a dark result.[162]

XI

We found that the term _saṅkhāra_ appears in the _Tipiṭaka_ in compounds. The venerable Kaccāna said to one of the housefathers that in order to find the heart fully freed, four elements have to cease. They are sensation, recognition, _saṅkhāras_ and consciousness. Here the compound form is _saṅkhāradhātuyā_.[163]

Also in the _Dīgha Nikāya_ the three _saṅkhāras_ have been discussed in compounds with the prefix _abhi_. The examples are _puññābhisaṅkhāra_, _apuññābhisaṅkhāra_, and _āneñjābhisaṅkhāra_.

Also the term _saṅkhāra_ is found at the beginning of the compound when discussing the path leading to the cessation of _saṅkhāra_ (_saṅkhāranirodhagāminipaṭipadā_).[164]

In the analysis of the four bases of power (_iddhipāda_) the term _saṅkhāra_ is in the middle of the four compounds as follows:

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162. A. II. 231

163. S. III. 13

164. M. I. 54

cattāro iddhipādā. *idh' āvuso bhikkhu chanda-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti*. *citta-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti*. *viriya-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti*. *vīmaṃsā-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti*. [165]

The basis of power which is endowed with *saṅkhāras* of exertion for concentration of will.

The basis of power which is endowed with the *saṅkhāras* of exertion for concentration of thought.

The basis of power which is endowed with *saṅkhāras* of exertion for concentration of energy.

The basis of power which is endowed with *saṅkhāras* of exertion for concentration of investigation.

XII

In the *Suttapiṭaka* and the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* we found the two terms *sasaṅkhāra* and *asaṅkhāra*. In the *Suttapiṭaka* we found these two terms almost always with the term *parinibbāyin*. But in the *Abhidhamma* these two terms are not with *parinibbāyin* but with the term *citta*.

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165. D. III 222-223

The distinction between *sasaṅkhāra parinibbāyin* and *asaṅkhāra parinibbāyin* is made in respect of the five-fold classification of those who are not reborn (non returners).

The fivefold classification is as follows:[166]

1. Midway extinction (*antarāparinibbāyin*)
2. Extinction after striking (another birth) (*upahaccaparinibbāyin*)
3. Extinction without *saṅkhāra* (*asaṅkhāraparinibbāyin*)
4. Extinction with some *saṅkhāra* (*sasaṅkhārapa-rinibbāyin*)
5. One who is on the way (to extinction) (*uddhaṃsoto*).

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the Buddha explained to the monks how a person becomes *sasaṅkhāra* and *asaṅkhāra parinibbāyin*.[167] When a monk lives contemplating the ugliness of the body, aware of the repulsiveness of food and distaste of the world and aware of the impermanence of the all *saṅkhāras*, then the idea of death is well planted in his mind. He lives dependent on the five strengths such as confidence and understanding and so on.

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166. S. V. 201

167 A. 1. 233

For such a person the following five faculties, confidence, energy, mindfulness and concentration are manifested abundantly.

CHAPTER 5

ABHIDHAMMA AND KHUDDAKA

(A) ABHIDHAMMA

The Abhidhamma Piṭaka represents the third section of the Pali Tipiṭaka. It contains seven books, namely, (1) Dhammasaṅgaṇi (2) Vibhaṅga (3) Dhātukathā (4) Puggalapaññatti (5) Kathāvatthu (6) Yamaka (7) Paṭṭhāna.

In this chapter we look at the way in which the term saṅkhāra and its related forms have been used in the Abhidhamma texts. It is generally believed that Abhidhamma represents a later period than that of the sutta texts and manifests some kind of systematization of the doctrine in the suttas.

We see that the term saṅkhāra and its related forms have been used in different senses or contexts in the exposition of the Abhidhamma as follows:

(1) as a general term (saṅkhāra is a synonym of saṅkhata and the antonym asaṅkhata is not a saṅkhāra)

(2) saṅkhāra as a paccaya

(3) as a khandha

(4) āyu saṅkhāra

(5) saṅkhāras of exertion for concentration in the four iddhipādas.

(6) sasaṅkhāra and asaṅkhāra

All the twelve contexts that we discussed in chapter 3 are found in the Abhidhamma, but they are included in the above six groups in the process of systematization.

The Abhidhamma exposition of saṅkhāra as a general term disposes of saṅkhata and asaṅkhata as well (item #7 and #9 in chapter 3). Saṅkhāra as paccaya includes cetanā (item #2), three saṅkhāras ceasing in samādhi (item #3), saṅkhāras with the prefix abhi (item #8), and saṅkhāras and kamma (item #10).

I

As a general term

Throughout the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the term saṅkhata has been used as a general term to convey everything in the phenomenal world except nibbāna. Since the asaṅkhata is not a saṅkhāra, it will not be discussed as a separate item, but treated as the antonym of saṅkhata. It is clear from the Kathāvatthu that apart from saṅkhata and asaṅkhata, there is no third possibility.[168]

Following the suttas, the Kathāvatthu gives a quotation from the Aṅguttaranikāya showing the three characteristics of saṅkhata as arising, passing away, and being subject to change.[169]

Instead of saṅkhāra that has been used as a general term in the suttas on the basis of sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, we find the term dhamma (principle) in place of saṅkhāra in the Abhidhamma except for direct quotation and discussion of the suttas.

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168. Kvu. 1 60, D. III 274 (see also Madanayake's article, 'Is there a consciousness in Nibbāna' in New Paths in Buddhist Research, pp 17-25

169. A 1·152 (see P 66 above)

The first of the twenty-two triads in the Abhidhamma mātikā of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi gives the basis of the whole Abhidhamma as good principles (kusalā dhammā), bad principles (akusalā dhammā) and undetermined principles (avyākatā dhammā).[170]

The three verses in the Dhammapada concerning saṅkhāra and dhamma are found in the Kathāvatthu. The first two verses state that all saṅkhāras are impermanent (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā) and all saṅkhāras are unhappiness (sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā). The final verse declares that all dhammas are no-soul.[171]

Both the Dhammapada of the Suttapiṭaka and the Kathāvatthu of the Abhidhammapitaka represent a later period than that of the four Nikāyas. By the time of the composition of these texts, the Abhidhamma systematization of the doctrine has been in progress and the contents of the Abhidhamma and the Khuddakanikāya show this. It is clear from these three verses that if it were said that all saṅkhāras are no-soul (anattan) then some opponents may have confused the issue by saying that if all saṅkhāras are impermanent, unhappiness and no-soul, then the asaṅkhata is with soul (attan)as the nibbāna is with a soul.

In order to show that erroneous opinions are immoral, the Theravādins of the Kathāvatthu quote a passage from the Aṅguttaranikāya. (A.V. 212).

> 'Oh, bhikkhus, of a person having wrong views, whatever action of deed, word and thought, he completes and carries out, based on those views, it may be volition or aspiration (or desire) or determination or saṅkhāras, all those dhammas lead to the undesirable, to unhappiness, to the disagreeable, to trouble, to ill.'

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170. Dhs. p. 1.
171. Kvu. 11. 531

Micchādiṭṭhikassa bhikkhave purisapuggalassa yañ c'eva kāyakammaṃ yathādiṭṭhisamattaṃ - pe - yañ ca manokammaṃ yā ca cetanā yā ca patthanā yo ca paṇidhi ye ca saṅkhārā sabbe te dhammā aniṭṭhāya akantāya amanāpāya ahitāya dukkhāya saṃvattantīti.[172]

Similarly, on the question of 'a person' (puggala) in the Kathāvatthu, the Theravādins give the three characteristics of saṅkhata by quoting a statement from the Buddha as it appears in the Aṅguttaranikāya.[173] (1) Arising is evident (uppādo paññāyati), (2) the passing away is evident (vayo paññāyati) and (3) alteration is evident (ṭhitānaṃ aññathattaṃ paññāyati).[174]

Conversely, for asaṅkhata, the Kathāvatthu gives the three characteristics as (1) arising is not evident, (2) the passing away is not evident and (3) change is not evident.

In the argument with Pubbaseliyas, who hold the view that the four truths are asaṅkhāra, the Theravādins showed that unhappiness is bodily ill, mental ill, grief, lamentation, melancholy, despair, etc. If unhappiness is asaṅkhata, then the other three truths are also asaṅkhata.[175]

The four immaterial spheres are described by the suttas as imperturbable. The opponents of the Theravāda tradition believe that since immaterial spheres are imperturbable, they are asaṅkhata. But the Theravādins argue that the arising in

172. Kvu. 11. 506
173. A. 1. 152
174. Kuv. 1. 61
175. ibid. 11.322

immaterial spheres is a form of rebirth, a station of consciousness, etc. If that is asaṅkhata, then there cannot be arising there, as arising is a characteristic of saṅkhata. Thus, the Theravādins (proved) that the four immaterial spheres are saṅkhata.

Both Pubbaseliyas and Mahiṃsāsakas believe that the conditioned origination is asaṅkhata

On the argument on space (ākāsa), at least three schools of early Buddhists held that it was asaṅkhata. Theravādins and Andhakas on the one hand hold the view that space is saṅkhata as it is in the range of matter (rūpakkhandha) [being perceived as the gaps between pieces of matter].

Uttarāpathakas, Sammitiyas and Mahiṃsāsakas were of the view that space is asaṅkhata.[176]

II

Saṅkhāra as a paccaya

Saṅkhāra as a paccaya as noted above includes (a) cetanā [2] (b) three saṅkhāras ceasing in samādhi [3] (c) saṅkhāras with the prefix abhi[8] and (d) saṅkhāra and kamma.[10].[177]

The main reasons for including the above four items in the category of saṅkhāra as paccaya are the following passages or statements in the Vibhaṅga and the Aṅguttaranikāya.

Tattha katame avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā? Puññābhisaṅkhāro apuññābhisaṅkhāro āneñjābhisaṅkhāro kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro cittasaṅkhāro.

Thus saṅkhāra as a paccaya includes all 6 saṅkhārā of (b) and (c).

Tattha katamo puññābhisaṅkhāro? kusalā cetanā kāmāvacarā

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176. Ponts of Controversary, p. 192

177. The numbers beside the words refer to the items on chapter 4

rūpāvacarā dānamayā sīlamayā bhāvanāmayā, ayam vuccati puññabhisaṅkhāro.[178]

Puññabhisaṅkhāra includes kāmāvacarā and rūpāvacarā kusalā cetanā. Similarly apuññābhisaṅkhāra includes akusalā cetanā and āneñjābhisaṅkhāra includes arūpāvacarā kusalā cetanā.

Thus all cetanā appears to be included in saṅkhāra paccaya.

Tattha katamo avijjāpaccayā saṅkhāro? Yā cetanā sañcetanā sañcetayitattam, ayam vuccati avijjāpaccayā saṅkhāro.[179]

Here again saṅkhāra as a paccaya is explained as cetanā.

Tattha katamo saṅkhāro?

Yā cetanā sañcetanā sañcetayitattam ayam vuccati saṅkhāro.[180]

This is another context showing that saṅkhāra is cetanā.

Cetanāham bhikkhave kammam vadāmi 'O bhikkhus, volition, I call action.'[181]

Here kamma includes cetanā and thus appears to include saṅkhāra. Does saṅkhāra include kamma? This will be discussed in chapter 7 below.

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178. Vbh. p. 135 (p. 242 below provides English translation)

179. ibid p. 144

180. ibid p. 173

181. A. 111.415

Thus in the analysis of conditioned origination(paticcasamuppāda) in the Vibhaṅga the basic formula in relation to saṅkhāra given in the Suttas is presented in a more systematized manner, as follows:

Which saṅkhāras are from the condition of ignorance?

Puññābhisaṅkhāro apuññābhisaṅkhāro āneñjābhisaṅkhāro kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro cittasaṅkhāro.

Then what is puññābhisaṅkhāro? Profitable volition in the sensuous sphere and the fine material sphere, consisting of giving, morality and mental development (kusalā cetanā kamāvacarā rūpāvacarā dānamayā sīlamayā bhāvanāmayā).[182]

Then what is apuññābhisaṅkhāro? Unprofitable volitions in the sensous sphere. (akusalā cetanā kāmāvacarā).

Then what is āneñjābhisaṅkhāra? Profitable volitions in the four immaterial spheres (kusalā cetanā arūpāvacarā)

Then what is kāyasaṅkhāro?

Bodily volition is kāyasaṅkhāro (kāyasañcetanā)

Verbal Volition is vacīsaṅkhāro (vacīsañcetanā)

Mental volition is cittasaṅkhāro (manosañcetanā)

The Saṅkhāra Yamaka of the Yamaka also gives detailed analysis of saṅkhāra in relation to kāya, vacī and cittasaṅkhāra.[183]

The Vibhaṅga discussion leads to detailed discussion of the various saṅkhāras. Between the two existences (bhavas) existence as action (kammabhava) and existence as rebirth (uppattibhava),

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182. Vbh. pp. 135 - 136

183. Yam. I. pp. 229-230

existence as action is decribed as three saṅkhāras, puññābhisaṅkhāra, apuññābhisaṅkhāra and āneñjābhisaṅkhāra.

This refers to the fact that from clinging as condition arises existence. The difference between the two existences is that the first, existence as action is all action whether good or bad leading to existence. Then the second, existence as rebirth, is the rebirth in the existence of desire, form, formless, recognition or perception existence, non-recognition existence, neither recognition nor non-recognition, single group existence, four group existence, and five group existence.[184] This again suggests that kamma is saṅkhāra.

The Andhakas appear to believe that at the time of the passing away of Arahants, they have puññābhisaṅkhāra or āneñjābhisaṅkhāra. According to the Theravāda standpoint Arahants have no puññābhisaṅkhāra or āneñjābhisaṅkhāra as the Arahants have already finished with all that, and an Arahant whose consciousness is kusala becomes extinct (arahā kusalacitto parinibbāyātīti).[185]

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184. Vbh. p. 137

185. Kvu. II pp. 613 - 614

Continuing with the same discussion on conditioned origination, the Vibhaṅga explains how unprofitable principles (akusalā dhammā) will lead to the whole mass of suffering.

What principles are bad (dhammā akusalā)?

At the time when bad consciousness accompanied by mental pleasure associates with wrong view, having a visible object as support, audible object as support, odorous object as support, taste object as support, tangible object as support, an object of mind as support, then as a result of the bad principles (akusalā dhammā) whatever objects come to the mind at that time are polluted by bad principles.[186] That is, from ignorance as condition, saṅkhāras arise. From saṅkhāras as conditions there is consciousness. There are four methods of the Paṭiccasamuppāda found in the Vibhaṅga.

(1)

Viññāṇa-paccayā nāmaṃ
nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyatanaṃ
chaṭṭhāyatana-paccayā phasso

From consciousness as condition there is sentience,
From sentience as condition there is the sixth base,
From the sixth base as condition there is contact

(2)

Viññāṇa-paccayā nāmaṃ
nāmapaccayā phasso

From consciousness as condition there is sentience,
From sentience as condition there is contact.

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186. Vbh. p. 144

(3) Viññāṇa-paccayā nāmarūpam
Nāmarūpa-paccayā chatthāyatanam
Chattāyatana-paccayā phasso

From consciousness as condition there are sentience and matter.
From sentience and matter as condition there is the sixth base
From the sixth base as condition there is contact.

(4) Viññāṇa-paccayā nāma rūpam
nāmarūpa-paccayā saḷāyatanam
saḷāyatana-paccayā phasso

From consciousness as condition there are sentience and matter
From sentience and matter as condition there are six bases
From six bases as condition there is contact[187]

What is the difference between the above four methods? In the first one only sentience is mentioned but not sentience and matter and the sixth base instead of six bases. The reason is that the first method contains only the mental properties included in a single moment of consciousness and all processes of consciousness. Also this method applies to immaterial existence.

In the second method, there is no sixth base and six bases. This applies to immaterial existence.

The third method applies to life in the sense sphere to beings of spontaneous origin with incomplete sense organs.

The fourth method applies to being with full sense organs of either sense sphere or spontaneous origin.[188]

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187. Vbh. pp. 138-139
188. VbhA. pp. 202-204

From sentience and matter as condition there are the six bases and so on,[189] until ageing and death. This process shows how the mass of suffering continues.[190]

The second member of conditioned origination is repeatedly introduced as volition (cetanā), being volitional (sañcetanā) and state of being volitional (sañcetayitattaṃ).[191]

Now let us see the division of saṅkhāras in the Yamaka. There are three saṅkhāras: bodily (kāya), verbal (vacī) and mental (citta). Inbreathing and outbreathing are kāyasaṅkhāra. Reasoning and pondering are vacīsaṅkhāra. Recognition or perception and sensation are cittasaṅkhāra. All principles associated with consciousness are cittasaṅkhāras except reasoning and pondering (vitakka and vicāra).[192]

Although inbreathing and outbreathing are said to be kāyasaṅkhāras, it is understood that everything related to the body materially and everything that keeps the body sustained is called kāyasaṅkhāra. For instance if there is no breathing function in respect of the body, that body is clinically dead unless the bodily functions are suppressed through a jhāna.

189. Vbh. p. 144
190. Ibid
191. Ibid. p. 145

192. Yam. I. p. 229

III

As a Khandha

In the Khandha Vibhaṅga of the Vibhaṅga there is a discussion of all five khandhas. It clearly shows that there is no permanent entity or soul, the body is composed of groups namely rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra and viññāṇa. These five groups are treated as citta, cetasika and rūpa in the Abhidhamma. The entire analysis is based on three methods; namely, Suttantabhājaniya (sutta analysis), Abhidhammabhājaniya (abhidhamma analysis) and pañhāpucchaka (interrogation).[193]

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193. For sutta-analysis by quoting suttas and abhidhamma analysis by applying the trichotomies and dichotomies such as kusala, akusala, avyākata, etc., See Indian Buddhism pp. 220-4

In question and answer form it is said that saṅkhārakkhandha is singlefold when it is associated with thought (citta); twofold as cause (hetu) and not cause (na hetu); threefold as good (kusala), bad (akusala) and neither good nor bad (avyākata); fourfold as sense sphere (kāmāvacara), material sphere (rūpāvacara), immaterial sphere (arūpāvacara), unincluded [of supramundane state] (apariyāpanna); fivefold as associated with the (physical) faculty of happiness (sukhindriya), associated with the faculty (physical) of unhappiness (dukkhindriya), associated with the faculty of mental happiness (somanassindriya), associated with the faculty of mental unhappiness (domanassindriya), associated with the faculty of indifference (upekhindriya); sixfold as volition (cetanā) born of eye contact (cakkhusamphassajā) volition born of ear contact (sotasamphassajā), volition born of nose contact (ghānasamphassajā), volition born of tongue contact (jivhāsamphassajā), volition born of body contact (kāyasamphassajā), volition born of mind contact (manosamphassajā); sevenfold as, in addition to the first five of the sixfold, as volition born of mind - element - contact (manodhātu) and volition born of mind-consciousness - element - contact (manoviññāṇadhātu); eight fold as comprised of first four volitions as in the fivefold and volition born of body contact accompanied by happiness, that accompanied by unhappiness, volition born of mind - element - contact, volition born of mind - consciousness - element contact; as ninefold, all volitions upto volition born of

mind-element-contact and volition born of mind - consciousness - element that is good, bad and indeterminate; as tenfold, the first four volitions as described in sixfold and volition born of body contact accompanied by happiness and unhappiness, volition born of mind - element - contact, volition born of mind - consciousness - element - contact that is good, bad and indeterminate. Afterwards the divisions are narrowed down to two-fold (duka) and threefold (tika). It is shown that bad principles (akusala dhammās) will arise with greed, hatred and dullness with four groups as follows:

'Then how do evil bad principles (papakā akusalā dhamma) arise? There are three bad roots (akusala mūla), greed, hatred and dullness and the defilements occuring associated with the group of sensation, the group of recognition (perception) the group of saṅkhāra and the group of consciousness and originated with bodily action, verbal action and mental action.' These are said to be evil bad principles that have arisen. In the above paragraph of the Vibhaṅga[194] the bhikkhus are shown how to abandon evil bad principles whenever they are generated in their minds. Whenever the bad roots are generated, the four groups are set in motion as a consequence of bodily actions, speech and thoughts.

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194. Vbh. p.209

In the presence of greed, hatred and dullness, the teachings of the Buddha show five specific instructions to get rid of them. In the first place one has to wish (chandaṁ janeti) that evil principles go away from the mind. Secondly one has to realize that greed or hatred or dullness is detrimental to one's well being. Thirdly one has to make effort (vāyamati). Fourthly, one has to apply energy (viriyaṃ). Fifthly one has to exert the mind (ārabhati cittaṃ). Similarly, good principles will arise in the absence of hatred, greed and dullness with the four groups. There are three good roots: namely, absence of greed, absence of hatred and absence of dullness. The four groups, namely, group of sensation, group of recognition (perception), group of saṅkhāra and group of consciousness are associated with the three good roots (kusala mūla). Thereby bodily action, verbal action and mental action are generated.[195]

When these good roots associated with the four groups have not arisen, then one has to exert energy to generate good roots. In the Vibhaṅga discussion on bad roots (akusala mūla) and good roots (kusala mūla) the position of the ābhidhammikas is quite clear. Thus when hatred, greed and dullness are present, the workings of the four groups generate bad verbal, bodily and mental actions. The bad roots always contribute to continue bad (akusala) roots, bad groups and bad actions

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195. Vbh. p.210

(akusala kamma). Conversely, good roots contribute to generate good groups and good actions (kusala kamma).

In the analysis of the saṅkhārakkhandha the authors of the abhidhamma have clearly explained the concept in the discussion on mind. In order to understand what the saṅkhārakkhandha is, let us see some of the contexts.

Saṅkhārakkhandha is one of the four groups which comprise the 'body' (kāyo). The 'body' refers in this instance to mental groups; the group of sensation (vedanā), the group of recognition (perception), the group of saṅkhāra and the group of consciousness. A person may experience pleasure by way of these mental groups. It is the pleasant experience or feeling associated with the mental contact.[196]

Similarly saṅkhārakkhandha is included in the category of nāma along with three other groups: the group of sensation, the group of recognition (perception) and the group of consciousness and asaṅkhata dhātu.[197]

In the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, saṅkhārakkhandha appears as having a mental object (sārammaṇa) along with the group of sensation, the group of recognition and the group of consciousness.[198] Also, saṅkhārakkhandha is one of the principles which are not

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196. Vbh. p. 259

197. Dhs. p. 226

198. ibid. p. 209 (ārammaṇa is a mental object, not a physical or sense object, which is visaya), see Warder, A.K. 'Objects', Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III, 1975, pp. 355-361.

thought (no citta) but it is one of the principles along with vedanā and saññā which are mental properties (cetasika).[199]

In the previous chapter also, we saw that the two groups sensation (vedanā) and recognition or perception (saññā) are cittasaṅkhāra and that there is a separate group called saṅkhārakkhandha. The Abhidhammapitaka goes along with the Sutta and gives the list of 50 saṅkhāras in the saṅkhārakkhandha in the first good thought (kusala citta).[200]

Then we find the enumeration of saṅkhārakkhandha numbering 23 in the first bad thought (akusala citta).[201] The third book of the Abhidhammapitaka, the Dhātukathā, discusses the five groups separately and states that every khandha is classified under 1 group, 1 base and 1 element. In respect of the classification under association, disassociation, saṅkhārakkhandha is associated with three other groups with 1 base and with 7 elements and it is disassociated with 1 group (matter).[202]

According to the Dhātukathā, from saṅkhāra as a condition, there is consciousness, which is associated with 3 groups (saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ tīhi khandhehi sampayuttaṃ...).[203]

The Khandha yamaka explains all the five khandhas and their delimitations. It states that not all saṅkhāras are

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199. Dhs p. 209
200. Ibid. p. 17-18
201. Ibid. pp. 84-85
202. Dhk. p. 51
203. Ibid. p. 53

saṅkhārakkhandha. For example, sensation, recognition and consciousness are also saṅkhāras but they are not saṅkhārakkhandha. But saṅkhārakkhandha is associated with other saṅkhāras.[204]

Among the 24 conditions (paccaya) given in the vivid exposition of the Paṭṭhāna, there are seven conditions that are directly based on the four groups, sensation, recognition, saṅkhāra and consciousness.[205]

It is important to discover how the following seven conditions are relating to the four groups and the saṅkhārakkhandha in particular.

1. conascence (sahajātapaccayo)
2. mutuality (aññamañña)
3. dependence (nissaya)
4. resultant (vipāka)
5. association (sampayutta)
6. presence (atthi)
7. non disappearance (avigata)

On the basis of the first condition (sahajāta), the four groups vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra and viññāṇa are mutually related to one another by the condition of conascence. If one group is

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204. Yam. pp. 14-16

205. Pṭh. pt 2, pp 169-180

sappaccaya, then the other three are saṅkhata and vice versa. There are 89 thoughts (cittas) and 52 mental properties. All the 89 thoughts are the consciousness group. Out of 52 mental properties, the sensation property is sensation group, the recognition property is recognition or perception group and the remaining 50 properties belong to saṅkhārakkhandha.

All the groups condition each other and the four elements (mahābhūta) are conditioned by way of mutuality (aññamañña).

The four groups mutually depend on each other due to the dependence condition (nissaya).

The action-result condition (vipāka paccaya) is the condition of good and bad volition (cetanā). Since the four groups are the results of actions, they condition each other group by way of action-result.

On the basis of arising and ceasing together, taking the same object, and depending on the same base, the groups are associated with one another (sampayutta).

The presence of one principle supports the other principles in respect of the groups. This is called (atthi paccayo).

Similarly, the avigata paccaya as the non disappearance of a principle contributes in supporting the other principles of the groups.

IV

Āyu saṅkhāra

The term āyu saṅkhāra in the Abhidhamma has the same sense as in the suttas; namely, the duration of life. It is found in the Kathāvatthu that the term has been used to show that the duration of the life of the Buddha was coming to a close (āyusaṅkhāro ossaṭṭho).[206]

In the analysis of the material principles which are the life faculty the Dhammasaṅgaṇi says,

> 'The āyu of these material principles, their subsistence, their sustenance, their being kept sustained, their progress, continuance, preservation, life, life faculty.'
>
> (Kataman tam rupam jivitindriyam? Yo tesam rūpīnam dhammānam āyu ṭhiti yapanā yāpanā iriyanā vattanā pālanā jīvitam jīvitindriyam).[207]

206. Kvu. 11 p. 557

207. Dhs. p. 27

V

Saṅkhāras of exertion for concentration of the four iddhipādas

In the analysis of the four bases of power (iddhipāda) saṅkhāra is a **saṅkhāra of exertion (padhāna) for concentration** of will, energy, etc. It appears that on account of saṅkhāra right effort will lead the mind into the principles of the four bases of power. As a result a monk may get rid of the wrong view for the entering of the first jhāna, abandoning self pleasures.[208]

VI

Sasaṅkhāra and asaṅkhāra

In the Abhidhamma, the two terms asaṅkhāra and sasaṅkhāra are used in respect of thought (citta). The thought may arise spontaneously to give something to someone: that is called asaṅkhāra. But sasaṅkhāra does not arise spontaneously, it needs some effort or instigation either by oneself or from others. For example, when there is an instigation to offer food to monks, that is sasaṅkhāra.

In the Dhammasaṅgani we find that even if a thought has

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208. Vbh. p. 220 (See above Chapter 4)

arisen by sasaṅkhāra (instigation) that thought is good.[209]

Apart from asaṅkhāra and sasaṅkhāra in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi the Puggala-Paññatti and the Kathāvatthu introduce the two terms asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyī and sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī following the suttas. According to the Puggala Paññatti, a person, who by asaṅkhāra (without any instigation) recognizes the noble path, may give up the fetters of the higher nature. Such a person is described as asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī.

On the other hand a person who by the aid of the sasaṅkhāra (strenuous effort) will recognizes the noble path with the intention of giving up the fetters of the higher nature is called a sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī.[210]

The term parinibbāyī in relation to the terms antarā, upahacca, asaṅkhāra, sasaṅkhāra and uddhamsoto has been discussed in detail in the Sutta chapter.[211] The usage in both the Kathāvatthu and the Puggalapaññatti is the same as in the suttas[212]

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209. Dhs. p. 27

210. Pug. p. 17

211. Kvu 105-106, 242, 275, 291, 366

212. S.V. 201

(B) KHUDDAKA

In addition to the usage of the concept of saṅkhāra in the four nikāyas in chapter 3 and Abhidhamma in this chapter, an attempt is made to deal with some of the texts of the Khuddaka Nikāya. We will consider here only the Dhammapada, the Niddesa, the Udāna, and the Paṭisambhidāmagga. We have not taken into consideration the remainder of the Khuddaka Nikāya which is mainly poetic and narrative.

The Paṭisambhidāmagga represents a later period than the Dīgha, Majjhima, and Samyuttanikāyas. The term paṭisambhidā (discrimination) does not appear in those nikāyas. In the Aṅguttara nikāya, however, the term paṭisambhidāmagga (discrimination) is found and the Aṅguttara nikāya appears to have been closed later than the other three nikāyas.[213]

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213. Path of Discrimination, (Introduction) p. vii

The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* illustrates the relationship of *saṅkhāra* to the sequence of conditioned origination in a statement which is worded differently from that of the four *nikāyas*. It is as follows:

> 'ignorance is the basis when *saṅkhāras* are arising; it is the basis in their continuance; it is the basis in their sign; it is the basis in their accumulation; it is the basis in their association; it is the basis in their obstruction; it is the basis in their origin; it is the basis in their cause; it is the basis in their conditionality.'

In these nine perspectives, ignorance is a condition, *saṅkhāras* are originated from a condition. That both these two principles are conditionally arisen is the understanding of the grasping of a condition in the bases (stations) of the principles. In the long path of the past and the long path of the future ignorance is the basis of arising of *saṅkhāras*; it is the basis of their continuance; it is the basis of their sign; it is the basis of their accumulation; it is the basis of their association; it is the basis of their obstruction; it is the basis of their origin; it is the basis of their cause and it is the basis of their conditonality. Understanding of the grasping of conditinns is in these nine

perspectives, ignorance is a condition, _saṅkhāras_ are conditionally arisen, both these two principles originate from a condition in the knowledge of the stations of principles.[214]

This illustrates the nine perspectives through which ignorance is the basis or station for _saṅkhāras_.

Next, there is a discussion of four general classifications as follows:

A. In existence as action (before this life) there is delusion which is ignorance; there is accumulation which is _saṅkhāras_; there is longing which is craving; there is undertaking which is clinging; there is volition which is existence; then, these five principles in existence as action are conditions for rebirth-linking here.

B. [In the present life] There is rebirth-linking which is consciousness; there is arising (in the womb) which is sentient body; there is sensitivity which is base (_āyatana_); there is touching, which is contact; there is sensing, which is sensation; then, these five principles

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214. Ps. I. 50

in respect of (their causing) existence here have their basis in actions done in the past.

C. [In the present life] Here with the well matured bases there is delusion, which is ignorance; there is accumulation, which is *saṅkhāras*; there is longing which is craving; there is undertaking which is clinging; there is volition, which is existence; then, these five principles in respect of existence as action here are conditions for rebirth-linking in the future.

D. There is rebirth-linking in the future, which is consciousness; there is arising (in the womb) which is sentient body; there is sensitivity which is base; there is touching, which is contact; there is sensing which is sensation; then, these five principles in respect of being reborn in the future have their conditions in the actions performed here. Thus one knows, sees, understands and penetrates the four classifications.[215]

This shows the continuity (impersonal principles) from a past to a present life, from a present life to a

215. Ps .I.52

future life. This discerning of conditions is achieved by generalizing the conditions and the conditionally arisen principles into four classifications as follows:

(a) Past conditions for present principles (dhammas).

(b) Present conditions as principles with past conditions.

(c) Present conditions for future principles.

(d) Future conditions as principles with present conditions.

In the discussion in volume II of the Paṭisambhidāmagga we found that defilements and obsessions are bound up with measure. Cessation is measureless in the sense of immobile and in that sense it is asaṅkhata.[216]

In the analysis of the four noble truths the Paṭisambhidāmagga gives saṅkhata and asaṅkhata as two characteristics of the truths. Then it enumerates six characteristics of the truths, three for saṅkhata and three for asaṅkhata. They are described as follows:

' How many characteristics have the truths?

The truths have two characteristics: The

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216 . Ps. II.p.127

characteristic of _saṅkhata_ and the charateristic of _asaṅkhata_. The truths have these two characteristics. How many characteristics have the truths?

The truths have six characteristics. Of the _saṅkhata_ truths arising is made known, their fall is made known, and their alteration when present is made known; of the _asaṅkhata_ truth, no arising is made known, no fall is made known, and no alteration when present is made known. The truths have these six characteristics.

How many characteristics have the truths? The truths have twelve characteristics. Of the truth of unhappiness its arising is made known, its fall is made known, and its altertion when present is made known; of the truth of origin its arising is made known, its fall

is made known, and its alteration when present is made known; of the truth of the way its arising is made known; its fall is made known, and its alteration when present is made known; of the truth of cessation no arising is made known, no fall is made known, and no alteration when present is made known. The truths have these twelve characteristics.[217]

In the Paṭisambhidāmagga text here, the order of the third and fourth truths has been changed in order to separate cessation which is asaṅkhata.

Among the three doors to liberation from the world the Paṭisambhidāmagga connects saṅkhāra with the first two of the three, dhammas with the third. The first door is to the seeing of all saṅkhāras as limited[218] and to the entering of consciousness into the signless principle. The second door is to the sharpening of the mind in respect of all saṅkhāras and to the entering of consciousness into the desireless (uncommitted) principle. Thirdly to the seeing of all principles as alien and to the entering of consciousness into the emptiness principle. The above three are called three doors to liberation.[219]

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217. Ps.II.p.108

218. Cf p.27 above (Ps.II.127)

219. Ps.II.p.48

At the moment of rebirth-linking, the five groups and the four great principles interact as conditions. In the same way three _jīvīta saṅkhāras_ become conditions. According to Mahānāma they are life span (_āyu_), heat and consciousness.[220]

'At the moment of rebirth linking five groups are simultaneous origin conditions. They are mutual conditions, they are support conditions, they are separated conditions. At the moment of rebirth-linking, the four great principles are simultaneous origin conditions, they are mutual conditions, they are support conditions, they are separated conditions. At the moment of rebirth-linking the three life _saṅkhāras_ are simultaneous origin conditions, they are mutual conditions, they are support conditions, they are separated conditions. At the time of rebirth-linking the parts of the sentient body are simultaneous origin conditions, they are mutual conditions, they are support conditions, they are separated conditions. At the moment of rebirth-linking, these fourteen principles are simultaneous origin conditions, they are mutual support conditions, and they are separated conditions.[221]

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220. PsA. II. 372

221. Ps, II. p. 48

In the Paṭisambhidāmagga there is whole treatise on suññatā (emptiness). Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu has translated this term as voidness in his Path of Discrimination.

The concept of emptiness of the saṅkhāras is explained with reference to the sets of three — puñña, apuñña, and āneñja - and the other three -kāya, vacī and citta - and past, present and future, but they are only said to be empty of each other.[222]

In the Dhammapada the Buddha shows this idea after his enlightenment.

'O house builder, you are seen,
You cannot build a house again,
All your ribs are broken, your ridge pole is
collapsed, (visaṅkhitaṁ)
My thought gone to the state of visaṅkhāra
has experienced the end of desire.[223]

There is no object of consciousness as the bliss of nibbāna has been experienced. According to the Dhammapada all saṅkhāras are impermanent. Realization of this

222. Ps.II.p.178

223. Dh. V. 154

leads the way to the attaining of the final bliss of *nibbāna*.

All *saṅkhāras* are impermanent, when one sees this with understanding, then one becomes disgusted with unhappiness. This is the way to purification.[224]

All *saṅkhāras* are unhappy. When one sees this with understanding, then one becomes disgusted with unhappiness. This is the way to purification.[225]

All principles are no soul. When one sees this with understanding, then one becomes disgusted with unhappiness. This is the way to purification.[226]

In the above first two verses *saṅkhāras* are both impermanent and unhappy. But the final verse shows that principles or elements are no soul. It is evident that in this context *saṅkhāras* are included in principles in order to avoid any misunderstanding that beyond

224. *Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā ti yadā paññāya passati atha nibbindati dukkhe esa maggo visuddhiyā*. (Dh. 277)

225. *Sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā ti yadā paññāya passati atha nibbindati dukkhe esa maggo visuddhiyā*. (Dh. 278)

226. *Sabbe dhammā anattā ti yadā paññāya passati atha nibbindati dukkhe esa maggo visuddhiyā* (Dh. 279)

saṅkhāra there is a soul. It is said that all saṅkhāra and asaṅkhata principles have no-soul thereby avoiding any reference to soul.

A similar description is found in the Niddesa concerning the above Dhammapada statements that all saṅkhāras are impermanent and unhappiness and all principles (dhamma) are no-soul.[227] This statement that saṅkhāras are impermanent is equivalent to the way in which the term saṅkhata has been used in the Niddesa. But the presentation in the Niddesa is different from other canonical texts in respect of saṅkhata. According to the Niddesa there is a division of saṅkhata and that is twofold on the basis of the arrangement. They are the craving arrangement (taṇhāpakappanā) and arrangement of wrong view (diṭṭhipakappanā) and in the usual way they are subject to conditions (paṭiccasamuppanna), decay (khayadhammā), loss (vayadhammā), passionlessness (virāgadhammā), extinction (nirodhadhammā).[228]

The other Niddesa context different from the other canonical texts in respect of saṅkhāra is two loved ones (dve piyā) in the explanation of piya in Sn. 41, etc. They are living beings and saṅkhāras. The living beings (sattā piyā) are narrated as: desiring to be beneficial (atthakāma), blessing (hitakāma), comforting (phāsukāma), and releasing from attachments (yogakkhemakāma). These are in respect of mother, father, brother, sister, son, daughter, friend, a fellow-worker, relative and a kinsman.

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227. Nd1 .. pp. 235-245 (Sn. 853), Nd2 .p. 259

228. ibid., pp. 72-73

The other loved one, saṅkhāra, is pleasing sights(manāpikā rūpā), pleasing sounds(manāpikā saddā), pleasing smells(manāpikā gandhā), pleasing tastes(manāpikā rasā) and pleasing tangibles (manāpikā phoṭṭhabbā). In the same manner, there are two unpleasant ones. They are unpleasant living beings and unpleasant saṅkhāras. The unpleasant living beings are: desiring to be unbeneficial,unblessing,uncomforting not releasing from attachments and depriving of life (jīvitā voropetukāmā). The unpleasant saṅkhāras are: displeasing sights, displeasing sounds,displeasing smells,displeasing tastes and displeasing tangibles. In the privious discussion in chapter 4, we saw that saṅkhāras transmit from previous life to present life. Similarly the saṅkhāras in the present life accumulating by way of five sense objects will transmit to the future life.

These saṅkhāras have been explained as visaṃkhata (destroyed or removed), abhisaṅkhata (prepared, fixed, made up, arranged, or done) and saṇṭhapitā (settled, established, adjusted) and these saṅkhāras are impermanent. This appears to be the definition given in the Niddesa.[229] The Niddesa definition is relevant to the

229. Nd1.p. 72

present life as from the previous saṅkhāras, one is able to have birth in this life. Also due to the sense objects, one is preparing for a future life and due to saṅkhāras a new life can be established in this life or in the future.

This is based on the action (kamma) done in this life and that action is described as puññābhisaṅkhāra, apuññābhisaṅkhāra and āneñjābhisaṅkhāra.[230] Also, hanging on to the five groups is worthless (asāra) as the more one hangs on to it the more it will generate empty or deserted saṅkhāras (tuccha saṅkhāra).[231]

On the whole the Niddesa explanation of saṅkhāra is in line with the other sutta texts and appears to go beyond the suttas to explain certain key terms in respect of saṅkhāras as worthless. The more one keeps enjoying the five senses the more saṅkhāras will increase for future births and the message conveyed in the Niddesa is to control the senses, thereby one may reduce the level of saṅkhāras to perceive the right path to attain the ultimate bliss of nibbāna.

The term saṅkhata is found in a famous passage in the Udāna which analyses nibbāna as follows:

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230. Nd1 . p. 206 (Sn. 846)

231. Nd2 , p. 278 (on suññato loko in Sn. 1119)

'O bhikkhus, there is not born, not become, not made, and *asaṅkhata*. *Bhikkhus*, if there were not not born, not made, not become and *asaṅkhata*, there would be no liberation from here from birth, becoming, making and *saṅkhāra*. *Bhikkhus*, since there is not born, not become, *asaṅkhata*, therefore there is a liberation from birth, becoming, making and *saṅkhāra*.[232]

232. Ud. pp.80-1

CHAPTER 6

ATTHAKATHĀ (COMMENTARIES)

Sutta and Abhidhamma contexts where the term saṅkhāra appears have been discussed in the earlier chapters. This chapter will be devoted to discussing the contexts of saṅkhāra appearing in the Pali Aṭṭhakathās (commentaries). The history of the commentaries has been studied by E. W. Adikaram in his Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon.

In the first part of the fifth century A.D. Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa arrived in Sri Lanka for the purpose of translating the Sinhalese Aṭṭhakathās into Pali. According to Adikaram there were twenty-eight Sinhalese Aṭṭhakathās in the island including the famous Mahāaṭṭhakathā, Mahāpaccari and Kurundi.[233]

Before translating the Aṭṭhakathās Buddhaghosa wrote the Visuddhimagga on the basis of the Sinhalese Aṭṭhakathās. Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa has written Aṭṭhakathās for the Vinaya Piṭaka, the Pātimokkha, the four Nikāyas (Dīgha, Majjhima, Samyutta and Aṅguttara) and the seven Abhidhamma texts. Also the Aṭṭhakathās for the Khuddakapātha, Dhammapada, Suttanipāta and Jātaka are attributed to Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa.[234]

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233. Adikāram, p. 10

234. ibid., pp. 1-2

He eliminated a good deal of material from the Aṭṭhakathās by referring to the Visuddhimagga for details given systematically there, instead of repeating them. It is doubtful whether Buddhaghosa in fact wrote the Dhammapada and Jātaka Aṭṭhakathās.

Apart from the above Aṭṭhakathās the following writers have composed Aṭṭhakathās for the remaining Tipiṭaka (Khuddaka Nikāya) texts:

Udāna	Dhammapāla
Itivuttaka	"
Vimānavatthu	"
Petavatthu	"
Theragāthā	"
Therīgāthā	"
Niddesa	Upasena
Paṭisambhidāmagga	Mahānāma
Buddhavaṃsa	Buddhadatta
Cariyāpiṭaka	Dhammapāla
Apadāna	Anonymous

Buddhaghosa has discussed saṅkhāra at length in the Visuddhimagga. The actual commentaries in Pali add very little to what is to be found in the Visuddhimagga and instead presuppose the discussion given in the Visuddhimagga, to which some of them refer.[235] We shall take the detailed discussion from the Visuddhimagga and supplement it with additional points from other Aṭṭhakathās where they are found.

Following the Saṃyuttanikāya (S.11.87) statement that saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti ti saṅkhārā, thus they are saṅkhāras, Buddhaghosa

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235. tesaṃ vitthārakathā Visuddhimagge vuttā (AA.p.97)

states that saṅkhāras are twofold, namely (a) saṅkhāras with ignorance as condition and (b) saṅkhāras given in the texts with the word saṅkhāra. The saṅkhāras with ignorance as condition are six and they are: (a) three, namely, abhisaṅkhāras [sic] of merit, of demerit and of the imperturbable, and (b) the three, namely, the bodily, the verbal and the mental. All these are simply mundane good and bad volition. Then the saṅkhāras given in the texts with the word saṅkhāra are:

1. the saṅkhāras consisting of the saṅkhatasaṅkhāras.
2. the saṅkhāras consisting of the abhisaṅkhatasaṅkhāras.
3. the saṅkhāras consisting of abhisaṅkharaṇakasaṅkhāras
4. the saṅkhāras consisting in momentum - payogābhisaṅkhāra.

(1) All principles with conditions given in the statements such as 'saṅkhāras are impermanent' are saṅkhāras consisting of the saṅkhatasaṅkhāras. (2) In the commentaries material and immaterial principles of the three planes, generated by kamma, are called saṅkhāras consisting of the abhisaṅkhatasaṅkhāras. They are also included in the statement 'saṅkhāras are impermanent'. (3) The good and bad volitions of the three planes are called the saṅkhāras consisting of abhisaṅkharaṇakasaṅkhāra. (4) Bodily and mental energy (viriya) is called the saṅkhāras consisting in momentum. This is given in the texts in such statements as: 'the wheel having gone as far as the impetus (abhisaṅkhāra) [Ṭīkā says abhisaṅkhāra here = payogavega] carried it as if fixed on an axle, it stopped'. And not only these, but many other kinds of saṅkhāras are given in the texts with the word saṅkhāra in the way starting 'when a monk is attaining the cessation of recognition and sensation, friend Visākha, first his verbal saṅkhāra ceases, then his bodily saṅkhāra, then his mental saṅkhāra,' (M.1.302). But there is no saṅkhāra among them not included

in (1) saṅkhāras consisting of the saṅkhatasaṅkhāras;[236]

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236. Yaṃ paṭicca phalam eti, so paccayo. Paṭiccā ti na vinā; appaccakkhitvā ti attho. Etī ti uppajjati c'eva pavattati cā ti attho. Api ca upakārakaṭṭho paccayaṭṭho. Avijjā ca sā paccayo cā ti avijjāpaccayo, tasmā avijjāpaccayā. Saṅkhatam abhisaṅkharonti ti saṅkhārā. Api ca, avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārasaddena āgatasaṅkhārā ti duvidhā sankhārā. Tattha, puññāpuññāneñjābhisaṅkhārā tayo, kāya-vacī-cittasaṅkhārā tayo ti ime cha avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā. Te sabbe pi lokiyakusalākusalacetanāmattam eva hoti.

Saṅkhatasaṅkhārā, abhisaṅkhatasaṅkhārā, abhisaṅkharaṇaka-saṅkhāro, payogābhisaṅkhāro ti ime pana cattāro saṅkhārasaddena āgatasaṅkhārā.

Tattha 'Aniccā vata saṅkhārā' ti [D.ii.157] ādisu vuttā sabbe pi sappaccayā dhammā saṅkhatasaṅkhārā nāma. Kammanibbattā tebhūmakā rūpārūpadhammā abhisaṅkhatasaṅkhārā ti Aṭṭhakathāsu vuttā. Te pi, 'Aniccā vata saṅkhārā' ti etth'eva saṅgahaṃ gacchanti; visuṃ pana nesaṃ āgataṭṭhānaṃ na paññāyati. Tebhūmakakusalākusala-cetanā pana abhisaṅkharaṇaka-saṅkhāro ti vuccati. Tassa, 'Avijjāgato ayaṃ bhikkhave purisapuggalo puññañ ce saṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharotī' ti [S.ii.82] ādisu āgataṭṭhānaṃ paññāyati. Kāyika-cetasikaṃ pana viriyaṃ payogābhisaṅkhāro ti vuccati. So, 'Yāvatikā abhisaṅkhārassa gati, tāvatikaṃ gantvā akkhāhataṃ maññe aṭṭhāsī' ti [A. i. 112] ādisu āgato.

Na kevalañ ca ete yeva, aññe pi, 'Saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ samāpajjantassa kho āvuso Visākha bhikkhuno paṭhamaṃ

We could summarize this in the following table.

Five khandhas	1. saṅkhata = all conditioned dhammas (includes all the other saṅkhāras).	
Five khandhas (not as wide as preceding)	2. abhisaṅkhata = produced by kamma = dhammas	
paccaya-one khandha?[237]	3. abhisaṅkharaṇaka = cetanā (conditioning dhammas) ↓ <producing paṭisandhi>	(=kusala + akusala + avyākata = puñña, apuñña, āneñja = 29 cetanās including kāya vacī and citta)
Part of preceding	4. payoga (abhi-) = viriya	(also physical momentum of a wheel)
Four khandhas (but only small part of rūpa and saṅkhāra) (But sometimes these are explained as sañcetanā)	5. kāya, vacī, citta = saṅkhāras (breathing, vitakka vicāra and saññā and vedanā) of or acting on kāya, vacī and citta	(cease when saññā and vedayita cease)

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236. (cont'd) nirujjhati vacīsaṅkhāro, tato kāyasaṅkhāro, tato cittasaṅkhāro' ti [M.i. 302] ādinā nayena saṅkhārasaddena āgatā aneke saṅkhārā. Tesu n'atthi so saṅkhāro yo saṅkhata-saṅkhārehi saṅgahaṃ na gaccheyya. Vism. pp 448-449.

237. Saṅkhārakkhandha = especially cetanā, phassa and manasikāra (MA.1.221)

In explaining _saṅkhārakkhandha_ earlier in the _khandha_ chapter (p.391) Buddhaghosa follows the _Dhammasaṅgaṇi_ enumeration with the additions of the _Atthasālinī_ and gives _abhisaṅkharaṇa_ as characteristic of _saṅkhāra_. Perhaps this is another '_saṅkhāra_' (i.e. no 6):

One _khandha_ 6. _abhisaṅkharaṇa_ = _saṅkhārakkhandha_ (accumulating)

Ultimately _saṅkhāra_ = _dhammas_ as conditioned and conditioning, but some are selected for special treatment with reference to rebirth or conditioned origination - the main driving forces; as for the _khandhas_, the _saṅkhāra_ concept here shows the relations between them.

According to the preceding passages there are four (or more) types of _saṅkhāras_ which have been mentioned above. They are:

1. _Saṅkhata saṅkhāra_ - (conditioned _saṅkhāra_)
2. _Abhisaṅkhata saṅkhāra_ - (_kamma_; conditioned _saṅkhāra_ or active, energising or willing)
3. _Abhisaṅkharaṇaka saṅkhāra_ - (volition which is good or bad)
4. _Payogābhisaṅkhāra_ - (energy consisting of bodily and mental momentum)

(+5. _Vacīkāyacittasaṅkhāra_ - (in order of cessation))

(+6. _Abhisaṅkharaṇa saṅkhāra_ - (_saṅkhārakkhandha_, accumulating)

Further the _Visuddhimagga_ gives examples from the _suttas_. The above twofold analysis of _saṅkhāra_ may be regarded as a well defined formula for the understanding of the theory of _saṅkhāra_.[238] Buddhaghosa further states that the three _saṅkhāras_; namely, _puñña_, _apuñña_, and _āneñjābhisaṅkhāra_ are twenty-nine volitions; that is _puññābhisaṅkhāra_ consists

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238. An identical passage is found in VbhA. p.134-5

of thirteen volitions, out of them eight are sense sphere kusalā cetanā (profitable volitions) and the remaining five are material sphere profitable volitions.

Apuññābhisaṅkhāra consists of twelve akusalā cetanā (unprofitable volitions).

Āneñjābhisaṅkhāra consists of four kusalā cetanā (profitable volitions) associated with immaterial spheres (arūpāvacara).

The three saṅkhāras - citta, kāya and vacī have been identified as mental volition, bodily volition and verbal volition. These three volitions are present at the three doors of kamma when there is an accumulation of kamma. The kāya saṅkhāra is comprised of

Sense sphere profitable volitions	8
Sense sphere unprofitable volitions	12
Total	20

These twenty volitions occur in the body door and generate bodily intimation. Similarly these twenty volitions occur in the speech door and generate verbal intimation.

All the twenty nine volitions are citta saṅkhāras when they occur at the mental door (manodvāra) without originating either kind of intimation.[239]

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239. Itaresu pana tīsu kāyasañcetanā kāyasaṅkhāro, vacīsañcetanā vacīsaṅkhāro, manosañcetanā cittasaṅkhāro. Ayaṃ tiko kammāyūhanakkhaṇe puññābhisaṅkhārādīnaṃ dvārato pavattidassanatthaṃ vutto. Kāyaviññattiṃ samuṭṭhāpetvā hi kāyadvārato pavattā aṭṭha kāmāvacarakusalacetanā, dvādasa akusalacetanā ti samavīsati cetanā kāyasaṅkhāro nāma. Tā eva vacīviññattiṃ samuṭṭhāpetvā

From the above discussion it is clear that when the volitions arise through bodily intimation (kāya viññatti) and verbal intimation (vacī viññatti) that would create kāya saṅkhāra and vacī saṅkhāra respectively. These saṅkhāras have ignorance as condition as they exist so long as the ignorance exists.

Then Buddhaghosa continues to explain what the three abhisaṅkhāras are respectively. They are the non-abandoning of ignorance as to the four truths, which prevents one from recognizing as unhappiness the kind of unhappiness called the fruit of merit. That would lead to many miseries such as birth, ageing, disease and death, so one embarks upon the puññābhisaṅkhāra named as bodily, verbal and mental. Similarly not knowing the miseries of indulging in sense pleasures one embarks upon the apuññābhisaṅkhāras which occur in the three doors. Also as a result of not knowing unhappiness and owing to the mistaken views of eternality, etc., one embarks upon the āneñjābhisaṅkhāras.

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239. (cont'd) vacīdvārato pavattā vacīsaṅkhāro nāma. Abhiññā-cetanā pan'ettha parato viññāṇassa paccayo na hoti ti na gahitā. Yathā ca abhiññācetanā, evaṃ uddhaccacetanā pi na hoti. Tasmā sā pi viññāṇassa paccayabhāve apanetabbā. Avijjāpaccayā pana sabbā p'etā honti. Ubho pi viññattiyo asamuṭṭhāpetvā manodvāre uppannā pana sabbā pi ekūnatiṃsati cetanā cittasaṅkhāro ti. Iti ayaṃ tiko purimattikaṃ eva pavisatī ti atthato puññābhisaṅkhārā-dīnaṃ yeva vasena avijjāya paccayabhāvo veditabbo. Vism p. 452

The commentary (ṭīkā) to the Visuddhimagga, the Paramatthamañjusā states that although kāyasaṅkhāra is consciousness originated it is called kāyasaṅkhāra as its existence is bound up with a kamma-born body.[240] According to Buddhaghosa, kāyasaṅkhāra has many ramifications and when a bhikkhu reaches arahantship with its sixteen bases he may always define his āyusaṅkhāra.[241] On this topic Buddhaghosa narrates an incident of how a bhikkhu calculated his āyusaṅkhāra and foretold the time when he would attain nibbāna.[242]

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240. Pm. p.263

241. Vism.p.241

242. ibid. pp241-2

In many ways ignorance is the condition for apuññābhisaṅkhāra as the support condition at the time of arising of greed. As a result of ignorance one may kill living beings without knowing the dangers involved.

After the exposition of kāya saṅkhāra there is a detailed description of what cittasaṅkhāra is. It is the two aggregates, namely sensation (vedanā) and recognition or perception (saññā). The experiencing of bliss must be understood to be through three jhānas and that of the cittasaṅkhāra through four. By tranquilizing sensation and recognition (perception) a recluse attains bliss of mind. When there is a stop to the workings of sensation and recognition there is bliss of mind. Since sensation and recognition (perception) are bound up with the mind, sensation and recognition (perception) are called cittasaṅkhāra.[243]

After presenting the argument from consciousness, Buddhaghosa states that puññābhisaṅkhāra, giving rebirth-linking produces its results in two kinds of existence, four kinds of birth beginning with egg-born, two destinies, namely human and divine and four stations of consciousness (human, first level of jhāna, second level of jhāna and third level of jhāna).[244]

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243. Vism, p. 238

244. Tatr'idaṃ ādito paṭṭhāya mukhamattappakāsanaṃ. Imesu hi saṅkhāresu yasmā puññābhisaṅkhāro tāva dvīsu bhave.. paṭisandhiṃ datvā sabbaṃ attano vipākaṃ janeti, tathā aṇḍajādisu catūsu yonisu, devamanussasaṅkhātāsu dvīsu gatisu, nānattakāyā-nānattasaññī-nānattakāyā-ekattasaññī-ekattakāyā-nānattasaññī-ekattakāyā-ekattasaññī-saṅkhātāsu catūsu viññāṇaṭṭhitisu, asaññasattāvāse pan'esa rūpamattaṃ evābhisaṅkharotī ti catūsu yeva sattāvāsesu ca paṭisan-

The *apuññābhisaṅkhāra*, as rebirth- linking ripens in the sense sphere existence only, in the four kinds of generation (*catūsu yonisu*), in the remaining three destinies (*gatisu*), in the one station of consciousness namely different in body and same in recognition (*nānattakāya ekattasaññī saṅkhātāya ekissā viññāṇatthiyā*) and in the one corresponding existence of beings.[245] But *āneñjābhisaṅkhāra* associated with rebirth- linking produces in the immaterial sphere being, in one spontaneous rebirth(*opapātika*), one divine destiny, in the three stations of consciousness beginning with the infinity of space and in the four existences of beings starting with the base comprised of boundless space.[246]

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244. (cont'd) *dhiṃ datvā sabbaṃ attano vipākaṃ janeti, tasmā esa etesu dvīsu bhavesu, catūsu yonisu, dvīsu gatisu, catūsu viññāṇaṭṭhitisu, catūsu sattāvāsesu ca ekavīsatiyā vipākaviññāṇānaṃ vuttanayen'eva paccayo hoti, yathāsambhavaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ pavatte ca.* Vism. p. 476.

245. *Apuññābhisaṅkhāro pana yasmā ekasmiṃ yeva kāmabhave, catūsu yonisu, avasesāsu tīsu gatisu, nānattakāyā-ekattasaññī-saṅkhātāya ekissā viññāṇaṭṭhitiyā, tādise yeva ca ekasmiṃ sattāvāse paṭisandhivasena vipaccati, tasmā esa ekasmiṃ bhave catūsu yonisu, tīsu gatisu, ekissā viññāṇaṭṭhitiyā, ekamhi ca sattāvāse sattannaṃ vipākaviññāṇānaṃ vuttanayen'eva paccayo paṭisandhiyaṃ pavatte ca.* (Vism. pp. 476-7.)

246. Vism. p.477.

For *saṅkhāras*, ignorance is a condition as object condition and support condition. In terms of the *puññābhisaṅkhāra* ignorance is an object condition in the sense sphere at the time of understanding that ignorance is liable to destruction and fall. Similarly for those in the fine material sphere, at the time of understanding the confused state of mind through direct knowledge consciousness. Conversely, ignorance is a support condition, in two instances. One is that for the purpose of surmounting ignorance, one fulfills the various instances of sense sphere making *puññābhisaṅkhāra* consisting in giving, etc. The other, for the fine material sphere *saṅkhāras*, that one may develop *jhānas* for the purpose of avoiding ignorance.[247]

In terms of *apuññābhisaṅkhāra* the two conditions apply as in the case of *puññābhisaṅkhāra*. They are object conditions at the moments of arising greed. There will be a support condition that is due to ignorance; one may kill living things without being aware of the danger. But for *āneñjābhisaṅkhāra* ignorance appears as a support condition and it is similar to the support condition mentioned in respect of *puññābhisaṅkhāra*.

According to *paṭiccasamuppāda* the basic function of ignorance is to confuse with respect to real objects. This becomes more clear when considering the analysis of Buddhaghosa which was put forward in relation to the round of births, source, function and prevention.

(a) *Saṅkhāras* and existence are the round of kamma (*saṅkhārabhava-kammavaṭṭam*)

(b) Ignorance, craving and clinging are the round of defilements (*kilesavaṭṭam*).

(c) Consciousness, sentient body, sixfold base, contact

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247. Vism. p. 461

and sensation are the round of results (vipākavaṭṭaṃ)
The three rounds revolve again and again until the defilements are cut off.[248]

With ignorance as condition there are saṅkhāras, is the second truth with second truth as source. Conditioned by saṅkhāras there is consciousness. That is the first truth with the second truth as source.[249]

The next is the function of ignorance. Ignorance confuses beings about physical objects (of sense desire) and ignorance is a condition for the manifestation of saṅkhāras. That is:

'tathā saṅkhārā saṅkhatañca abhisaṅkharonti'[250]

Since consciousness is conditioned by saṅkhāras, transmigration is not seen (as it is). So the wheel of becoming is in fact not seeing

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248. Tivaṭṭaṃ anavaṭṭhitaṃ bhamatī ti ettha pana, saṅkhāra-bhava kammavaṭṭaṃ avijjā-taṇhupādānāni kilesavaṭṭaṃ viññāṇa-nāma-rūpa-saḷāyatana-phassa-vedanā vipākavaṭṭan ti imehi tīṇi vaṭṭehi tivaṭṭaṃ idaṃ bhavacakkaṃ yāva kilesavaṭṭaṃ na upacchijjati tāva anupacchinnapaccayattā anavaṭṭhitaṃ, punappunaṃ parivaṭṭanato bhamati yevā ti veditabbaṃ. (Vism.p. 498)

249. ibid. p. 499

250. ibid.

appropriately, due to ignorance in the round of rebirths. The round of conditioned origination continues without any known cause.

When ignorance is present there are saṅkhāras. So long as saṅkhāras are present consciousness is present. This is going round and round without ending and with no known beginning.

The eradication of ignorance is the only way out. It is compared to the cutting off of a snake's head. When seizing ignorance a foolish person is tangled with defilements in the round of kamma. Seizing the head of a snake would not prevent the arms getting caught in the coils. If one cuts off ignorance it is like cutting off the snake's head, so that nothing remains in the round of kamma. On account of ignorance there are saṅkhāras but there is no maker of saṅkhāras such as Brahmā the creator, who starts the functions of the round of rebirths. Nor is there an attan as an experiencer of happiness and unhappiness.[251]

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251. Evaṃ sati, avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ti idaṃ ādimattakathanaṃ virujjhatī ti ce, — nayidaṃ ādimattakathanaṃ; padhānadhammakathanaṃ pan'etaṃ. Tiṇṇannaṃ hi vaṭṭānaṃ avijjā padhānā. Avijjāgahaṇena hi avasesakilesavaṭṭaṃ ca kammādīni ca bālaṃ palibodhenti. Sappasiragahaṇena sesasappasarīraṃ viya bāhaṃ. Avijjāsamucchede pana kate tehi vimokkho hoti, sappasiracchede kate palibodhitabāhāvimokkho viya. Yath'āha: 'Avijjāya tveva asesavirāganirodhā saṅkhāranirodho' ti [S. ii. 1] ādi. Iti yaṃ gaṇhato bandho muñcato ca mokkho hoti, tassa padhānadhammassa kathanaṃ idaṃ na ādimattakathanan ti. Evaṃ idaṃ bhavacakkaṃ aviditādī ti veditabbaṃ.

Tayidaṃ yasmā avijjādīhi kāraṇehi saṅkhārādīnaṃ pavatti, tasmā

Buddhaghosa following the Sīhala Aṭṭhakathā (ten'āhu Porāṇā) discussed the way in which one comprehends, applying three characteristics in the following seven ways;

'Ādānanikkhepanato vayovuddhatthagāmito
āhārato ca ututo kammato cāpi cittato
dhammatārūpato satta vitthārena vipassatī'ti (Vism p. 530)

1. As taking up and dropping down
2. As what is grown is decaying in each stage
3. As food
4. As season or climate
5. As action
6. As consciousness
7. As materiality

He sees clearly with these seven in detail. On the first point taking up means rebirth linking and dropping down means death. So the recluse observes the characteristics, as all saṅkhāras are impermanent through the following conditions of impermanence.

The first characteristic of saṅkhāra is impermanence (anicca).

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251. (cont'd) tato aññena, 'Brahmā Mahābrahmā ... seṭṭho sañjitā' ti [D.i.18] evaṃ parikappitena Brahmādinā vā saṃsārassa kārakena, 'So kho pana me ayaṃ attā vado vedeyyo' ti evaṃ parikappitena attanā vā sukhadukkhānaṃ vedakena rahitaṃ. Iti kārakavedakarahitan ti veditabbaṃ. (Vism p. 495)

From the rebirth-linking (paṭisandhi) to death (cuti) all the saṅkhāras in between are impermanent. Buddhaghosa gives four characteristics of saṅkhāras.

(a) rise and fall (uppāda and vaya)

(b) change (vipariṇāma)

(c) temporariness (tāvakālika)

(d) hindrance to permanence (niccapaṭikkhepa)

All saṅkhāras which arise are subject to ageing and dissolve after sometime. No one exercises control over them preventing them from coming into being or from ageing and dissolving. Thus they are 'empty' and without soul.[252]

All the characteristics of saṅkhāra, impermanence (anicca) unhappiness (dukkha) and no soul (anattan), have been discussed in almost all the aṭṭhakathās in the same way. It is to be approved, after considering, that all saṅkhāras are impermanent and unhappy, all principles are no soul (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccato dukkhato sabbe dhammā anattato).[253] These saṅkhāras will cease and they will be destroyed (saṅkhārā nirujjhanti vinassanti).[254] There is nothing called not to be destroyed of arisen saṅkhāras whether for the Buddha or his disciples (Buddhā va hontu Buddhasāvakā va uppannā saṅkhārā abhijjanakā nāma n'atthi).[255]

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252. Vism. p. 530

253. ItvA. p. 429

254. ApA. p. 334

255. SA. p. 31

After quoting two passages from the Samyutta Nikāya Buddhaghosa comments on nibbāna as asaṅkhata .He says that if nibbāna is temporary then it must have the characteristics of saṅkhata, that nibbāna would be obtained regardless of the right effort, that if it has the characteristics of saṅkhata it would be included in saṅkhata and subject to the fire of greed, etc. and thus it would be suffering.[256]

Following the sutta analysis, Buddhaghosa states that the saṅkhārakkhandha has the characteristic of abhisaṅkharaṇa. The function is accumulating; the manifestation is expanding; the proximate cause is the rest of the (mental) aggregates. In this connection the Paramatthamañjūsā agreeing with the sutta and the Visuddhimagga adds that saṅkhāra with reference to khandha has the characteristic of adding together or accumulating.[257]

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256. Evaṃ hi sati nibbānaṃ ittarakālaṃ, saṅkhatalakkhaṇaṃ, sammāvāyāmanirapekkhādhigamanīyabhavañ ca āpajjati; saṅkhatalalakkhaṇattā yeva ca saṅkhatapariyāpannaṃ, saṅkhatapariyāpanattā rāgādīhi aggīhi ādittaṃ, ādittattā dukkhañ cā ti pi āpajjati. (Vism. p .432)

257. rāsikaraṇalakkhaṇan ti sampiṇḍanalakkhaṇaṃ, tato saṅkhārā āyūhana rasā vuccanti. (Paramatthamañjūsā, p. 484.) [see also Vism. p.391]

In the *Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā* , *saṅkhārakkhandha* is described as consisting of *cetanā*, *phassa* and *manasikāra* (*Cetanā, phasso, manasikāro ti saṅkhārakkhandho veditabbo*) .[258]

In the same *Aṭṭhakathā* *abhisaṅkhāra* is shown as one of the hidden burdens.[259] On the basis of the *Sāratthappakāsini*, *saṅkhārakkhandha* is threefold as *kammābhisaṅkhāra*.[260]

Also *saṅkhārakkhandha* is described as *cetanā* and contact which is associated with *cetanā* (*tamsampayutto phasso ca cetanā ca saṅkhārakkhandho*).[261] Afterwards Buddhaghosa gives a list of twelve conditions that create unhappiness beginning with ageing. All of them are *saṅkhāras*. Ageing has the characteristic of being conditioned (*saṅkhatalakkhaṇa*).

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258. MA. p.221

259. *ibid.* p. 43 (*ohitabhāro ti, tayo bhārā: khandhabhāro, kilesabhāro, abhisaṅkhārabhāro ti: tass'ime tayo bhārā ohitā, oropitā, nikkhittā, pāpitā: tena vuccati ohitabhāro ti*).

260. SA. p.21 (*nandi-bhava-parikkhayā ti, nandi-mūlakassa kamma-bhavassa parikkhayena nandiyā ca bhavassa cā ti pi vattati. Tattha hi purima-nayena nandi-bhavena tividha-kammābhi-saṅkhāravasena saṅkhāra-kkhandho gahito*).

261. Vism.p. 507

It is unhappiness due to _saṅkhāra_ and it is a basis of unhappiness. Similarly death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, despair, association with the unloved, separation from the beloved and not getting what one wants are unhappiness and they are due to _saṅkhāra_ (_saṅkhāradukkhabhāvato_).[262] As stated earlier ignorance is the prime cause of _saṅkhāra_ although there are other causes such as physical support and object (_vatthārammaṇa-sahajātadhammādisu_). In addition ignorance is the cause of other causes of _saṅkhāra_, such as cankers and craving (_āsava_, _taṇhā_).[263]

The _Manorathapūraṇī_ states that _saṅkhāras_ have volition as characteristic (_saṅkhārāṇam cetanālakkhaṇam_) and also " the characteristic of _abhisaṅkharaṇa_ (_saṅkhārāṇam abhisaṅkharaṇalakkhaṇam_).[264]

Then the _Sumangalāvilasinī_ shows that _saṅkhāra_ with ignorance is a condition in nine ways, following the _Paṭisambhidāmagga_. (see Ch.4).[265]

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262. Vism. pp. 428-429

263. _ibid._ p.462 ('_Avijjāsamudayā āsavasamudayo_' _ti ca vacanato aññesam pi taṇhādīnam saṅkhārahetūnam hetū ti padhānattā_, '_Avidvā, bhikkhave, avijjāgato puññābhisaṅkhāram pi abhisaṅkharotī_')

264. AA. p. 107

265. DA. p. 101

Next following the Vibhaṅga analysis the Visuddhimagga continues with a description of the process of existence which has two aspects; namely, existence as action (kammabhavo) and existence as rebirth(upapattibhavo).

Existence as action refers to volition and what is associated with volition. In turn they are puññābhisaṅkhāra, apuññābhisaṅkhāra and āneñjābhisaṅkhāra ,all action that is described as volition will lead to rebirth in the next birth. Existence as rebirth is based on the past action that generates aggregates. There are nine kinds of existence as rebirth.[266]

266.- Tattha bhavatī ti bhavo. So kammabhavo, upapattibhavo cā ti duvidho hoti. Yath' āha: 'Bhavo duvidhena: atthi kammabhavo, atthi upapattibhavo' ti [Vbh. 137]. Tattha kammam eva bhavo kammabhavo; tathā upapatti yeva upapattibhavo. Ettha ca upapatti, bhavatī ti bhavo; kammaṃ pana yathā sukhakāraṇattā, 'Sukho Buddhānaṃ uppādo' ti [Dh. 194] vutto, evaṃ bhavakāraṇattā phalavohārena bhavo ti veditabban ti. Evaṃ tāv' ettha atthato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Dhammato pana kammabhavo tāva saṅkhepato cetanā c' eva cetanāsampayuttā ca abhijjhādayo kammasaṅkhātā dhammā. Yath' āha: 'Tattha katamo kammabhavo? Puññābhisaṅkhāro apuññābhisaṅkhāro āneñjābhisaṅkhāro, parittabhūmako vā mahābhūmako vā, ayaṃ vuccati kammabhavo. Sabbam pi bhavagāmikammaṃ kammabhavo' ti [Vbh. 137].

Ettha hi puññābhisaṅkhāro ti terasa cetanā; apuññābhisaṅ-

1. Sensual existence (kāmabhavo)
2. Material existence (rūpabhavo)
3. Immaterial existence (arūpabhavo)
4. Percipient existence (saññābhavo)
5. Non percipient existence (asaññābhavo)
6. Neither percipient nor non percipient existence (nevasaññānāsaññābhavo).
7. One constituent existence (ekavokārabhavo)
8. Four constituent existence (catuvokārabhavo)
9. Five constituent existence (pañcavokārabhavo)

Thus kammabhava = cetanā + cetanāsampayuttā dhammā and upapattibhava= five khandhas produced by action. It is clear that

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266.(cont'd) khāro ti dvādasa; āneñjābhisaṅkhāro ti catasso cetanā. Evaṃ, parittabhūmako vā mahābhūmako vā ti etena tāsaṃ yeva cetanānaṃ mandabahuvipākatā vuttā. Sabbam pi bhavagāmikamman ti iminā pana cetanāsampayuttā abhijjhādayo vuttā.

Upapattibhavo pana saṅkhepato kammābhinibbattā khandhā; pabhedato navavidho hoti. Yath'āha: 'Tattha katamo upapattibhavo? Kāmabhavo, rūpabhavo, arūpabhavo, saññābhavo, asaññābhavo, nevasaññānāsaññābhavo, ekavokārabhavo, catuvokārabhavo, pañcavokārabhavo, ayaṃ vuccati upapattibhavo' ti. (Vism p.489)

existence as action is a condition of past kamma for rebirth-linking and existence as rebirth and it is a condition for future existence.

It is bit difficult for a layman to understand this repetition over and over again due to the fact that we are dealing with three existences here. For instance when we are analysing the puññabhisaṅkhāra we refer to the past actions (kamma). Due to the past action abhisaṅkhāra is generated to give birth in this existence. On the basis of abhisaṅkhāra in this existence there is generated more abhisaṅkhāra or volition for a future existence.[267]

The existence as action mentioned above refers to previous birth (purimakammabhavasminti purime kammabhave). Thus if there is delusion it is due to ignorance that one commits a kamma. The saṅkhāra which is accumulation (āyūhana saṅkhāra) indicates previous volitions present, as in one who prepares to make a gift. Another saṅkhāra is attachment which leads to craving and to clinging.[268]

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267. Sātthato ti, yathā ca bhavaniddese, tath'eva kāmaṃ saṅkhāraniddese pi puññābhisaṅkhārādayo va vuttā; evaṃ sante pi purime atītakammavasena idha paṭisandhiyā paccayattā vuttā, ime paccuppannakammavasena āyatiṃ paṭisandhiyā paccayattā ti puna vacanaṃ sātthakaṃ eva. Pubbe vā, 'Tattha katamo puññābhisaṅkhāro? Kusalā cetanā kāmāvacarā' ti [Vbh. 135) evamādinā nayena cetanā va saṅkhārā ti vuttā; idha pana, 'Sabbam pi bhavagāmikamman' ti [Vbh. 137] vacanato cetanāsampayuttā pi. Pubbe ca viññāṇapaccayaṃ eva kammaṃ saṅkhārā ti vuttaṃ; idāni asaññābhavanibbattakaṃ pi. (Vism P. 490)

268. Tattha, purimakammabhavasmin ti purime kammabhave; atīta-

In this discussion of characteristics of the rebirth-linking condition there are two sets of five dhammas as follows.

1. delusion = ignorance (moho avijjā)
2. accumulation = saṅkhārā (āyuhanā saṅkhārā)
3. wishing = attachment (nikanti taṇhā)
4. approaching = grasping (upagamanaṃ upādānaṃ)
5. volition = existence (cetanā bhavo)

On the basis of the discussion of Dhammapāla in the Paramatthamañjusā in respect of the passage on saṅkhāra in the Visuddhimagga it appears that he has explained clearly that there are two saṅkhāras, one being saṅkhāra as a condition (paccaya), the other whatever (else) is

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268. (cont'd) jātiyaṃ kammabhave kayiramāne ti attho. Moho avijjā ti yo tadā dukkhādisu moho, yena mūḷho kammaṃ karoti, sā avijjā. Āyūhanā saṅkhārā ti taṃ kammaṃ karoto yā purimacetanāyo, yathā, dānaṃ dassāmī ti cittaṃ uppādetvā māsaṃ pi saṃvaccharaṃ pi dānūpakaraṇāni sajjentassa uppannā purimacetanāyo: paṭiggāhakānaṃ pana hatthe dakkhinaṃ patiṭṭhāpayato cetanā bhavo ti vuccati. Ekāvajjanesu vā chasu javanesu cetanā āyūhanā saṅkhārā nāma, sattamā bhavo; yā kāci vā pana cetanā bhavo, sampayuttā āyūhanā saṅkhārā nāma. Nikanti taṇhā ti yā kammaṃ karontassa tassa phale upapattibhave nikāmanā patthanā, sā taṇhā nāma. Upagamanaṃ upādānaṃ ti yaṃ kammabhavassa paccayabhūtaṃ, idaṃ katvā asukasmiṃ nāma ṭhāne kāme sevissāmi, ucchijjissāmī ti ādinā nayena pavattaṃ upagamanaṃ gahanaṃ parāmasanaṃ, idaṃ upādānaṃ nāma. Cetanā bhavo ti āyūhanāvasāne vuttā cetanā bhavo ti. Evaṃ attho veditabbo.
(Vism p. 497)

called a _saṅkhāra_ in the texts [_tasmā vaṇṇetabba-sangahavasena duvidhatā vuttāti veditabbā_].[269]

The above discussion will be taken into account in the formulation of the theory of _saṅkhāra_ in chapter 11.

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269. _Saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharontī ti yathā saṅkhataṃ hoti, evaṃ abhisaṅkharonti. saṅkhārasaddaggahaṇena āgatā saṅkhārā-saṅkhārasaddena āgatasaṅkhārā, Yadipi avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārāpi saṅkhārasaddena āgatā, te pana imissa desanāya padhānāti visuṃ vuttā. Tasmā duvidhāti ettha saṅkhārasaddena āgatasaṅkhāresu abhisaṅkharaṇakasaṅkhāraṃ vajjetvā tadaññe saṅkhārasaddena āgatasaṅkhārā yojjetabbā. Saṅkhārasaddena āgatasaṅkhārati vā samudāyo vutto._ (Pm. vol. iii. p. 570)

CHAPTER 7

KAMMA, CETANĀ AND SAṄKHĀRA

The terms 'action' (kamma) and 'volition' (cetanā) are very close to saṅkhāra, overlapping with it if not the same. In this chapter we attempt to find out the relationship of saṅkhāra to these closely related terms, in order to clarify its meaning.

According to the Aṅguttara Nikāya 'kamma is volition'. 'I call action volition. After volition (having willed) one does an action with the body, with the speech, with the mind'.[270]

In other words the volition is the real content of an 'action', the essence of it, the principle which enters into moral causation. There is a narration of an incident in the Aṅgulimāla sutta which illustrates whether good or bad kammas (actions) have fruits.[271] Once the Thera Aṅgulimāla walking along the streets in Sāvatthi, saw a pregnant woman in a difficult and unbearable condition. After the round of alms gathering was over he told this incident to the Buddha. The Buddha asked him to go back to the scene where he saw the woman and to tell her that he (Aṅgulimāla) had never taken life intentionally since birth. 'By the power of

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270. A. III. 415 (cetanāham bhikkhave kammam vadāmi, cetayitvā kammam karoti kāyena vācāya manasā)

271. M. II. 102-104

that truth may you be well and happy and your unborn child'. Then Aṅgulimāla said to the Buddha that it would be a deliberate lie if he said that he had not deprived anybody of life since his birth. Then the Buddha asked him to say that since he was born of the Ariyan birth (ariyāya jātiyā jāto) he had not intentionally deprived anybody of life. Aṅgulimāla did as the Buddha said to him.

In the same sutta, there is another narration showing how it is intentional action bears fruit. When Aṅgulimāla was walking along the street someone threw lumps of earth which fell on him and a stick thrown by another person and gravel thrown by yet another hit his head, making it bleed, and smashed his bowl. The Buddha saw him from the distance and asked whether he endured it and said to Aṅgulimāla that he was experiencing the ripening of a kamma, otherwise he would have spent many years in niraya.[272]

In the above narration it is clear that if a person intentionally does a deed, whether good or evil, that deed eventually has fruition. Even after becoming an arahant Aṅgulimāla could not avoid a past kamma. Thereby he was subject to physical pain, although those

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272. M. II. 104

pains were not directed against him by the present 'agents'.[273]

A similar connotation is implied by the discussion of Pāyāsi and Kassapa. Once an evil thought came to Pāyāsi that there is no other world, beings are not born other than from parents and there is no happiness or unhappiness resulting as the effect of actions.[274] After listening to Pāyāsi, Kassapa explained why his views were wrong and finally he became a disciple of Kassapa. From this discussion also it is possible to establish the fact that there are good and bad results from good and bad kammas. The Buddha declared that a person is crooked who takes life without compassion for living beings. His actions of body, speech and mind are

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273. MA.III.338 explains that the piece of earth, stick and gravel were thrown at crows, dogs and pigs and by accident Aṅgulimāla was walking nearby; because of ripening of his kamma he was hit by them.

274. D. II. 316-317

crooked and he will be reborn as a crooked person.[275] It was said by the Buddha that when the acts are done intentionally their effects accumulate as kammas and there is no wiping them out without first experiencing their results.[276]

Continuing with the same argument it can be said that the present body is the result of old actions (kamma) which have been abhisaṅkhata. On the basis of what one did before, one's present body exists. The present existence is due to previous saṅkhāras and on the basis of those saṅkhāras there is consciousness at death (cuti) and the process continues with rebirth (paṭi-sandhi). Briefly, rebirth results from groups arisen from kamma [277] and this applies also to present actions, the effects of which link together to form the conditions of the future existence.[278]

Unlike in the Vedic traditions, in Buddhism everything is subject to impermanence (anicca), unhappiness (dukkha) and no-soul (anattan). On the basis of these three cornerstones of the teachings of the Buddha, there is no

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275 A. V. 289

276 ibid. 292

277 Vism. 253

278 Vism. 253

action or result which will pass from one life to another. There is no permanent entity that goes from one life to another. The Buddha clarified his position on the subject of no-soul (anattan) in the Anattalakkhana sutta, preached to the first five bhikkhus. He said that matter is not soul (rūpam bhikkhave anattā). If matter were soul or self, it would not be subject to illness, since one would have control over it. One cannot say that one has control over it. As matter suffers illness one cannot say that one has control over it. Therefore it is not one's soul.

Sensation is not soul (vedanā anattā), recognition (perception) is not soul (saññā anattā), saṅkhāras are not soul (saṅkhārā anattā), consciousness is not soul (viññāṇam anattā).[279] There is no person (puggala), soul (jīva) or any other substance that creates action or making or doing. The answer to Vedic tradition is that in the teachings of the Buddha there is no soul and instead there are five groups.

The Vedic tradition stresses that the soul or self (ātman) is permanent, going from one life to another as an agent. The main difference from the Vedic tradition in the teachings of the Buddha is the doctrine of no

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279 S. III. 66-67

soul. The main argument levelled against the Vedic tradition is that according to conditioned origination conditioned by ignorance there are saṅkhāras and these are the conditions for consciousness. Thus instead of a transmigrating soul we have cetanā-kamma producing saṅkhāras, which produce paṭisandhi viññāṇa + nāmarūpa.

In a conversation between Ānanda and the Buddha, Ānanda asked to what extent there is existence (kittāvatā nu kho bhante bhavo hoti ti). 'In the absence of kamma having fruition in kāmadhātu, would there be manifestation of sensual existence?', was the answer of the Buddha. (kāmadhātuvepakkañ ca Ānanda kammaṃ nābhavissa api nu kho kāmabhavo paññāyethā ti).[280] Further the Buddha explained to Ananda that kamma is the soil (or field), consciousness is the seed and craving is the moisture. For beings who are hindered by ignorance associated with craving, consciousness is established in a lower sphere. (iti kho Ānanda kammaṃ khettaṃ viññāṇaṃ bījaṃ taṇhā sineho avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ hīnāya dhātuyā viññāṇaṃ patiṭṭhitaṃ. evaṃ āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti..evaṃ kho Ānanda bhavo hoti ti.[281]

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280 A. I. 223

281 A. I. 223

Now let us see how actions vary quantitatively or in strength. In the Aṅguttara Nikāya a simile of a grain of salt is given to show how the gravity of action will be experienced by a person. Supposing a grain of salt is put into a cup of water then the water becomes undrinkable. Suppose a grain of salt is thrown into the river Ganges, the water in the Ganges will not become undrinkable.[282]

Similarly if a person is mischievous in his thought, behaviour and body and he does not develop insight, he is not a well-mannered person. Whatever action (kamma) he does, he cannot escape its results, even when that action is a minor one, just as a grain of salt put into a cup of water will render that water undrinkable.

On the other hand if a person is careful and controls his body, behaviour and thought, he develops insight; he is a great person. If he commits a similar small offence its fruition is similar to the grain of salt put into the river Ganges, without the water becoming undrinkable.

The important point that the Buddha wanted to make here is that when a person makes an action it is not

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282 A. I. 249

always true that he experiences its result regardless of the other circumstances.

The teachings of the Buddha do not make the claim that everything happens due to action (*kamma*). This kind of deterministic view is not found in the teachings of the Buddha.

> *yo bhikkhave evaṃ vadeyya--yathā yathāyaṃ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathā taṃ paṭisaṃvediyatī ti--evaṃ santaṃ bhikkhave brahmacariyavāso na hoti okāso na paññāyati sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāya. yo ca kho bhikkhave evaṃ vadeyya--yathā yathā vedaniyaṃ ayaṃ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathāssa vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvediyatī ti--evaṃ santaṃ bhikkhave brahmacariyavāso hoti okāso paññāyati sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāya.*

> O Bhikkhus, if one would say thus, 'however this man does an action thus he has to experience it'. If this is so there is no living of the best life, there is no opportunity available for a final end of unhappiness. Supposing one would say, 'However this man does an action to be experienced, thus he experiences its result'. If this is the case there is living

> of the best life; there is opportunity available for final end of unhappiness.[283]

As shown above, Buddhism is not deterministic, otherwise there would be no end to unhappiness. A man does not again experience his past action exactly as he did when he committed it, but he experiences the effect of it, in so far as it can be felt. Suffering must refer to some previous action of the sufferer, but the suffering can be experienced in different ways, at any time, and diluted or not.

Buddhaghosa says that among the three saṅkhāras kāya saṅkhāra is bodily volition (cetanā), citta saṅkhāra is mental volition and vacī saṅkhāra is verbal volition. At the moment of accumulation of kamma, puññābhisaṅkhāra, apuññābhisaṅkhāra and āneñjābhisaṅkhāra occur in those kamma doors (dvārato).[284]

In some instances the term saṅkhāra is used to denote the same meaning as cetanā (volition) as follows:

> katamā ca bhikkhave saṅkhārā? chayime cetanākāyā, rūpasaddagandha-rasa-phoṭṭhabba-

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283 A. I. 249

284 Vism. 452

sañcetanā-dhammasañcetanā ime vuccanti saṅkhārā.[285]

O *Bhikkus* what are *saṅkhāras*? Six bodies of volition: sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, thought; these six volitions are *saṅkhāras*.

Then what is *cetanā* (volition)?

cetanāham bhikkhave kammam vadāmi. [286]

Monks, I declare action volition.

According to the above analysis three terms *kamma*, *cetanā* and *saṅkhāra* are in certain contexts synonymous.

In the *Mahākammavibhaṅga Sutta*,[287] the Buddha said to Ānanda that the foolish man Samiddhi should have explained properly to Potali's son about the fruition of the intentional deeds from body, speech and mind (*sañcetanikam āvuso Samiddhi kammam katvā kāyena vācāya manasā, kiṃ so vediyatīti*).

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285 S. III. 60

286 A. III. 415 (see also *Abhidharmakośa* iv - 1. (*cetayitvā karaṇam*)

287 M. III. 207

There is a fourfold classification of kamma in Atthasālinī. The four forms of kamma are:

(a) impure kamma

(b) pure kamma

(c) both pure and impure

(d) neither pure nor impure

The seven factors of enlightenment are kamma that is neither pure nor impure and that would lead to the ending of kamma.[288] Therefore the essence of both action and saṅkhāra appears to be volition, at least in connection with rebirth.

Deeds without volition (cetanā) have no good (kusala) or bad (akusala) effects. In order to make an action good or bad it must be done intentionally.

On the basis of different kammas, the future birth will be determined. This may be short-lived, long-lived, weak, healthy, ugly, in high families, weak in understanding, and so on.

Also the Buddha was asked by Mallikā why some women are beautiful and others are not. The Buddha's explanation was that on the basis of what they do they will be reborn according to the past action.[289] A similar kind

288 DhsA. p.89-90

289 A. II. 203

of situation can be viewed in the *Cūḷakammavibhaṅga Sutta*.[290] Subha (Todeyya's son) once spoke to the Buddha and asked what is the cause or reason why some people are low, and some are excellent and appear in human form. Also some have a long life and some a short one, some are beautiful and some are ugly, some are weak and some are great in understanding.

The Buddha's unambiguous reply was that actions are one's own. This means that one does not have to be born only in the form of a human being in order to experience actions. Beings are possessing actions as their own, heirs to actions, having actions as their origins, having actions as their kinsmen: actions are their own makers. Beings are classified according to whether their actions are excellent or low. (*kammassakā māṇavā, sattā, kammadāyādā, kammayoni, kammabandhu kammapaṭisaraṇā kammaṃ satte vibhajati yadidaṃ hīnappaṇītatāyāti*.)[291]

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290 M. III. 203

291 M. III. 203

There are three causes of *kamma*; namely, greed (*lobha*), malice (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*).[292] The action performed through greed, born of greed, originating from greed will cause bad experience, and will have its fruition whenever the person is reborn. The text further asserts that so long as the seeds are not broken, not spoiled by wind and heat, they are capable of sprouting in abundance. In the same manner, if an act is performed through greed, malice and delusion, one experiences the fruition in this very life or in another.[293]

Conversely if the act is performed without greed, malice or delusion the particular act committed without any of the three *kamma* causes has no fruition to be experienced, just as a palm tree cut off at the root is not able to sprout. Similarly in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* it is stated that there is no resting place for consciousness when the greed for the body is abandoned and support is

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292 A. I. 134 *tiṇ' imāni bhikkhave nidānāni kammānaṃ samudayāya. katamāni tīṇi? lobho nidanaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāya, doso nidānaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāya, moho nidānaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāya.*

293 A. I. 134

cut off.[294] Without consciousness there is no growth of kamma. Consciousness is freed and as such it is steady and undisturbed.

In a popular sense action causes the different circumstances and experiences of people. But this means voluntary actions of body, speech and mind. Action as a causal factor in human life is cause always conjoined with volition.

Looking at the issue in later texts we find that King Milinda asked Reverend Nāgasena where the deeds stay, whether kusala or akusala, that are being done.[295] His reply was that those deeds follow like a shadow.[296]

In the introduction to the English translation of the Milinda Pañha, the late Dr. I. B. Horner states that the proposition that depending on desire there is action (taṇhā paccayā kammaṃ)[297] is a novel theory. On the basis of the Nidānasaṃyutta conditioned origination starts with avijjāpaccayā saṅkhāraṃ, saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ. On the basis of the analysis of the paṭiccasamuppāda the Milinda Pañha statement taṇhāpaccayā kammaṃ

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294 S. III. 53

295 Milin p. 72

296 Dh. 2

297 Milin 51

may not be a novel theory, but it is the emphasis of the present life. It has been observed that conditioned by avijjā (ignorance) there are several paccayas, namely saṅkhāra, taṇhā etc.[298]

In normal circumstances conditioned origination continues with taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ. Instead of upādāna, Milinda Pañha introduced the term kamma.

In the above discussion, we saw that the terms cetanā and kamma are important in the understanding of the term saṅkhāra. The question is, is there a difference between these three terms or are they synonymous?

We saw on page 151 above that action (kamma) is volition (cetanā). This is true if a person after volition acts with the body, speech and mind. If the action does not follow after volition, then it is not action (in the Buddhist sense of kamma). Therefore it is evident in Buddhism then that all actions are volitions but not all volitions are actions.

On page 160 we saw that six bodies of volition are saṅkhāras. Since not all volitions are actions, then not all saṅkhāras are actions. Volition is one of the members of the saṅkhārakkhandha (Dhs.p.17). In that respect volition and saṅkhārakkhandha are different. Then it is clear that all volitions are saṅkhāras but not all saṅkhāras are volitions.

The term saṅkhāra is wider in meaning and scope. It is due to volition that one acts with the body, with the speech and with the mind, then in concert with other principles saṅkhāras appear to produce rebirth. In this respect all three terms depend on each other but they are not synonymous in all situations.

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298. S.III.96

CHAPTER 8

SANKHĀRA AND PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA

The understanding of conditioned origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) is important to understand what saṅkhāra is. In this chapter we will examine where the term saṅkhāra stands in the twelve links of conditioned origination.

The Buddha argued that two extreme philosophical positions prevalent at his time were false. One of these was based on the concept that everything exists, while the other contended that everything ceases to exist. This is demonstrated in the Kaccāyana Sutta. The Buddha said to Kaccāyana that there are two views in the world: existence and non-existence. But the person who has the right view sees the arising of the world as it is, having understood as it is the arising of the world, one seeing it does not have the idea of is not-ness (non existing, annihilation) with reference to the world.

Further the Buddha said to Kaccāyana that everything exists, that is one extreme. Everything does not exist is the other extreme. Without going to either extreme the Tathāgata teaches the doctrine by the middle.

That is: Conditioned by ignorance (avijjā) saṅkhāras arise and so on.[299]

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299 S. II. 17 - Dvayanissito khvāyaṃ Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitañ ceva natthitañ ca. lokasamudayaṃ kho Kaccāyana yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā sā na hoti. lokanirodhaṃ kho Kaccāyana yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā sā na hoti. upāyupādānābhinivesavinibandho khvāyaṃ Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena. tañcāyaṃ upāyupādānaṃ cetaso adhiṭṭhānaṃ abhinivesānusayaṃ na upeti na upādiyati nādhiṭṭhāti attā na me ti. dukkhaṃ eva uppajjamānaṃ uppajjati dukkhaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ nirujjhatīti na kaṅkhati na vicikicchati aparapaccayā ñāṇaṃ evassa ettha hoti. ettāvatā kho Kaccāna sammādiṭṭhi hoti. sabbaṃ atthīti kho Kaccāyana ayaṃ eko anto. sabbaṃ natthīti ayaṃ dutiyo anto. ete te Kaccāyana ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti. avijjāpaccayā saṅhārā. saṅhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ. pe. evaṃ etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

Conditioned origination (*paticcasamuppāda*) can be illustrated by the occasion when Sāriputta learned about the noble way to final emancipation. Once Sāriputta was residing in Rājagaha. After observing the serenity and calmness of a *bhikkhu*, Sāriputta asked him who his teacher was. When the *bhikkhu* replied that his teacher was the Buddha, Sāriputta requested him to describe briefly what the Buddha's philosophy was. Sāriputta was brilliant in intellect. As soon as he heard that the Buddha taught the origination of principles (*dhammas*) from causes, Sāriputta obtained insight into the Buddha's teachings. Although Sāriputta must have known most of the philosophical theories current at that time, the Buddha's theory of causes helped him to solve the riddle of life, which no teacher had previously explained to him.

Conditioned origination was discovered by the Buddha and it was the central point in his teachings. When the Buddha was conversing with Ānanda, the latter said to the Buddha, 'It is surprising, it is wonderful, even then it is simple.' Then the Buddha said to Ānanda, 'Do not say so. This conditioned origination is profound and its illumination is profound.'

The doctrine of the Buddha is quite clear if one tries to understand the teachings as a raft to cross a

river and not as something to carry on one's shoulder.[300] The conditions (paccayas) are mental and material and there is a sequence in them:

Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti.
Imass'uppādā idaṃ uppajjati.
Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti.
Imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.[301]
When this is, that is.
When this arises, that arises.
When this is not, that is not
With the cessation of this, that ceases.

The conditions of the sequence are given in order, to show their mutual relationships. They should not be treated as isolated entities. If one thinks that the conditions are permanent entities, then the whole purpose of the formula will be lost in misunderstanding. In replying to Poṭṭhapāda the Buddha explained to him that in transmigration there is no permanent entity (attan) which continues from one life to another. Each successive life is quite different from the previous life despite the causal connections between them.[302]

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300 M .1.134-135

301 M.III.63

302 D. I. pp 201 - 202

There is no permanent entity despite the continuation of the sequence. The conditioned origination set out in Mahānidāna sutta is as follows.

Decay and death are conditioned through birth

Birth is conditioned through existence

Existence is conditioned through clinging

Clinging is conditioned through craving

Craving is conditioned through sensation

Sensation is conditioned through contact

Contact is conditioned through a sentient body

A sentient body is conditioned through consciousness.

As shown above from the Mahānidāna sutta there are nine conditions in conditioned origination. Here saṅkhāra is missing. The Dīgha Nikāya is one of the earliest texts of the Pali canon. The absence of the term saṅkhāra in it definitely poses some doubts as to the importance of saṅkhāra in conditioned origination. On the other hand, in addition to saṅkhāra two other conditions are added to the sequence in the Saṃyutta Nikāya. They are avijjā and saḷāyatana. In the Dīgha Nikāya the description of conditioned origination starts with jarāmaraṇa. The sequence from viññāṇa to jarāmaraṇa is elaborated.

There is a sequence of nine conditions from decay and death to consciousness. The text also specifies

mutual dependence of consciousness and sentient body without reference to saṅkhāra. We do not find saṅkhāra as a condition for consciousness (viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇam).

On the other hand in the Nidāna Saṃyutta the sequence starts with avijjā. But in elaborating conditioned origination the Nidāna follows the sequence of the Mahānidāna Sutta and starts with jarāmaraṇa. On account of this it is sometimes supposed that the Mahānidāna represents an earlier stage of the doctrine than the Nidāna Saṃyutta. The Nidāna Saṃyutta has twelve conditions and the Mahānidāna has only nine, but it is not clear whether this represents a historical development of the doctrine. In the Saṃyutta Nikāya conditioned origination is described as follows.

The saṅkhāras are conditioned through ignorance
Consciousness is conditioned through the saṅkhāras
A sentient body is conditioned through consciousness
The six bases are conditioned through a sentient body
Contact is conditioned through the six bases
Sensation is conditioned through contact
Craving is conditioned through sensation
Clinging is conditioned through craving
Existence is conditioned through clingings
Birth is conditioned through existence

Decay, death, sorrow, lamentation are conditioned through birth.[303]

The *Samyutta nikāya* gives *saṅkhāra* as the condition for consciousness. But in the *Mahānidāna* a sentient body is the condition for consciousness. The good and bad *saṅkhāras* that one has accumulated in the previous life ultimately decide the next birth. Another *Dīgha* text, *Mahāpadāna*, has nine conditions in agreement with the *Mahānidāna*. Also *Mahānidāna* in the *Madhyama* of Sarvāstivāda as well as in *Mahāpadāna* in the *Dīrgha* of Sarvāstivāda have twelve conditions.[304]

On the basis of an analysis of both the *Mahānidāna Sutta* and the *Nidāna Samyutta* it appears that in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* the Buddha was giving a lecture on two lives but that in the *Nidāna Samyutta* he was going beyond the scope of two lives and his explanation referred to three lives. It is possible for conditioned origination to be explained so as to describe any number of lives. Accordingly ignorance (*avijjā*) and *saṅkhāra*

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303 S. II. 1.

304 Priestley, C.D.C, *A Study of the Pali and Chinese versions of the Mahānidāna suttanta*. p. 79

belong to a previous life. But in every life there must be consciousness and nāmarūpa, as the Mahānidāna points out, so in the sense of simultaneous and mutual conditions they may be said to condition each other. There is a further implication that consciousness and nāmarūpa in the third life are the result of saṅkhāras in the second, namely, 'craving' and so on as separately specified there.

Once a bhikkhu asked Sāriputta the following four questions.[305]

(a) Whether each condition in the sequence is made by oneself.

(b) Whether each condition is the sequence is made by another.

(c) Whether each condition in the sequence is made by both oneself and by another.

(d) Whether each condition in the sequence exists without being made by oneself or by another.

Sāriputta told him that not one of these positions was correct and that each member of the sequence existed only in as much as it was conditioned by the next member. As in the Mahānidāna Sutta this text takes the sequence up to consciousness and a sentient body.

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305 S. II .112

All the conditions of conditioned origination are impermanent.[306] In other words they are _saṅkhata_ and also _khayadhamma_ (having the principle of cessation). As mentioned above, the Buddha said to Kaccāyana that there were two extremes. One is that everything exists (_sabbaṃ atthi_) and the other is that everything does not exist (_sabbaṃ natthi_). Without going to either extreme the Buddha showed the middle way. The _saṅkhāras_ exist through the condition of ignorance and consciousness exists through the condition of the _saṅkhāras_. By implication through the cessation of ignorance there is cessation of _saṅkhāras_. Through the cessation of _saṅkhāra_ there is cessation of consciousness.

The Buddha advised his disciples to investigate[307] the conditions of the sequence of conditioned origination. A similar statement was made by the Buddha in the _Mahānidāna Sutta_. He said that a disciple could attain enlightenment and _nibbāna_ in this world in this life and spend the rest of his life either in the _vimokkhas_ or in the factors of _bojjhaṅga_.

Ignorance and craving (_avijjā_ and _taṇhā_) are the causes of _kamma_ that produces happy or unhappy destinies.

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306 S.II. 26.

307 S.II. 81f.

According to the theory of conditioned origination, what has been transmitted from previous lives is described as *saṅkhāra*, and what one accumulates from this life is denoted by the word *tanhā*. Both terms are used for the same function. *Saṅkhāra* is described as having ignorance as a cause (*avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā*). Moreover the influence of *saṅkhāras* from previous lives will affect the *saṅkhāra* of the current life and its activities. Together with whatever is accumulated in the present life they will contribute towards producing a following life also. All *saṅkhāras* are sometimes classified as those pertaining to the body (*kāya*), those pertaining to speech (*vacī*) and those pertaining to thought (*citta*). With the *cittasaṅkhāra* the following three *saṅkhāras* are incorporated: *puññābhisaṅkhāra*, *apuññābhisaṅkhāra* and *āneñjābhisaṅkhāra*. Consciousness is determined on the basis of these six *saṅkhāras*. Whatever is produced by consciousness is influenced by the *saṅkhāras* with which it was mixed in the previous life. Thus consciousness adulterated by the *saṅkhāras* will have a lasting impact on the mental and material aspects of the current life. It will produce more and more *saṅkhāras*.

Chapter 9

SAṄKHĀRA AND DHAMMA

These two terms are difficult to translate into English and the difficulty has been summed up by Henry Clarke Warren as: ' The two terms dhamma and saṅkhāra are very troublesome to render into English, both because they each of them mean so many things and their ground meaning is not translatable into English being expressive of a different philosophy.'[308]

The purpose of this chapter is to consider only the relationship of saṅkhāra and dhamma, in order to clarify the meaning of the term saṅkhāra. A long research chapter on the term dhamma is beyond the scope of this thesis.

A very few scholars have attempted to clarify the various meanings of the term dhamma and in this respect Professor A.K Warder's article on 'Dharmas and Data' is the most useful recent discussion developing Stcherbatsky's ideas published half a century earlier.[309] Following his discussion I have taken up the word 'principle' or 'element' as equivalent to the term dhamma.

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308 Warren, Henry Clarke p.116

309 Warder, A.K. 'Dharmas and Data', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1971. Also John Ross Carter has reviewed many previous writings on dhamma, but as he concentrated on dhamma as doctrine or truth, it has not much relevance to the present investigation. He has very little to say about dhamma as a principle or element.

The Sinhalese Buddhist tra... seems mostly interested in two facets of meaning apart from dhamma as ... rine and truth. That is dhamma as a general term for the plurality of experiences which includes (1) saṅkhata and (2) asaṅkhata dhammas. Saṅkhata is everything in the phenomenal world and asaṅkhata is nibbāna.[310]

Both terms, dhamma and saṅkhāra are considered as conditioned, which seems to be the central meaning of both. They are similar in being saṅkhata, of course with the exception of nibbāna. The idea of being saṅkhata is the essence of both terms.

Saṅkhāra is not a permanent element, but just something temporarily 'put together' or conditioned and conditioning itself and other things. Dhamma except nibbāna is exactly the same, something which is conditioned by other dhammas or which itself conditions more dhammas.

Hardly anybody had taken up the point about plurality of dhammas prior to Stcherbatsky. Before him and his pupil Rosenberg no modern scholar had ever made clear the second special meaning of dharma. This may be regarded as a breakthrough in Buddhist studies in the West. Stcherbatsky drew all his ideas from the Abhidharmakośa but the Pali Theravāda tradition is almost exactly the same, of course with ... variations of detail, such as 3 asaṃskṛtas, etc.

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310 Whenever there is a funeral in the Buddhist community, the phrase 'siyalu saṃskāraka dharmayo anityayi' (all saṅkhata principles are impermanent) is written on the board attached to the pyre or the structure. Also see the Butsarana, p. 154 regarding the meaning as doctrine.

But the general idea is the same. The idea that a dharma is one of the elements underlying all experience is a great discovery in his book.

The four Nikāyas do not give a comprehensive list of dharmas. The Abhidhamma (Dhs) has attempted to provide systematic lists of dhammas and it is only in the Aṭṭhakathās that dhamma is defined and it is shown that the dhammas can be reduced to a finite list of elementary constituents of experience. In the Abhidharmakośa we see that the Sarvāstivāda tradition had done the same thing, working from a very similar collection of sūtras.

The Papañcasūdanī gives the term suññatā(emptiness) among the many meanings for dhamma. This means that the dhammas are empty of 'soul' or 'being.' Other meanings given by the Papañcasūdanī include nature or own nature etc.

The twelfth century lexicon Abhidhānappadīpikā and the grammer Saddanīti give all possible meanings of the term dhamma, based on sutta, abhidhamma, aṭṭhakathās and ṭīkās. Since the writers of these texts are contemporaries and their prime sources are aṭṭhakathās it appears that there is no difference in their presentations.

The meanings of the word dhamma given by the Abhidhānappadīpikā are: sabhāva, pariyatti, paññā, ñāya, sacca, pakati, puññ, ñeyya, guṇa, ācāra, samādhi, nissatta, āpatti, kāraṇa, ādi. 'nature, doctrine or teaching, understanding, justice, truth, condition or state, merit, knowledge, virtue, conduct, concentration, no-soul, rule of Vinaya, cause etc.

The Abhidhānappadīpikāsūci provided the following additional meanings:[311] vikāra, paccaya, paccayuppanna, visaya, yutti, and nibbāna.

change, condition, arisen from a cause, object, custom and nibbāna.

Then it appears that the list of meanings of the Abhidhānappadīpikā and its sūci is the same as that of the following meanings given in the Saddanīti[312] with the exception of the term paññatti (concept) not given in the Abhidhānappadīpikā or the Sūci:

pariyatti-paccayesu guṇe nissattatāya ca
sabhāve c' eva paññāyaṃ puññe paññattiyam pi ca
āpattiyaṃ vokāre ca paccayuppannake pi ca
sacca-samādhi-pakati-ñeyyesu yuttiyam pi ca
visaye c' eva nibbāne dhammasaddo pavattati.

doctrine or teaching, virtue, no-self, nature, understanding, merit, concept, rule, change, arisen from a cause, truth, concentration, condition or state, justice, custom, object and nibbāna.

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311 Carter, DHAMMA p.156
(the Abhidhānappadīpikāsūci is not available to the writer)

312 Saddanīti. p.562

In the Samyutta Nikāya [313] we found that the Buddha said he will teach: 'conditioned origination and principles being originated from conditions.' Now, since what originates in conditioned origination is the conditions themselves, it follows that some dhammas are conditions (paticcasamuppādan ca vo bhikkhave desissāmi paticcasamuppanne ca dhamme). In the sequence of conditioned origination one condition conditions the next condition. [314] These dhammas in the chain of conditioned origination are described as khayadhamma, vayadhamma, virāgadhamma and nirodhadhamma. [315]

There are important passages quoted in the first four nikāyas elucidating the two terms dhamma and saṅkhāra in more detail. In some contexts saṅkhāra and dhamma appear to be synonymous. At the passing away of the Buddha (parinibbāna) Sakka the king of the gods says that all saṅkhāras are impermanent and what has arisen

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313 S. II. p. 25

314 See chapter 3

315 S. II. p. 60

will pass away as it is natural to grow and then decay.[316] This refers to the five aggregates (khandhas).

The Buddha's last words were that saṅkhāras have the principle of impermanence (vayadhammā saṅkhārā appamādena sampādetha). Also in the Mahāsudassana Sutta the Buddha said to Ānanda that all those saṅkhāras were finished, ended and passed away.

Among the dhammas mentioned in connection with meditation, the Buddha discussed what a bhikkhu should observe and further explained that all saṅkhāras are impermanent. Whatever is experienced is mixed with unhappiness, and saṅkhāras have the principle of fading away and ceasing.[317] Further he explained that the ceasing of saṅkhāras is successive. When one has attained the first level of jhāna one's speech has ceased. When one has attained the second level one's vitakka and vicāra have ceased. When one has attained the third level pīti has ceased. When one has attained the fourth level one's in-breathing and out-breathing have ceased. When one has attained the level of infinite space one's recognition of objects has ceased. When one has attained the state of infinite consciousness, one's recognition

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316 See above chapter 3

317 See above chapter 3

of the level of infinite space has ceased. When one has attained the level of nothingness, one's recognition of the level of infinite consciousness has ceased. When one has attained the level of neither recognition nor non recognition one's recognition of the level of nothingness has ceased. When one has attained the level of cessation of recognition and sensation one's recognition and sensation have ceased.

All five khandhas have been discussed as lokadhamma in the Samyutta Nikāya.[318] The Buddha showed Rāhula that whether past, future or present, or internal or external, all of them are seen as 'not mine'.[319] The Buddha sat down near an ailing monk and said to the monks that a monk abides seeing nothing attractive in the body, he is conscious of a lack of interest in food; conscious of distaste as to the whole world, he recognizes impermanence in the saṅkhāras.[320]

All the dhammas are classified under two headings: conditioned (saṅkhata), which consists of all conditioned things in the world, and unconditioned (asaṅkhata). There is only one unconditioned element and that is

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318 ibid.

319 See above chapter 3

320 ibid.

nibbāna according to Theravāda tradition. All the other dhammas are grouped together and called saṅkhata. Then it is evident that all saṅkhata dhammas are subject to unhappiness, impermanence and no soul but the asaṅkhata dhamma is permanent and happy.

In conditioned origination all the twelve conditions are dhammas and saṅkhāra is one of them. On the basis of the previous volitions and of action through body, speech or mind they may contribute to further rebirth.[321] This analysis is explained on the basis of the six kinds of wills. [cha ime ... cetanākāyā ... saṅkhārā (S.III. 60-]. There are six bodies of will. They are sights, sounds, smells, tastes, contacts and mental impressions (dhammā sañcetanā).

Depending on one dhamma another dhamma is produced in the chain of conditioned origination. In order to activate dhammas every dhamma must be accompanied with volition to commit an action. These dhammas are directed by greed, hate and delusion. Also they have the intrinsic qualities of impermanence, unhappiness and no soul.

In the first four nikāyas discussed above it appears that the earlier suttas were mostly referring to saṅkhāras rather than dhammas (aniccā vata saṅkhārā,

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321 See below chapter 10

etc.). When it comes to the later development of the Buddhist thought there seems to be some kind of a trend forgetting such statements as anicca vata saṅkhārā and moving towards the term dhamma. Although the Dasuttara Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya seems to be in the earlier period it was preached by Sāriputta and not by the Buddha. There is no suggestion here that there is a difference of teaching between the Buddha and Sāriputta. However, the Dasuttara Sutta has paved the way by declaring five hundred and fifty dhammas as the systematization of the teachings. This sutta became the starting point for the Paṭisambhidāmagga. There are two hundred and one dhammas listed in the Paṭisambhidāmagga[322] - and all of them are classifiable according to saṅkhata and asaṅkhata.[323]

It seems that the saṅkhāra theory in the early period of the teaching had been pushed to the background at the time of the Paṭisambhidāmagga and to a greater extent in the abhidhamma and prominence is given to the dhamma theory.

In the abhidhamma, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi enumerates a comprehensive list of dhammas classified on the basis of

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322 Ps - Vol. I. 5-8

323 Ps - Vol. II. p. 108

kusala and akusala and avyākata. In the Milinda Panha an example is given to show that neither one dhamma nor any other dhamma passes from one life to another or from one moment to another.

The characteristics of dhammas are - unhappiness, impermanence and no soul. Expanding on the discussion in chapter four it can be said that the dhammas are nissatta, that is without a being, empty of any soul.[324] Also the Sāratthappakāsinī states that dhamma has its own nature.[325]

Commenting on three verses in the Dhammapada Dr. Walpola Rahula correctly states that

> 'in the first two verses (277, 278) the word saṃkhāra 'conditioned things' is used. But in its place in the third verse the word dhamma is used. ... The term saṃkhāra denotes the five aggregates, all conditioned, interdependent, relative things and states both physical and mental. If the third verse said: all saṃkhāras (conditioned things) are without self then one might think that, although conditioned things are without self, yet there

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324 MA. I.17

325 SA. I.29

> may be a self outside conditioned things, outside the five aggregates'.[326]

Dr. Rahula thinks that in order to avoid a misunderstanding the term dhamma is used in the third verse.

It is evident that both saṅkhāra and dhamma have the same characteristics and serve similarly as causes and conditions. The conditions in the conditioned origination are dhammas, but they all seem to be described as saṅkhāras also. But the term dhamma has been used to identify both saṅkhata and asaṅkhata elements. Since the term saṅkhāra is diametrically opposed to asaṅkhata, the terms dhamma and saṅkhāra are different. Dhamma is wider, but includes all saṅkhāras.

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326 Rahula Walpola p. 57

CHAPTER 10

IS THERE AN AGENT ?

In chapters four, five and six we saw how the concept of saṅkhāra is employed in various contexts in the Tipiṭaka and in the commentarial literature. Then we saw in chapters seven, eight and nine the relationship of the term saṅkhāra to the closely related terms kamma and cetanā, paṭiccasamuppāda and dhamma respectively.

If we understand saṅkhāras as activities, volition, intention, ill-will, concentration, right action, fear of blame, desire, etc. is there an agent who performs all these? If not how can we understand them? In chapter two, we saw that in the Vedic tradition, the priest prepares a new body (ātman) in a future life, by means of a sacrifice. So the priest acts as an agent through the sacrifice to make a new body in the future. Grammatically, the root kar to do, make (kṛ in Sanskrit) suggests an agent. It is a transitive verb, with a grammatical agent and a patient. When modified by the prefix sam it means to put together or prepare. But the question is does this 'putting together' or synthesis or any of its aspects such as volition and so on imply an agent.

In English most of the expressions do imply an agent who performs the action or feels ill will and so

on. Even in the ancient Indian languages this is usually the sense. In Vedic tradition and Jainism, etc., we find a strong belief in a soul as subject of all experiences. If the Buddha used the word saṅkhāra and other words current in the language, did he try to change the ordinary usage? How does saṅkhāra work without an agent in the language of the Buddha?

In most of his teaching the Buddha seems to use words in the ordinary 'Vedic' senses, speaking the ordinary language of the day. But his criticism in certain contexts of theories about a soul and of the use of pronouns as subjects implies, indeed sometimes states, that these popular lectures are not ultimately to be taken at face value.

The schools of Buddhism are unanimous that there are, in fact, two distinct levels of statement in the Tipiṭaka. On the one hand there is the ordinary, everyday language, as in lecturing to laymen, and speaking of 'persons' acting. On the other hand there is a special philosophical language where the terms are re-defined and the agent eliminated. This suggests already that ultimately all the Buddha's words lose their everyday, 'historical' meanings and, though the same words are used, they have quite new senses ascribed to them.

Actually it seems even saṅkhāra may be used in a popular sense, as in the Mahāsudassana. All these saṅkhāras (the majesty and splendour of a great emperor, his city, etc.) are past ... There a popular audience might think of saṅkhāra in the Vedic sense of bodies and so on prepared. In order to understand the concept at the ultimate level we plan to discuss in detail the two levels of truths or two levels of statements of their Tipiṭakas, recognized in all Buddhist traditions. We will also discuss what are later known as the three characteristics (tilakkhaṇa) of the groups (khandhas)[327] namely, impermanence (aniccā) unhappiness (dukkha) and that they are no self (anattan). This implies that, and in due course is explained as that, all saṅkhāras are impermanent (aniccā) subject to unhappiness (dukkha) and they are no-self (anattan). The last of these seems to deny categorically that āyusaṅkhāra can itself be an agent but it has been thought to leave open the possibility that there is some other agent, a Vedantic subjectivity or something of this sort.

In this connection we must look at other discussions in the Tipiṭaka on the attan and on right theory (sammādiṭṭhi) and wrong theory (micchādiṭṭhi) to determine

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327 Vin. 1, 13-14

whether there is an agent behind action or there are nothing but impersonal elements.

A curious point in the teaching of the Buddha is its duality in the interpretation of certain statements. In day to day life we say 'beings' 'he was re-born' and so on. The Buddha employed certain conventional terms and phrases such as 'I', 'he', "that particular person is reborn," etc. But in reality there is no 'I', 'he', or "that particular person is reborn". Many critics think that this duality is a confusion and it is an inconsistency in the teachings. But in actual fact one should look at the teachings laid down in the Tipiṭaka as based on two levels of statements. One is to give an understanding in the day to day level of conventional truth (sammuti) and the other is on the level of ultimate truth which is specifically for the understanding of the teachings of the Buddha in an ultimate sense. For a non Buddhist or an amateur this is hard to understand. But the Buddha himself is said to have realized that his teaching was difficult to understand. In fact after his enlightenment according to the Ariyapariyesana sutta the idea come to his mind that beings might not understand his teachings.[328] But Sahampati Brahmā appeared before

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328 M. I. 168

him and appealed to the Buddha to preach his doctrine out of compassion for humanity. This story in the Tipiṭaka may not be of any use to us. However, it is plausible that the Buddha was at first reluctant to preach his newly discovered doctrine but out of compassion for suffering beings he finally decided to preach it. This is evident from the fact that after his decision to preach he searched for those who could grasp his teachings. Immediately the Buddha thought that Ālāma Kālāma and Uddaka, Rāma's son might be able to grasp the doctrine. But he found that they both had died recently. Then he thought that the five ascetics who had been with him might understand the doctrine. He set forth to meet them near Vārāṇasī and on finding them taught them the three characteristics to which we shall refer below. To comprehend the way in which the two levels of statements are presented is definitely a problem for lay people. At the time of the Buddha there was a popular belief in an unchanging entity called 'soul' (attan). When the Buddha tried to explain his ideas to ordinary people, they immediately thought that an unchanging soul went from one life to another. But the truth of the matter was that the person or soul did not go from one life to another. To begin with, there is no soul concept in Buddhism. We call some one by name to identify him as a

person, that is to say an individual numerically distinct from others. Even the Buddha often used conventional terms in his teachings because he wanted to speak to people in language easily understood especially on questions of behaviour or practice. However when it comes to the deeper questions of doctrine or theory we have to go beyond conventional ideas to understand the ultimate truth (paramattha).

In the Milinda Pañha, the King Milinda asked Venerable Nāgasena what his name was. Venerable Nāgasena replied that his companions addressed him as Nāgasena and his parents merely gave that name for the sake of designation, a way of counting, and there was no person or puggala to be found in him. King Milinda was puzzled over the answer given by Venerable Nāgesena and asked several questions. If there is no person here, who supplies the necessary requisites to the monks, and who enjoys them. Who observes precepts and who practises meditation, who attains the path and ultimately attains nibbāna, who breaks the five precepts such as killing, stealing, committing adultery, consuming intoxicants, and lying? If there is no person then there are no meritorious and demeritorious deeds. Then king Milinda asked venerable Nāgasena whether his hair was Nāgasena, or if his brain was Nāgasena. The reply was no.

Afterwards Venerable Nāgasena asked king Milinda how he came? The king said by chariot. Then Venerable Nāgasena asked him to find the chariot. Then Nāgasena asked the king if the chariot was the pole, or the wheels or the body of the chariot.

Then Nāgasena said to the king that the word chariot was merely a word, an empty sound. Similarly the word Nāgasena is a designation, an empty sound. In the absolute sense there is no person (puggala).

The three characteristics (tilakkhaṇa) impermanence (anicca) unhappiness (dukkha) and no soul (anattan) are the basis of the teaching of the Buddha. These three characteristics are common to all five groups, that is to all that comprises the material world.

The Buddha questioned the first five monks whether matter and the mental aggregates are permanent. Their reply was that all of them are impermanent.[329] In the Saṃyuttanikāya it is said that the conditions of conditioned origination are impermanent: these are sañkhata dhammas and they have the principles of cessation.[330]

The phenomenal world is composed of five groups; namely, matter (rūpa), sensation (vedanā), recognition

329 Vin. 1. 13 ff-, S III - 66 ff

330 S. II .26

(*saññā*), *saṅkhāra* and conciousness (*viññāṇa*). These five groups are all impermanent. In the *Bahudhātukasutta*, the Buddha explained to Ānanda that a bhikkhu is skilled in the elements if the bhikkhu knows and sees the two elements *saṅkhata* and *asaṅkhata*.[331]

Everything in this phenomenal world is called *saṅkhata dhamma*. *Nibbāna* is the only *asaṅkhata dhamma*. If the phenomenal world is called *saṅkhata dhamma*, then we could say that in this respect the term *saṅkhata* and the five aggregates are synonymous.

The next characteristic is unhappiness (*dukkha*). The Buddha after attaining enlightenment under the Bodhi tree gave the first sermon to his five previous companions. This first sermon contained what he had discovered; that is, the four truths of unhappiness (*dukkha*), its cause (*samudaya*), its cessation (*nirodha*) and the way leading to its extinction (*magga*).

According to the *Visuddhimagga* unhappiness is described in three ways, that is intrinsic unhappiness (*dukkha-dukkha*), unhappiness in change (*vipariṇāma dukkha*) and unhappiness due to *saṅkhāra* (*saṅkhāra dukkha*). Unhappiness from mental and bodily feelings is called intrinsic unhappiness based on their name and

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331 M. III. 63

painfulness. When there is a change in mental and bodily feeling it is called unhappiness in change.

The third, unhappiness due to <u>saṅkhāra</u> is what we generally call a being comprised of the five groups. These five groups of attachment are unhappiness, (<u>saṅkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā</u>)[332]. The argument from conditioned origination stresses the fact that dependent on consciousness, a sentient body arises; six spheres of sense are dependent on a sentient body; contact on the six spheres; sensation on contact; craving on sensation; grasping on craving; becoming on grasping; birth on becoming; then old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, unhappiness and despair are dependent on birth. This is the origination of the mass of unhappiness. If one item of the sequence is taken out, the others will fall apart. This conditioned origination has been summarized at length in chapter 8. However, in brief we have to mention its relevance to unhappiness here. All that Sāriputta needed to know was that the Tathāgata taught the arising of principles from causes. We have already discovered that the first two of the four noble truths are unhappiness and the cause for unhappiness. If we know what the causes for unhappiness are then we can

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332 S. V 421

attempt to know the way leading to the cessation of unhappiness and finally to attain the bliss of _nibbāna_. Immediately Sāriputta realized that the teachings of the Buddha were based on the arising of principles from causes. When the causes of unhappiness were removed then happiness could be achieved.

Once when the Buddha was questioned as to whether unhappiness is made by oneself, by another, by both or by neither as cause, he rejected all of them. Then the Buddha was asked whether unhappiness does not exist or whether he did not know the answer or did not see unhappiness.[333] It is constantly asked who experiences happiness or unhappiness. To all these questions the teachings of the Buddha give an unequivocal answer. This body is not mine and it is not another's. Based on an old action, there are (now) five groups. The fruits of the old action[334] whether good or bad will ripen in this birth.

Prince Siddhattha renounced all material comfort and lived as an ascetic after seeing an old man, a sick man, a dead body and a bhikkhu. These four sights activated his open mind to seek the mystery of life.

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333 S. II. 19

334 Not a Vedic sacrifice

Obviously these four sights show the unhappiness of the world. Ageing is unhappiness, because one is losing one's youth. All five groups are coming to a close showing that everything is impermanent, what is born is subject to change. Along with ageing there is attrition of the body, loss of memory and intelligence, weakness in the body. Death is a constantly in the thoughts of a person who is ageing.[335]

Death is unhappiness. Death has the condition of birth. Death is unhappiness as the person who dies is unhappy and the relatives and the friends of the departed person are unhappy. According to Buddhist thinking death is the end of one life and the beginning to another. All five groups will perish except the action (kamma) that has been done by the departed one.

Sorrow and lamentation are unhappiness. Sorrow and lamentation go hand in hand. Extreme sorrow is shown by openly weeping and crying aloud. Loss of a relative or friend or something which one likes is cause for sorrow.

Pain. Physical pain is unhappiness as it creates mental unhappiness. Pain occurs not only to ordinary people. Even the Buddha experienced pain at the last hour of parinibbāna due to sickness after eating his

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335 Vism. 502-503

last meal. In order to avoid pain the Buddha attained to various jhānas.

Grief and despair. Grief is also mental pain and gives bodily unhappiness. When one is in extreme grief, sometimes one tends towards suicide. Despair is mental unhappiness.

Meeting with the unwanted. The Buddha in the Mahāmaṅgala sutta said that it is a blessing not to associate with uneducated people and to have the opportunity to live and associate with the learned and intelligent (asevanā ca bālānam paṇḍitānam ca sevanā). If one does not want to associate with a certain person and if one has to associate with such a person due to an unavoidable reason then that creates unhappiness. Separation from loved ones is also a cause for unhappiness.

In this world one cannot expect everything. That produces unhappiness. Certain people want enormous wealth, power, and fame. If they cannot get what they want that creates unhappiness.

The above discussion on various aspects of unhappiness and causes for unhappiness demonstrates that all five groups are unhappiness. So long as one continues in the circle of saṃsāra, unhappiness cannot be eliminated.

Now we come to the last of the three characteristics, no soul (anattan, Sanskrit anātman). The theory of no soul is a characteristic of the teaching of the Buddha, as most other religions teach that there is a soul which survives death, may go to hell or heaven, etc. and is permanent.

We saw previously that everything in the phenomenal world is impermanent and leading to unhappiness. According to the teaching of the Buddha, there is nothing permanent in the phenomenal world therefore there is no place for a permanent entity like soul.

It is evident from the teachings of the Buddha that 'you are your own refuge or protection' (attā hi attano nātho).[336] Nobody else nor god nor a supreme being can help you. One is responsible for own's own action. The teachings of the Buddha show that, while the Buddna shows the way, it is up to the individual to seek his own salvation. (Tumhehi kiccam ātappam akkhātāro tathāgatā.)[337] In connection with the theory of no soul, texts on Buddhism give the term puggala, jīva or attan. The

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336 Dh. verse 160 [Here attan is a pronoun not a soul]

337 ibid

Pali or Sanskrit words have been translated as self, ego, soul and person.

When the Buddha was at Sāvatthi in Anāthapiṇḍika's park he said to the monks that there are four foods (āhāra) for the maintenance of being and future births. They are material food (āhāra), contact (phassa), volition (cetanā) and consciousness (viññāṇa). The first one, material food, is the general food that people eat everyday. Through the other three foods, people persist and produce more action for future births. Then one bhikkhu named Moliya Phagguna asked the Buddha who eats the consciousness food. The Buddha at once said that is not a properly formulated question. If he were to ask what the consciousness food is, the answer will be that the consciousness food is the condition for future rebirth.[338] We previously saw in this chapter that the teachings of the Buddha are based on two truths: Conventional (sammuti) and ultimate (paramattha). In the same vein the Buddha teaches that it is not a proper question to ask who contacts, who makes, who goes from one life to another. The Buddhist position is that nobody contacts or makes and that nobody goes from one life to another. But due to certain conditions contact

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338 S. II. 12

occurs. Based on previous actions, rebirth occurs. When beings are too ignorant to understand that there is no soul and there is no supreme being to determine their destiny, they feel insecure and lament as there is no permanent entity to maintain desire, pride, the idea of I or mine. Some tend to say 'I was insulted' or 'I have the power', 'I can do anything I want'. For a being who has this kind of inherited belief it is hard to understand what is meant by the concepts that 'I' means nothing more than the five aggregates and that due to certain conditions certain actions will occur.

In the Alagaddupama sutta the Buddha unequivocally answers these false beliefs saying that they serve no purpose for a good life. The Buddha states that an uninstructed average man has six kinds of false views. He thinks of the five groups as 'this is mine', 'this am I', 'this is myself'. Then he thinks of sensation as 'this is mine' he thinks recognition or perception as 'this is mine, he thinks of saṅkhāras as 'these are mine' he thinks of consciousness as 'this is mine'. Also whatever he has seen, heard, sensed, perceived, reached, looked for, pondered over with his mind he thinks of as 'this is mine, this am I, this is my self'. The uninstructed person with the above mentality thinks, 'this is the world', 'this is the self', 'after death I will be

permanent, lasting, eternal, not subject to change'. But a disciple who is well instructed in the dhamma thinks 'this is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self'. He sees sensation as 'this is not my soul', 'this is not mine', 'this is not I'. He sees saṅkhāras as, 'these are not mine'. He thinks of the material shape as this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self'. He thinks of sensation, recognition (perception), saṅkhāras in the same way. Also, whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, looked for, pondered by the mind he thinks of as 'this is not mine', 'this am I not', 'this is not my soul'. He also thinks the same way for the opposite false beliefs 'this is the world', 'this is the self', 'after death I will be permanent, lasting, eternal, not subject to change'.

A. Having heard this, a certain monk spoke to the Buddha and asked whether there might be an anxiety about something objective that does not exist (siyā nu kho bhante bahiddhā asati paritassanā ti). The Buddha said that it might occur to somebody that what was certainly his is not his (now); what might certainly be his, there is certainly no chance of his getting. He feels sorry, mourns, laments and is in confusion.

B. Again the monk asked the Buddha whether there is no anxiety about something objective that does not exist (siyā pana bhante bahiddhā asati aparitas-sanāti). The Buddha's answer was 'there might be, monk'. In this instance, it occurs to someone that what was certainly his is not his after all and what might certainly be his there is no chance of getting. Then he does not grieve, does not mourn.

C. The monk asked the Buddha again might there be anxiety about something subjective that does not exist. The Buddha's answer was 'it might be'. He explained that a being may think, 'this is the world', 'this is the soul' and, 'after death I will become permanent, lasting, eternal and not subject to change'. Then he hears the teachings of the Buddha based on uprooting false views, tranquilizing saṅkhāras, casting out all attachments for the destruction of craving, for cessation and finally nibbāna. After hearing the teachings of the Buddha he may think that definitely he will be annihilated and destroyed, so he grieves, laments and is in deep confusion.

D. Then the question was whether there might be no anxiety about something subjective that does not exist. Again the Buddha's answer was 'yes', there

is no anxiety. He said that for such beings this kind of view does not occur; that is 'this is the world', 'this is the self', 'after death I will become permanent, lasting, eternal and not subject to change'. That being is hearing the teachings as taught by the Buddha or his disciple. The teachings are rooting out false views, tranquilizing all _saṅkhāras_, getting rid of all attachments for the destruction of craving, for cessation and ultimately _nibbāna_. For such a being the idea of annihilation, destruction and non-existence will not appear. Then he will not grieve, mourn, lament, as he is not confused.[339]

The Buddha's contention was that if there were the concept of a self, then there would be the concept of 'this belongs to myself'. At the time of the Buddha some religious teachers criticized the Buddha and said that the Buddha was a nihilist. But in reality he was not. The Buddha himself said that those recluses and brahmins were misrepresenting him. According to the teachings of the Buddha, he rejected the concept of an abiding and enduring (_nicco dhuvo_) self, a soul in a being which goes from one life to another without

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339 M. 1

change. He rejected a creation by a supreme power in respect of life in the phenomenal world (attano loko anabhissaro)[340] The Buddha was neither an eternalist nor a nihilist. His teachings are based on the middle path of not going to either of the extremes. Life in the phenomenal world, past and future lives, is dependent on the conditions of conditioned origination (paṭiccasa-muppāda), which we have discussed at length in chapter 8.

In the Saṃyutta nikāya the Buddha was asked by a Brahmin whether he who acts is the same as he who experiences or whether one acts and another experiences. Here is an example that the Buddha teaches his doctrine in the middle way without stepping into either extreme (ucchedavāda and sassatavāda). Similar questions were posed by monks to Sāriputta concerning the conditions of conditioned origination. The four questions are (A) whether each condition of the sequence is made by oneself, (B) made by another, (C) made by both oneself and another or (D) made neither by oneself or by another. Sāriputta said that all the above four views are incorrect. In the conditioned origination one member arises through the condition of the next member. For example conditioned through ignorance saṅkhāras arise.

340 M. II. 68

Conditioned through *saṅkhāras*, consciousness arises. In respect of the body also, the body is not one's own nor is it another's.[341] *The Saṃyutta* explanation is that the body (*kāya*) is brought about by past action (*kamma*) or by volitions experienced.[342] The dichotomy of annihilationism and eternalism and the middle path on which the teaching of the Buddha is based has become a central point in the teaching of the Buddha.

Always a man tends to believe one or the other. That is the very reason why the Buddha after his enlightenment was of the opinion that his discovery was difficult to see, difficult to perceive. Once the Buddha is asked whether unhappiness is made by oneself, by another, or both, or by neither, being spontaneous (or without a cause). When the Buddha rejects all these he is asked whether then unhappiness does not exist, or finally whether the Buddha does not know or see unhappiness.[343] Then he explained why he rejected the alternatives. To say that he who acts is the same as he who experiences, that unhappiness is made by oneself, is to come to the conclusion that there is an eternal soul

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341 S. II. 64

342 *ibid*

343 S. II. 19

(eternalism). To say that one acts and another experiences, that unhappiness is made by another, is to come to the conclusion that there is a soul, but it is annihilated at death. A being may be happy at one moment, unhappy in another moment and indifferent in another moment. If there is a soul (attan) which is experiencing happiness, unhappiness and the state of indifference, then the soul is also changing from one moment to another. Then there cannot be an unchanging soul. This discussion of the no soul (anattan) doctrine may not be complete if we eliminate the logical arguments put forward by the wanderer Poṭṭhapāda to the Buddha. According to the Dīgha Nikāya Poṭṭhapāda wanted to discuss meditation and how one attains the summit of recognition (perception). Poṭṭhapāda asks the Buddha if recognition is the soul of a man or if recognition is one thing and soul another. Then the Buddha asked Poṭṭhapāda 'what now, Poṭṭhapāda, do you assume a soul'?, 'I assume a gross soul, sir, material, made of the four elements, feeding on solid food'. 'Yet if your soul were gross, Poṭṭhapāda, material, made of the four elements, feeding on solid food, in that case for you recognition would be one thing, soul another. On the basis of this assumption you have to ascertain how recognition can be one thing, soul another. Just let this gross ... soul be, Poṭṭhapāda,

for then a man's recognitions occur as one thing but cease as another thing ...' Then Poṭṭhapāda proposes to assume a mental soul with perfect faculties, complete in its faculties.

The Buddha's objection remains the same: recognitions would then occur as one thing but cease as another. Finally Poṭṭhapāda introduced an immaterial soul, 'consisting of recognition' (perception). The objection is still the same. The Buddha's answer to these questions is that recognition would occur as one thing and cease as another thing. In this case it is evident that if the soul is permanent or if it is continuing, then changing phenomena of recognition cannot be used to prove the existence of soul.

We come to the argument from right view (sammādiṭṭhi) and wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) in support of the claim that there is no self or soul acting as an agent but all elements are impersonal.

The fourth truth of the teaching of the Buddha shows the path leading to the cessation of unhappiness and the right view is one of the elements of the eightfold path. The opposite is the wrong view (micchā diṭṭhi). However, it should be understood that dogmatic attachment through right view is also a hindrance to happiness, as has been described by the Buddha in the

Alagaddūpamasutta.[344] The Buddha used a raft as an image and showed that a raft is only used for the purpose of crossing over from one bank to the other and his Dhamma is also used for the purpose of crossing over the ocean of wheel of becoming (saṃsāra). When one has crossed over, that raft has to be abandoned and similarly the Dhamma. Based on wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) some believe that soul is the agent. But the Buddha rejected the views in respect of the existence of soul as wrong views. In the Brahmajāla Sutta we see some eternalists having acquired the knowledge of recollecting their former lives and having this knowledge for a certain period of time they came to the conclusion that their souls and the universe have always existed, eternal, immovable as peaks, remaining for ever and that beings transmigrate eternally. According to Buddhism a belief that an agent is responsible for actions is wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) and that actions are done by impersonal elements is right view (sammādiṭhi).

In the Mahāpuṇṇamasutta[345] a reasoning arose in the mind of a monk that material shape is no soul, feeling is no soul, recognition is no soul, saṅkhāras are no

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344 M. I. 136

345 M. III. 19-20

soul, consciousness is no soul. Then what soul do deeds affect that are done by no soul. Then the Buddha having come to know this wrong view said, when some foolish man here, not knowing, ignorant, with his mind full of craving, may deem to go beyond the teacher's instructions thus, it is said that material shape is no soul. You monks have been trained by me (to look for) conditions now here, now there, in these things and in those.

So far in this chapter we have discussed how the teaching of the Buddha should be understood on the basis of the two truths - conventional (sammuti) and ultimate (paramattha). Then we saw the three characteristics of the teaching of the Buddha, impermanence (anicca), unhappiness (dukkha) and no soul (anattan). An effort has been made to explain these three characteristics to show that, when we are discussing the arguments of the theory of saṅkhāras in early Buddhism, the whole concept of phenomenal world is nothing but ever changing saṅkhāras.

Then saṅkhāras must be a powerful force to determine the psychophysical life of another birth. The present life depends on past actions. Those are basically what we describe as saṅkhāras. Those saṅkhāras operating in one life produce rebirth leading to consciousness and a

sentient body in the next life. At the begining of this chapter we saw that there is no permanent soul going from one one life to another but there is some kind of energy, ever-changing, passing from one life to another. In order to understand this point more clearly let us see an interesting discussion between king Milinda and the Venerable Nāgasena in the _Milinda Pañha_.[346] King Milinda asked the Venerable Nāgasena if when a being is just born that being is himself or some one else. The reply was that he is neither that being nor another being. Then king Milinda asked him to give an example. The Venerable Nāgasena asked the king if when he was a young tender weak infant crying on his back was that his present grown up self. The king said the infant prince was one person and the present grown up self was another person. In order to give insight on the question of no continuous personal identity Venerable Nāgasena asked him certain questions. Is there one person who studies and another person who finishes? Is there one person who commits the crime and another person suffers the penalty? The king said no. The Venerable Nāgasena said to the king that it was he that was a young tender infant lying on the back and it was he who was grown

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346 Miln. P. 40

up. As a result of the connection with the embryonic body all these different periods of time were connected. Nāgasena added that it is just as a person lights a light to burn all night. The flame of the first watch is not the same as the flame of the middle watch. The flame of the middle watch is not the same as the flame of the last watch. On the other hand, there was not one light in the first watch and another light in the middle watch and a third light in the final watch. Through the connection of the first light there was light throughout the night. The Venerable Nāgasena said to the king that in the final analysis just as the light of the lamp, the elements of being join one another in succession. When one element disappears another element arises coming forward as it were instantaneously. Thus, neither the same person nor a different person arises as the latest aggregate of consciousness. Further it is like the process of milk turning into sour cream then to butter, etc. But none would say that sour cream and butter are milk. They turned out to be sour cream or butter through their connection with the milk. A similar description was made by Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga. The extent of a life is short. It is hard to predict whether or not a life will last as long as it takes to chew and swallow a few mouthfuls. According to the

Visuddhimagga, the life of a living being is short and its duration is a single conscious moment. When a wheel is rolling it touches the ground at one point and it rests only on one point.

In the same manner the life of a being lasts only for the duration of one thought. When that thought moment ceases, the being is supposed to have ceased. So each 'life' is just one moment and the *āyu* of a being is millions of such 'lives', not one life.

Further the *Visuddhimagga* stresses this point that - (a) The being of the past moment of thought has lived, but does not live and will not live. (b) The being of the future moment of thought will live, but did not live and does not live. (c) The being of the present moment of thought lives, but did not live and will not live. From this formula it is apparent that at one moment of thought a being lives but does not have any thought of the other two lives.

This discussion leads to the question as to, if a being live even from one moment to the other; what has tied these psychophysical elements together. The five aggregates named earlier are also called the five aggregates of clinging (*pañcupādānakhandhā*).

Conditioned by craving, arises clinging, and there are four clingings. (a) Sense - desire clinging (b)

falre view clinging, (c) rite and ritual clinging, (d) self doctrine clinging. (a) Based on contact a being is able to perceive visible forms. Then due to craving it clings on to them and that is sense desire clinging. (b) Having the false view that the world is eternal, one clings to this life and also to the perverse assumptions that there is no good and virtuous ascetic or brahman.[347] (c) If a person thinks that purification comes from rites and rituals, that is called rites and rituals clinging. (d) A person sees (e.g.) materiality as self, such an assumption is called self doctrine clinging.

The above four clingings have been explained by the Buddha as burdens. They are the mass of the body factors of clinging, of the sensation factors, the recognition, saṅkhāras and consciousness factors of clinging. The holding on to the burden is 'the person with concepts such as; that venerable one is known by this name and he is from that family'. This kind of clinging to 'person' is called a burden and leads to rebirth.

We have already seen that in the ultimate sense there is nothing to be called 'mine'. The Buddha's

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[347] Dhs 1215

advice is to put this concept away. This leads to profit and welfare. More specifically what are not mine are, sensation, recognition (perception) sañkhāras, consciousness.

The important simile that the Buddha gives in the Saṃyutta Nikāya shows that not only are the five attachments groups not profitable but also that the Buddha advised that without clinging onto something one be an island unto oneself. Accordingly the source of sorrow, grief, lamentation and despair is that some untrained unskilled people regard the body as self. But if these people abandon those ideas and think that the body is impermanent, unhappiness and unstable in nature, they are free from sorrow, grief, lamentation and despair.[348]

The concept of a sentient being is nothing but the five aggregates and the associated five attachment agregates. The Buddha over and over again emphasised the fact that he taught to avoid the two extremes. When he was in Jetavana, he said to the monks that depending on ignorance kamma arises. Thus the entire mass of misery arises. Then the Buddha was asked what old age and death are and what has old age and death. The Buddha said that the question was unsound as old age and death

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348 S. III. 39-40

are one thing and what has old age and death is another thing. Then the Buddha showed the two extreme views that are not conducive to religious life. To believe that soul and the body are identical, that is one extreme. The other extreme is that the soul is one thing and the body another. Based on the middle path which is conducive to religious life is the idea that conditioned on birth, old age and death arise.

In summary, not only does volition seem to imply an agent but also action (kamma) would appear to imply an agent. In Pali and Sanskrit grammar kamma or karman is the patient, the receiving end of an action: the action expressed by the verb implies an agent, to perform the action. Thus the idea that an agent performs an action is deeply embedded in the language itself. If we forget the term saṅkhāra for a moment, how can there be an action (kamma) without an agent? Everything in Pali implies that there is an agent. How can then can the Buddha possibly be saying that there is no agent? Buddhist tradition firmly denies that there is an agent. The languages are inherently agential just because of the way sentences are made up - an agent, an action and a patient. The same language has to be used in a non agential way if possible, that is in a philosophical way instead of inventing a new language.

In the preceding chapters we found that in early Buddhism the theory of soul or an eternal soul is definitely rejected. This means that whatever the saṅkhāras are or whatever the word saṅkhāra means, has to be understood in relation to the absence of an agent.

We saw in chapter 2 that in a Vedic sacrifice, the priest puts together a new body. In Buddhism instead the body comes together without any agent, as a result of previous actions, not actions by an agent but non agential actions.

The Buddha used the existing words in the language and taught how to understand in a new way.

What we have found in the Tipiṭaka is strongly confirmed by what we have found in the Visuddhimagga more systematically and categorically that there is no doer (kāraka), as follows:

Dukkham eva hi na koci dukkhito
kārako na kiriyā va vijjati
atthi nibbuti na nibbuto pumā
maggam atthi gamako na vijjatīti.[349]

For there is suffering, but none who suffers; doing exists although there is no doer; extinc-

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349 Vism. p . 436

tion is but no extinguished person; although there is a path there is no goer.[350]

350 <u>Path of Purification</u> p. 587

CHAPTER 11

ANALYSIS

On the basis of the primary sources submitted in the previous chapters; namely, the four *Nikāyas*, the *Abhidhamma* and *Khuddaka* and the *Aṭṭhakathās*; it may be possible to determine what *saṅkhāra* is, where it stands in the teachings of the Buddha, and what is the best English equivalent for the word *saṅkhāra*. Certain terms in philosophical discussions of the East may not find exact English equivalents. If it is not possible to find an accurate English translation to convey the correct meaning it is advisable to use the term in its original form and in its own language. The whole exercise of this thesis is not necessarily to find the correct English translation though if possible we try to find one. But the thesis is to find out what *saṅkhāra* means as a concept in the original sources and to explain the way in which the term has been used by the Buddha and commentators.

First of all let us go back to the previous chapters and find out in what contexts the Buddha used the term *saṅkhāra* and related forms. On the basis of the survey in the *suttas* it is shown that the Buddha employed the term *saṅkhāra* or its verbal form *saṅkharoti* and related

terms such as abhisaṅkharoti etc. to convey a specific meaning (chapter four).

It is shown in chapter two that the term saṅkhāra is used in Sanskrit in Vedic tradition before the Buddha in a ritual context. We saw in the same chapter that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad of the Yajurveda in answering the questions (but not using the term saṅkhāra) of other people, Yājñavalkya explains that in every being, there is an immortal soul (ātman). According to him at the higher state of deep dream, one is free from all desires. Finally at death the man (puruṣa) goes back into breath and it will be reborn.[351] He tries to explain this theory in the following example. The soul goes from one life to another just as a caterpillar climbs on a blade of grass and when he comes to the tip of the grass, he climbs over to another blade (grass). The soul that goes is brahman. It is comprised of consciousness, mind, breath, sight, hearing, earth, water, air, space, heat, non-heat, desire (kāma), non-desire, anger, non anger, dharma, non-dharma and everything. As a result of desire, rebirth occurs and soul enters a new body

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351 Śatapathabrāhmaṇa IV. 4

(*rūpa*). Any one who does not have desire is *brahman* and goes to *brahman*.

From the above Yājñavalkya discussion we gather certain points that have similarities among the many dissimilarities in respect of Buddhism. Some of them are: the concept of rebirth, transmigration of soul from one body to another, idea of becoming free from desire and union with *brahman*. According to Yājñavalkya the soul is not born (*aja*) in this world. Soul is the maker of all beings, it is indescribable (*na iti*), one cannot express it in conceptual terms. It is inconceivable, imperishable, not suffering, not attached. It does not have feelings and above all soul is ageless, deathless, immortal and fearless and it is *brahman*. When this kind of belief, idea and thinking were prevalent at the time of the Buddha, what we are trying to explicate in this chapter is, what is the Buddhist answer to all these questions of life after death and before birth. Even before Buddhism there were ideas about rebirth and that it was due to desire. On the other hand there was a concept of ritual preparation (*saṃskāra*) of a better life (in heaven). Buddhism rejects ritual but shows *saṅkhāra* in a different way in connection with rebirth.

In the Buddhist explanation of rebirth the concept of *saṅkhāra* is central.

We found twelve contexts where saṅkhāra and related terms were used in the four nikāyas. They are:

1. Saṅkhāra as a general term
2. Saṅkhāra as cetanā
3. Saṅkhāra as three saṅkhāras ceasing in samādhi
4. Saṅkhāra as a paccaya
5. Saṅkhāra as one of the five khandhas
6. Saṅkhāra as bhava saṅkhāra, jīvita saṅkhāra, āyu saṅkhāra
7. Saṅkhata
8. Saṅkhāra with the prefix abhi, and cognate verb forms
9. Asaṅkhata
10. Saṅkhāra and kamma
11. Saṅkhāra in compounds, iddhipāda
12. Saṅkhāra with the prefixes a and sa

The above twelve fold classification is made on the basis simply of the usage in the texts. We discuss the above twelve contexts in brief.

(1) Saṅkhāra as a general term is synonymous with the term saṅkhata dhammas(7). Everything in the phenomenal world is called saṅkhata as opposed to asaṅkhata, that is nibbāna. There is one asaṅkhata dhamma and that is cessation (nibbāna) and everything else is saṅkhata. We came across phrases like all saṅkhāras are

transient (vayadhammā saṅkhārā), all saṅkhāras are impermanent (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā).

(2) Saṅkhāra as cetanā (volition) is more complex and profound in its deep philosophical connotation. This represents six kinds of volitions, namely, rūpa sadda, gandha, rasa, phoṭṭhabba and dhamma.

(3) Saṅkhāra as three saṅkhāras ceasing in samādhi is described as kāyasaṅkhāra, vacīsaṅkhāra and citta-saṅkhāra. At various levels of concentration in meditation, a meditator may suppress the above three saṅkhāras. This is one way of suppressing saṅkhāras, or some of them, in this very life.

(4) Saṅkhāra as a paccaya (condition) is described in respect of conditioned origination, and more specifically saṅkhāra is the second member of the sequence of conditioned origination, as conditioned by ignorance and conditioning consciousness.

(5) Saṅkhāra as one of the five khandhas. There are five khandhas namely - matter (rūpa) sensation (vedanā) recognition (saññā), saṅkhāra and consciousness (viññāṇa). Matter, sensation, recognition or perception, saṅkhāra and consciousness are all saṅkhāras in sense No. 1 above. But there is a specific group named saṅkhārakkhandha among the five groups. Why are these saṅkhāras more saṅkhāras than the other saṅkhāras?

(6) *Saṅkhāra* as *bhavasaṅkhāra*, *jīvitasaṅkhāra*, *āyusaṅkhāra*. These *saṅkhāras* are given specific designation to identify their specific meaning. *Bhava* and *jīvita saṅkhāras* appear to be synonymous. *Jīvita* means the life span of a compound of the five groups as a living being. *Āyu saṅkhāra* is the duration of that life span. When a person has attained the state of cessation of recognition and sensation (*saññāvedayitanirodha*), due to *āyu saṅkhāra* he comes back in the descending order of meditation regaining his consciousness.

(7) *Saṅkhata* has been explained in connection with the *saṅkhāra* as a general term, as all things in the phenomenal world as opposed to *asaṅkhata dhamma* = *nibbāna*.

(8) *Saṅkhāra* with the prefix *abhi* and cognate verb forms. In addition to (No. 3) *kāya*, *vacī* and *citta saṅkhāra*, there are three other *saṅkhāras* namely *puññābhisaṅkhāra apuññābhisaṅkhāra* and *āneñjābhisaṅkhāra* (conditioning rebirth) and also the verbal forms *abhisaṅkhata* and *abhisaṅkharoti*.

(9) The term *asaṅkhata* has been discussed above when we were exploring *saṅkhāra* as a general term and as antonym of *saṅkhata*. This has been explained as *nibbāna*.

(10) *Saṅkhāra* and *kamma* has been discussed in chapter 7. In many respects *saṅkhāra* and *kamma* are

two terms used synonymously. But saṅkhāra has a wider meaning and usage than kamma.

(11) Saṅkhāra is found in compounds, besides simple compounds like kāyasaṅkhāra mentioned above, in explaining the four bases of power (chanda - samādhipadhāna-saṅkhārasamannāgataṃ).

(12) Saṅkhāras with the prefixes a and sa are asaṅkhāra and sasaṅkhāra. These forms are used in combination with parinibbāyin.

However in the usage of the four nikāyas we could reduce the above to the following six contexts. We eliminated numbers 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10 as they can be grouped with the other remaining contexts. Saṅkhāra as cetanā(2), saṅkhāra as a paccaya(4) saṅkhāra with the prefix abhi(8) and cognate verb forms, saṅkhāra and kamma(10) and the three saṅkhāras ceasing in concentration (samādhi) (3) can be grouped as saṅkhāra as a condition (4). The term saṅkhata(7) is explained in connection with number 1 and asaṅkhata(9) is not itself a saṅkhāra. Therefore both these terms are eliminated from the list. The remaining saṅkhāras are as follows:

1. saṅkhāra as a general term (1)
2. saṅkhāra as a condition (4)
3. saṅkhārakkhandha (5)

4. saṅkhāra with the prefixes a and sa (12)

5. jīvita saṅkhāra or bhava saṅkhāra or āyu saṅkhāra (6)

6. saṅkhāra in iddhipāda (11)

It has been observed that the group no. 1 implies that all saṅkhāras are saṅkhata dhammas and that it excluded nibbāna only. Then all the five groups (five khandhas), namely matter, sensation, recognition (perception), saṅkhāras and consciousness, are saṅkhāras. These five khandhas include all the events of the universe. The first is material and the rest of the groups are mental. They possess the principles of arising and passing away (uppādavayadhammino).

All saṅkhata dhammas are conditioned (paṭiccasamuppanna) and 'willed' (cetayita). Also they are impermanent (anicca), unhappy (dukkha) and no soul (anattan). The present body and senses are the results of old actions abhisaṅkhata.

Secondly among the twelve links in the chain of conditioned origination, saṅkhāra is the second link. This represents six kinds of volitions (cetanā), rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa, phoṭṭhabba and dhamma. In respect of these six volitions contact is important. In the absence of contact (phassa) there are no five groups.[351a] When a good or bad or neutral action occurs connected

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351a. in the internal sense of a living being.

with speech, body, or mind there may be accumulations of saṅkhāra. As a consequence of those previous saṅkhāras there is consciousness in this life.

The five groups are interconnected in the discussion on the three saṅkhāras, kāyasaṅkhāra, vacī-saṅkhāra and cittasaṅkhāra. Kāyasaṅkhāra consists of in breathing and out breathing. Vacīsaṅkhāra consists of applied and sustained thought (vitakka vicāra). Citta-saṅkhāra consists of sensation (vedanā) and recognition or perception (saññā). In various levels of attainments these saṅkhāras cease.[352] Matter and consciousness (rūpa and viññāṇa) are themselves not saṅkhāras, but they are driven along by saṅkhāras. It seems that these three (kāya, vacī and citta) are not ultimately different from the same three as saṅkhāra paccaya. In the last chapter we saw that the arising of a sentient being consists of consciousness (viññāṇa) and a sentient body (nāmarūpa), the combination of consciousness and a sentient body is the beginning of one life with its mass of unhappiness. One cannot survive without the other. That is, there will be no sentient body without consciousness. Also without sentient body there is no consciousness. They are mutually dependent.

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352 See Chapter 3 section III

In connection with saṅkhārakkhandha in the Majjhima Nikāya the Buddha said 'sensation, recognition (perception), volition, contact and attention are name (vedanā saññā cetanā phasso manasikāro, idam vuccati āvuso nāmam)'[353]. Then the four great elements and the material shape derived from them are called matter. '(Cattāri ca mahābhūtāni catunnañca mahābhūtānam upādāya rūpāni idam vuccati āvuso rūpam)[354]. Curiously enough, in the discussion of sentient body and consciousness, the term saṅkhāra is not mentioned. The reason is that volition, contact and attention are the basic parts of saṅkhārakkhandha. Although there is contact to a certain degree in name the full contact (phasso) can be obtained when the following three are available. They are material objects, eye consciousness and eye (Tinnam sangati phasso). It may be asked why there are five groups only, why not have six or seven including contact and volition (cetanā)? The term saṅkhārakkhandha has wider meaning and it has multiple functions. Without saṅkhārakkhandha there are no four groups. We saw earlier that the consciousness enters the mother's womb and then

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353 These last three form the saṅkhāras (MA. I. 221)

354 M. I. 54

it finds a resting place in four primary elements named matter (rūpa). Then we know the consciousness goes after matter and finds the resting place. Then it is evident that when we are discussing five groups; matter, sensation recognition (perception) saṅkhāra and consciousness, they work in concert and simultaneously.

Thirdly, saṅkhāra as a khandha is discussed by the Buddha in several suttas. In fact, although the Mahānidāna Sutta does not mention saṅkhāra as a paccaya in the chain of conditioned origination, saṅkhāra as a khandha is discussed.

What puzzles us about saṅkhārakkhandha is why, when all the five groups are considered as saṅkhāra, there should be a separate khandha named saṅkhāra. But the working of saṅkhārakkhanda applies to the process in time . Saṅkhārakkhandha produces the consciousness in the mother's womb. Saṅkhārakkhandha includes the contact, volition, reasoning, pondering, joy, concentration, energy, confidence, self possession, understanding, life, right speech, right work, right livelihood, self respect, fear of blame, desire, aversion, delusion, non desire, non aversion, non delusion, vanity, uncertainty, tranquility, lightness, suppleness, malleability, efficiency, straightness and intention to search for the unknown in the present life. These saṅkhāras have the function of

accumulating, which will lead to future rebirth. Since the *saṅkhārakkhandha* is responsible for the above process in time it is included among the five groups as a separate group and designated as *saṅkhārakkhandha*, among *saṅkhāras*. If we were to eliminate *saṅkhārakkhandha*, leaving *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *sañña* and *viññāṇa*, then could we identify the material and mental processes of the five groups? The answer is no. All the five groups have different activities to perform and each one of them has its own domain. For instance, matter (*rūpa*) means four elements earth, water, heat and air. Sensation (*vedanā*) implies to sense or to feel. Recognition (*sañña*) is to recognize that this is blue and that is red and so on. Consciousness (*viññāṇa*) is all conscious activities. As a separate *khandha*, *saṅkhārakkhanda* serves a dual purpose, to manifest what one accumulated in the previous life or lives and to accumulate further *saṅkhāras* on the basis of other *khandhas* for the future. This is the reason why all the *khandhas* are included in *saṅkhāra*, including *saṅkhārakkhandha*.

Saṅkhārakkhandha overlaps other *khandhas*; also it connects the other four *khandhas*. The function of *saṅkhāra* may be combining other groups in a living being. Moreover *saṅkhāra* as a *paccaya* is sometimes explained as *kāya*, *vacī* and *citta*, which in turn are

described as overlapping all five *khandhas*. When single *saṅkhāras* are mentioned they may come from different *khandhas*.

Fourthly *saṅkhāra* with the prefixes *a* and *sa*. They seem to be *saṅkhāras* in the usual sense of *saṅkhārak-khandha*, (see below p.235).

The fifth group of *saṅkhāras* are *jīvita*, *āyu* and *bhava*. *Āyu* has been absorbed in *jīvita* and *bhava* is same as *jīvita* as mentioned above. There is a narration in the Tipiṭaka that once the Buddha gave a hint to Ānanda that the Buddha could live longer by using his power (*iddhipāda*) [No. 6]. But Ānanda missed the hint, so the Buddha decided to enter final extinction when his bodily *saṅkhāras* ceased.

Sixthly, the final group is in compounds concerning the four bases of power. They are:

(a) The basis of power which is endowed with the *saṅkhāras* of exertion (*padhāna*) for concentration of will (*chandas*).

(b) The basis of power which is endowed with the *saṅkhāras* of exertion for concentration of thought (*citta*).

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355 See chapter 4 Section VI

(c) The basis of power which is endowed with the *saṅkhāras* of exertion for concentration of energy (*viriya*).

(d) The basis of power which is endowed with the *saṅkhāras* of exertion for concentration of investigation (*vīmaṃsā*).

The first three of the above four bases - will, thought and energy are mentioned in the formula for the exertions. It is given in the *Majjhimanikāya* that

(a) a monk produces will (*chandas*), exercises, initiates energy (*viriya*), applies and exerts (*padhāna*) thought (*citta*) for the non-occurrence of evil, bad principles which have not occurred;

(b) a monk produces will, exercises, initiates energy, applies and exerts thought for the abandoning of evil, bad principles which have occurred;

(c) a monk produces will, exercises, initiates energy, applies and exerts thought for the occurrence of good phenomena which have not occurred.

(d) a monk produces will, exercises, initiates energy, applies and exerts thought for the persistence, the not forgetting, development,

perfection of good principles which have occurred.

The main purpose of the four bases of power seems to be concertration of will etc., to eliminate bad principles and develop good ones. The *saṅkhāras* should be some of the group but may be *kāya*, *vacī*, and *citta saṅkhāra* or according to Buddhaghosa it may be momentum (*payoga*).

In the *Abhidhamma* and *Khuddaka* the usage of the term *saṅkhāra* is mostly not different from that in the other four *nikāyas*. But there appears to be a certain trend to put more emphasis on *dhammas*, especially in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and the *Dhammapada* (i.e the theory of *dhammas* is being developed as a basis for systematic analysis).

According to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* there are nine ways through which ignorance has a causal relationship to the *saṅkhāras*. Also the four generalizations discussed in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* including *saṅkhāras* and their characteristic of accumulation (*āyuhana*) do not appear to be found in the other four *nikāyas*).

The *Dhammapada* includes all *saṅkhāras* in a classification into *dhammas* and states that all *dhammas* are not soul. It appears that, sta..ing in the *Khuddaka nikāya*, there is a gradual trend emerging to push *saṅkhāra* into the background and put *dhamma* in its place. This discussion will continue later in this chapter.

In the *abhidhamma* period, the usage of *saṅkhāra* appears to be somewhat more restricted. It is primarily

not only because of the restricted usage; it may be due to the fact that *abhidhamma* analysed the materials collected from the *sutta* and prepared systematic treatises. Some usages which had seemed distinct are now assimilated into *saṅkhārakkhandha* etc.

In our chapter surveying the *abhidhamma* we found that the term *saṅkhāra* and its related forms have been used in six contexts as follows.

Abhidhamma

1. *Saṅkhārakkhandha*
2. *Saṅkhāra* as a condition
3. *Saṅkhāra* underlying (or driving) the *iddhi-pādas* (of exertion for concentration)
4. *Āyu saṅkhāra* or jīvita *saṅkhāra*
5. *Sasaṅkhāra*, *asaṅkhāra*
6. *Saṅkhāra* as a general term.

Since the term *asaṅkhata* denotes *nibbāna*, it is common to both *sutta* and *abhidhamma*. However in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *asaṅkhata* is included in *nāma*.[356]

In the *Suttapiṭaka* there is no enumeration of *saṅkhāras* or of the *saṅkhārakkhandha*. But in the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* gives a list of *saṅkhāras* in the *saṅkhārakkhandha*. Although there is

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356. Dhs. This is strange because it implies that the *asaṅkhata* is a *saṅkhāra* (*nāmarūpa*)

no such comprehensive enumeration, we found some of these *saṅkhāras* here and there in the *Suttapiṭaka*.

The terms *sasaṅkhāra* and *asaṅkhāra* with *parinibbāyin* are used in the *suttas* to denote passing away of non returners of two kinds, those with *saṅkhāras* and those without *saṅkhāras*.[357]

But in the *abhidhamma* the usage is completely different from the *suttas*. **This is a new sense, i.e. 'instigating,' which is a kind of *paccaya* (sense 2). This is for example as instigation by a mother**

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357 S. V. p. 201 - *Imesaṃ kho bhikkhave pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ samattā paripūrattā arahaṃ hoti. Tato mudutarehi antarāparinibbāyi hoti. Tato mudutarehi upahacca parinibbāyī hoti. Tato mudutarehi asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. Tato mudutarehi sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. Tato mudutarehi uddhaṃsoto hoti akaniṭṭhagāmi. Tato mudutarehi sakadāgāmī hoti. Tato mudutarehi sotāpanno hoti. Tato mudutarehi dhammānusārī hoti. Tato mudutarehi saddhānusārī hotī ti.*

of her son to do something or not to do something. The mother's motive here is a *saṅkhāra*. This appears to be volition (*cetanā*) of another person.[358] On the whole there is a concerted effort on the part of the *ābhidhammikas* to show that whichever way one looks at the various *dhammas* the ultimate analysis would be that *saṅkhāra* is one thing and that there are *saṅkhata dhammas*, as opposed to *asaṅkhata* which is *nibbāna*.

According to Buddhaghosa the concept of *saṅkhāra* can be viewed in more than five different contexts as follows: (actually he gives four plus 'others')

1. All conditioned *dhammas* - (*saṅkhatasaṅkhāra*)
2. *Saṅkhāra* - produced by action (*kamma*) - (*abhisaṅkhata - saṅkhāra*)

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358 cf. DhsA. pp. 70 - 71 *Somanassasahagatan ti vacanena tato catubbidham upekhāsahagataṃ pariccajitvā catubbidhaṃ somanassasahagatam eva gahitaṃ, ñāṇasampayuttan ti vacanena tato duvidhaṃ ñāṇavippayuttam pariccajitvā dve ñāṇasampayuttan' eva gahitāni, asaṅkhārivabhāvo pana pāliyam anābhaṭṭhatāya yeva na gahito, kiñcāpi na gahito parato pana sasaṅkhārena ti vacanato idha asaṅkhārena ti avutte pi asaṅkhārabhavo veditabbo.*

3. Producing paṭisandhi (cetanā) - (abhisaṅkhara-pakasaṅkhāra)

4. Performance saṅkhāra (viriya) - (payogābhi-saṅkhāra) [in iddhipāda]

5.* Not producing paṭisandhi (ceasing in samādhi).

According to Buddhaghosa, the first context includes all conditioned dhammas (therefore it excluded only nibbāna).

Item two above is not in the Tipiṭaka. It is only in the aṭṭhakathās (commentaries). Buddhaghosa read all the Sīhala aṭṭhakathās available at that time for him at the Mahāvihāra in Anurādhapura and after reviewing them he prepared his treatise called Visuddhi-magga. He does not directly say what saṅkhāra is and how it relates to the whole system of Buddhism. But he carefully translated from the Sīhala aṭṭhakathās and inserted their statements in his treatise. However, he gives invaluable clues for forming a systematic exposition of the concept of saṅkhāra. There is evidence for his compiling from different sources where in one place he

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* There also seems to be (Vism.p.391):

6. Accumulating (sankhārakkhandha) - (abhisaṅkharaṇasaṅkhāra) - one khandha only

says that there are two saṅkhāras[359] and then goes on to say that there are six saṅkhāras, namely vacī, kāya and citta on the one hand and puñña, apuñña and āneñja on the other. Then again he states there are four saṅkhāras given in the text but immediately adds a fifth.[360] Buddhaghosa failed to state whether or not there is a clear cut connection between those groups. It seems that Buddhaghosa tried to copy from several Sīhala aṭṭhakathās where the concept of saṅkhāra was expounded. One aṭṭhakathā may have differed from another in its treatment of the subject or the meaning of one context on saṅkhāra may be given in one aṭṭhakathā while other contexts may have been given in other aṭṭhakathās. So he copied faithfully from them without trying to make a systematic exposition of his own. His purpose of

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359 Vism. These apparently are saṅkhata as a paccaya and the 'traditional' saṅkhāras collected as saṅkhārakkandha. But Dhammapala says this is (1) paccaya and (2) all others.

360 ibid. p. 449 He has said 'others' (plural) but gives no further example. Perhaps saṅkhārakkhandha would be number 6 as abhisaṅkharaṇa-saṅkhāra.

visiting Sri Lanka was not to give an interpretation of any complex philosophical concept. Had it been the purpose he would have given a systematic exposition, of the concept of saṅkhāra. On the other hand the concept of saṅkhāra is a difficult and complex issue. Even the Sīhala aṭṭhakathās may have treated this concept as it appears in the Tipiṭaka, in six major contexts.

The major difficulty appears to be that exclusively in the teachings of the Buddha certain terms have been used on the basis of backward looking and forward looking. The purpose of saṅkhāra is to look backward to the previous life and in the meantime it is supposed to look forward to future birth. If a being has the ability and knowledge he can abandon all saṅkhāras in this very life following the noble eightfold path.

The above terms saṅkhata and asaṅkhata appear to refer respectively to all conditioned (paṭiccasamuppanna) and unconditioned dhamma(s) respectively. In other words the whole phenomenal world is described as saṅkhata and there is only one asaṅkhata, that is nibbāna or final extinction, according to the Theravāda tradition. Asaṅkhata conveys the meaning of not made, not born etc., and that is the only thing that can be permanent. Everything else is impermanent and has the characteristic of unhappiness. Both saṅkhata and asaṅkhata are expressed

by the term *dhamma*. Then these two terms are normally called *saṅkhata dhātu* and *asaṅkhata dhātu* or conditioned element and unconditioned element. The term element is the equivalent of the term *dhamma*.

It was mentioned earlier that the types of *saṅkhāra* are more than five/(six) in terms of the system as a whole. Let us see how the five/or six that Buddhaghosa explains lead to the unfolding of the central conception of Buddhism. The first one includes all the *saṅkhāras* in the world including the other types as well. Secondly *abhisaṅkhata saṅkhāra* is result (*vipāka*) produced by action (*kamma*) and this is included in the first one according to Buddhaghosa.

Thirdly, *abhisaṅkharaṇaka saṅkhāra* which would produce rebirth linking (*paṭisandhi*) is the condition that is explained as the second number of the sequence of conditioned origination. This represents the twenty nine volitions (*cetanā*). Conditioned by this *saṅkhāra* there is consciousness. In fact owing to rebirth-linking consciousness (*paṭisandhi viññāṇa*) the new birth will take place. This rebirth-linking consciousness is due to ignorance (*avijjā*). As long as ignorance exists, the round of rebirth exists. The ignorance is not knowing the four truths.

This third item, sañkhāra in respect of volitions, is divided into three parts, namely, speech (vacī) body (kāya) and mind (citta). In item three the three sañkhāras vacī, kāya and citta are described as:

(a) volition with reference to body (kāyasañcetanā as kāyasañkhāra

(b) volition with reference to speech (vacīsañcetanā) as vacīsañkhāra.

(c) volition with reference to mind (manosañcetanā) as cittasañkhāra.

These volitions are called vacīsañkhāra when they occur at the speech 'door' and produce verbal intimation (speech). Then the same volitions are called kāyasañkhāra when they occur at the body 'door' and produce bodily intimation (gesture). All these twenty nine volitions (cetanā) are cittasañkhāra when they occur at the mind 'door' without making any kind of intimation. The important point here is that the vacī, kāya and citta sañkhāras are wide in scope and in the analysis of cetanā or sañkhāra as a condition for rebirth (paccaya) these three sañkhāras are explained as vacī sañcetanā, kāya-sañcetanā and mano-sañcetanā and not as in-breathing and out-breathing (assāsapassāsa), applied thought and sustained thought (vitakka and vicāra) sensation and recognition (perception)(vedanā and saññā) respectively.

Then in turn these three _saṅkhāras_ have merit (_puñña_), demerit (_apuñña_) and neutrality (_āneñjā_) for each of the first three _saṅkhāras_.

Then the fourth, 'performance', _saṅkhāra_, consists of momentum (_payogābhisaṅkhāra_). This refers to mental and bodily energy in _iddhipāda_. In the _Tipiṭaka_ and _aṭṭhakathās_ the terms _āyu saṅkhāra_ and _jīvita saṅkhāra_ are constantly mentioned in connection with life until death. Although _āyu_ and _jīvita_ are synonymous in some sense, in the analysis of _saṅkhāra_ they are quite different.

The fifth not producing _paṭisandhi_ represents the _saṅkhāras_ ceasing in _samādhi_. The sixth is _khandha_ (accumulating).

Buddhaghosa described _saṅkhāra_ in a fourfold analysis. He stopped afterwards and started explaining _saṅkhāra_ again[361] with the passage from the _Majjhima Nikāya_.[362]

It should be noted here that the _Visuddhimagga_ does not say that there is a fivefold or sixfold analysis of _saṅkhāra_. The example of _saṅkhāra_ in respect of the fifth is given, showing how a recluse attempts to attain the highest goal in this very life and that is attainment of

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361 Vism. p. 449

362 M. I. 302

cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*). What Buddhaghosa actually gives is a fourfold classification (as we say on page 107) adding that there are others (*añne*) and then giving *vacīsaṅkhāra*, *cittasaṅkhāra* and *kāyasaṅkhāra* ceasing in *samādhi* as a further example. Thus we get five contexts.

1. All
2. Result
3. Condition (or cause)
4. Energy or exertion or continuing or performance
5. Cessation

(6. Accumulating without exertion).

Finally Buddhaghosa says that all *saṅkhāras* are included in the first context.

It has been observed in chapter seven that the Buddha called action volition, after having willed one acts with the body, the speech and the mind.

Also we have found that the Buddha called *saṅkhāra* six kinds of volitions. The results of the past actions will produce rebirth. But, as has been shown in chapter seven, that very action may not always have the same result but may have a result in a different manner. For instance Aṅgulimāla had taken the lives of other people, during the same life in which he had attained *arahantship*. But the results of his actions were ripened in a different manner and also to a certain degree the

results were not very severe for him, for reasons given in chapter seven. The results of the actions largely depend on the circumstances in which the actions are being done and taking into consideration other cumulative results of actions (<u>kammas</u>) and the state of the being at the time of ripening of the past action. In other words, every action may not have equal and opposite reaction as in the physical world. In the teachings of the Buddha all <u>dhammas</u> are subject to impermanence, unhappiness and no soul. If action has an equal and opposite reaction in the very life or another life, there is no end to unhappiness. This kind of deterministic view was rejected by the Buddha. The other point is that there is no soul going from one life to another. Therefore there is no agent to carry the results of actions to another life. On the other hand it has been pointed out that it is neither the same person nor a different person, who experiences the results. We may explain this paradox from the following simile.

If A asks B to go and bring some water from St. Lawrence Seaway, then B goes out and brings a jar of water from St. Lawrence Seaway. After some time B is again asked to bring water from St. Lawrence Seaway. B will again bring a bottle of water, it will not be the

same water but different water flowing through the same channel.

From this simile it can be understood how neither the same person nor another person feels the results of action. Instead of a 'soul' we have volition or action giving rise to impulses which in due course produce a reborn consciousness in a new body. Thus there are causes and effects, but no continuous entity; the effect is not the cause itself. The _saṅkhāra_ concept expresses and explains this process.

In reviewing the doctrine of conditioned origination in chapter eight we have discussed the twelve members of the sequence and seen that the doctrine as given in the _Mahānidāna sutta_ focuses only on the present and future lives, while that in the _Nidāna Saṃyutta_ refers to three lives, past, present and future.

On the basis of the past _saṅkhāras_, the consciousness will find a resting place in the mother's womb and the _cuti citta_ (at death) will contribute to produce a _paṭisandhi citta_. Both are single moments of _citta_ (consciousness).

Conditioned origination is the central point in the doctrine of the Buddha and in fact Sāriputta became a disciple of the Buddha after hearing that the Master

taught the origination of *dhammas* from causes. When the causes are removed unhappiness will cease.

Origination of unhappiness is the second truth of the four truths; unhappiness, origin of unhappiness, cessation and the way leading to the cessation of unhappiness. In the absence of *saṅkhāras* there will not be a consciousness. As two members are interlinked, one cannot survive without the other member of the sequence. The *saṅkhāras* become the focal point of the whole process producing rebirth, described either as *saṅkhāras* in general or specifically as *taṇhā* (elsewhere in the *Suttapiṭaka* called a *saṅkhāra*), *upādāna*, etc.

In chapter nine we discussed the connection between *saṅkhāra* and *dhamma*. On the basis of the early stage of teaching we had only *saṅkhārakkhandha*, then gradually the emphasis was focussed on *saṅkhāra* as a *paccaya*, then in the midst of this transition the concept of *dhamma* became the central theme, more important than *saṅkhāra* and *saṅkhārakkhandha* in the development of Buddhist thought after the *parinibbāna*.

It appears at first glance that there are two classifications parallel to each other. These are *saṅkhāra* and *dhamma*. Although the initial teaching does not say much about *dhamma*, a great deal has been said on *saṅkhāra*. It is true, of course, that Sāriputta also

discusses various *dhammas* in the *Dasuttara Sutta* but the trend seems to be to push the concept of *saṅkhāra* into the background. The statement that the Buddha often used, *sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā*, is more or less forgotten. In the systematization of the doctrine which emerges in the *Abhidhamma* and *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and subsequent texts prominence is largely given to *dhamma* rather than *saṅkhāra*.

After reviewing the writings of numerous scholars in the field of Buddhism and related studies, we have seen in Appendix A that there is no consensus as to the English or German equivalent of the term *saṅkhāra* and related forms. The difficulty in finding an English equivalent lies in the fact that the word must convey several shades of meaning.

Following Oldenberg, several scholars whom we have discussed in chapter one tend to use the word 'formation' for *saṅkhāra*. But the basic objection to 'form' or 'formation' is that it implies a substance (or soul) which assumes such a form and also that 'formation' presupposes objects to be arranged in it. Moreover it seems static rather than changing.

It is true of course that the deriviation of *sam+kṛ* implies putting together or forming or bringing together: confection (from Latin) or synergy (from Greek). If we

were to find an English equivalent purely on philological grounds 'formation' might seem close. But saṅkhāra is rather a cause of formation than the formation itself, 'a former' or 'combiner' or 'compounder'. Only as saṅkhata is it the effect 'put together'. The Buddha used saṅkhāra as a technical term in the sense of a driving force, something continuing from previous life to the present birth within the limitations of impermanence, unhappiness and no soul and producing a synthesis of consciousness and a body. In other words the English equivalent must convey that saṅkhāra means a combiner of principles and that it has the effect of accumulation. It seems that saṅkhāras do not act singly (cf. Abhidharmakoṣa. i.7) but interact together. Therefore the meaning or the English equivalent may be in the plural. So it is evident that if one tries to give a merely philological equivalent or cognate it will be quite inconclusive. When looking at the various translations and English equivalents of the scholars mentioned in chapter one and in appendix A one may naturally recall the incident in the Udāna when blind people try to explain what an elephant is on the basis of the part of the elephant that each has touched.

Most of these scholars have tried to explain the term saṅkhāra in six different ways.

1. *Kamma*, action, practice, function, activity, movement, process.
2. Will, intention, volition, voluntary action, purposeful intellection, desire, disposition.
   2a. strivings, exertions, effort.
   2b. potential energy.
3. impressions, latent impressions, subconsciousness, formations, latent formation forces, latent tendencies, predispositions, mental dispositions, inherent habitual tendencies, habit, instinct, tendencies, character, latent character, determination, potentiality, statement of actions.
4. presentation, representation, appearance of being, illusory appearance of existence.
   4a. conditioned appearances.
5. force, natural force, energy, synergy.
6. complex, synthesis, coming together, confection, connecting, combination, composition, co-factors, aggregates.

I. Geiger, Koppen, Warren and Wassiljew tried to explain *saṅkhāra* as *kamma*. Is it possible to substitute the word *kamma* for *saṅkhāra*? We have discussed earlier the words of the Buddha, *cetanāhaṃ kammaṃ vadāmi*. 'I call

action volition'. Stcherbatsky defined cetanā as the mental effort that precedes action.[363] Doing something alone cannot be understood as having the results of action. It is not just the action, but something continuing from it afterwards which is a saṅkhāra, to produce some result after an interval of time. The statement that the present body, for example, is an old action abhisaṅkhata, implies not that the body is the action itself but only that the action has in some sense been reintegrated in it. Now in Buddhism every effect (except nibbāna) is also a cause of further effects, so that a saṅkhāra both follows an action and precedes or conditions a later action.

II. Others have supposed that saṅkhāra precedes action and is will, volition, striving, etc. Schumann follows them by translating it as 'intention'. This overlooks the relation of a saṅkhāra to the previous action which gave rise to it. But what is most objectionable in 'intention' is that as a rule the result is

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363 Stcherbatsky, Central Conception, p. 19

not anything intended but rather unhappiness. Volition as we have seen is the essential nature of action itself, though sañkhāra overlaps with it. Keith and Kern tend to think that a word such as disposition would fit as an English equivalent. Disposition seems too passive to suggest the driving force of sañkhāras. It also hardly suggests that it has a cause but strongly implies an agent having it.

III. Others have held that sañkhāra follows action. These are those like Oldenberg who think of it as a 'formation' formed by an action. We have discussed this above and seen that although this is partly true, it appears to eliminate the nature of a sañkhāra as a cause or condition and to take sañkhāra as the same as sañkhata. The translations 'impression', 'latent impression' and so on catch the aspect of sañkhāra as a trace of an action (or of a volition) but make it seem passive rather than potent with effects. The same is true of 'formation'. However, this group of meanings does reflect

the function of *saṅkhāra* as a dynamic linking of past action and future results, even though none of these equivalents is satisfying as conveying that idea fully and precisely.

IV. This group of equivalents assumes that *saṅkhāras* are either illusory or a mere passive reflection in the mind. We may reject this at least for the Buddha himself and the more original schools of Buddhism, which are not idealist, do not teach that the world is a mere illusion, transient though it may be. *Saṅkhāras* also are active conditions, not mere reflexes.

V. Stcherbatsky, Professor A. K. Warder and to a certain extent Dahlke used the term energy or force for *saṅkhāra*. These seem closer to *saṅkhāra* than any other equivalents suggested. We must examine these thoroughly.

VI. The more etymological group of equivalents 'compound', 'complex', 'synthesis', 'coming together', 'confection', 'connecting', 'combination', 'co-factor', 'composition' also has much to recommend it, but is rather wide and vague and also passive or implying the result rather than the functioning of *saṅkhāra*. We

must take it into consideration subject to these reservations.

Other attempts at translation, such as 'ability to differentiate', 'powers of discrimination', 'distinction', 'existence', 'presence', 'emotion', 'constituent' seem wide of the mark in the light of our investigation and need not be discussed.

We have seen that in our primary sources saṅkhāra is used in several different contexts or classes of meaning. If these are in fact different meanings should we use only one English equivalent to translate them? We classified saṅkhāras in twelve ways in the four nikāyas then reduced them to six. In the abhidhamma we found five of these but also one different usage (sasaṅkhāra and asaṅkhāra). We saw also that Buddhaghosa following the Sīhala aṭṭhakathās has classified all saṅkhāras into five groups (4 + aññe) of which one (result produced by action) is new and perhaps the fifth also is new (saṅkhāras ceasing in concentration). Thus saṅkhāra is

(1) any saṅkhata dhamma

(2) a condition

(3) the fourth group of dhammas consisting of volition etc., which are 'mental' but not mind itself (accumulating).

(4) the span (of life of a living being).

(5) the driving force or momentum of exertion towards concentration.

(6) instigation (by another person)

(7) result (of action)

(8) what ceases (in concentration and in ending rebirth).

When there are so many contexts it might seem that most of the suggested translations are acceptable in certain contexts. But are these really different meanings or is there one meaning which fits all the contexts?

If <u>saṅkhāra</u> is both a condition and a result, as well as something connecting them can we see a single concept covering both ends of the process? Our understanding must include this 'locking both ways' in the concept and then we must seek a translation which does the same. Scholars who have previously attempted to translate the word are partially correct but seem not to have covered the complexity of the term. There may not exist any satisfactory equivalent covering the full range of contexts.

The five groups in the present life of a living being are due to past actions and saṅkhārakkhandha is one of them. The present saṅkhārakkhandha not only consists of the results of past actions (Buddhaghosa's abhisaṅkhatasaṅkhāra), but also it has the ability to accumulate further saṅkhāras for future births. Therefore it appears to overlap with saṅkhāra as a paccaya and with part (one khandha) of the general 'saṅkhata'.

Among the individual saṅkhāras in the earliest texts, are phassa (contact), rāga, dosa, moha, etc. Contact (phassa) is the impingement of three: eye, eye-consciousness and visible object and corresponding sets for the other senses (tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso). Rāga, dōsa, and mōha are three roots or causes of bad principles. These kinds of saṅkhāra are also due to past actions and they exist so long as ignorance exists. Therefore they also can be classed under saṅkhāra as a paccaya and under saṅkhārakkhandha. But saññā, vedanā, assāsapassāsa, etc. are also named as saṅkhāras though they belong to other khandhas. The significance of these seems to be that they have special links with saṅkhāras or connect other khandhas (consciousness, matter) with saṅkhārakkhandha.

Bhava means existence and it is equivalent to jīvita, that is the duration of life. In the Paṭisamb-

hidāmagga aṭṭhakathā, Mahānāma, probably following the Majjhimanikāya analysis of jīvita indriya, explains that jīvita saṅkhāra is āyu, usmā and viññāṇa. These terms appear in the Paṭṭhāna and the Aṭṭhakathās and it is possible to argue that at the time of rebirth-linking consciousness, the duration of the life span is also established. Thus this set of saṅkhāras comes under the domain of saṅkhāra as condition. Sasaṅkhāra and asaṅkhāra in the abhidhamma refer to instigated (deliberate) and uninstigated activities of the consciousness. Hence, they too may be classified as conditions. What ceases in concentration is again a condition for rebirth. In distinguishing it Buddhaghosa merely points out that the sequence of conditions can be ended. Although it appears that there are many classifications of saṅkhāras, all may thus be included under:

1. Saṅkhāra as a general term = saṅkhata (effect)
2. Saṅkhāra as a paccaya (cause)
3. Saṅkhāra in iddhipāda or momentum of a wheel (continuing action).

Grammatically a saṅkhāra is a cause (-kāra causative stem). Saṅkhata (past participle of the simple verb) is an effect and in that sense different. But in Buddhist doctrine an effect is usually itself a cause, so that the transferred sense saṅkhata = saṅkhāra arises. And

all causes are effects of previous causes. This is made very clear in the Paṭisambhidāmagga and by Mahānāma following the Vibhaṅga, where attha, 'objective', as effect is evidently the same principle as dhamma, 'condition': one is any dhamma as phala or vipāka, the other the same dhamma as hetu.

Then we are left with two contexts; saṅkhāra as a condition (paccaya) which is itself conditioned and saṅkhāra in the bases of power (iddhipāda) etc. (payoga or 'performance' saṅkhāra). Saṅkhāra in iddhipāda refers to exertion of concentration or momentum of iddhipāda. In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa mentions as another example that the rolling of a wheel will continue until it has lost its momentum.[364] So this saṅkhāra is the continuing momentum or velocity of the force of the concentration. The terms bhava, jīvita and āyu represent special kinds of paccayas and they may similarly be considered as continuing momentum of a condition. Similarly the performance (payoga) saṅkhāra of a wheel or of exertion, physical or mental might be regarded as a kind of paccaya.

In the final analysis of performance (payoga) saṅkhāra it cannot stand alone without an origin and

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364 Vism.pp. 448-449 - cf A. I. 112.

therefore _payoga_ _saṅkhāra_ is directly connected to _saṅkhāra_ as a _paccaya_, rather it is the continuing aspect, perhaps all _saṅkhāras_ have duration but a _payoga_ is gradually used up, whereas the other remains until it suddenly bears fruit.

Thus we conclude that _saṅkhāra_ as condition is the basic meaning, the other contexts or special meanings being mostly particular conditions or sets of conditions. Besides these there is only the other aspect of all conditions, namely that they are themselves effects of previous conditions, not ultimate or independent causes, that they are conditioned (_saṅkhata_).

It has been observed on the basis of the Pali sources of Buddhism that _saṅkhāra_ is what is transmitted from a previous life to form the present life and from present life to future lives subject to three characteristics. impermanence, unhappiness and no soul. This seems to be a kind of force passing from one body, or living being, to another.

There is no fundamental separation of mind and matter in the teaching of the Buddha, so that the 'body' or living being comprises both (or rather five _khandhas_) and the transmitted _saṅkhāras_ work as both. Since the above conception of transmigration is exclusive to Buddhism it is difficult to find an equivalent in a

language such as English in which such a process is unfamiliar. It also is necessary to have a term that would convey the sense of compounders or combiners or synthesisers, as the purpose of sañkhāra is to combine various principles and produce rebirth as a living being compounded of the five khandhas. Since we have investigated in a preliminary way most of the sixty or more equivalents in European languages used by earlier scholars, we must now try to find the closest word which might convey to a certain extent what sañkhāra means, as we have just attempted to delimit it from our review of its contexts.

A sañkhāra is a continuing force resulting from an action but without any substance or soul or entity to contain it or possess it, though it is associated with the still more fleeting consciousness (which it conditions). It produces effects, either gradually, such as a change of position or sustained concentration, or suddenly after a long time, as in rebirth of consciousness in a new body. Thus we have causes and effects, but no continuous entity; the effect is not the cause itself but nevertheless results from it. This process is indicated by the concept of sañkhāra. The sañkhāras in general become the focal point of the process producing rebirth, but specific sañkhāras are mentioned as taṇhā, upādāna, etc. We should bear in mind, as just noted, the

grammatically causal form of <u>saṅkhāra</u> as well as its etymological origin from a verb meaning 'put together'. It indicates a cause of some situation rather than the situation itself, a 'former' or 'combiner' or 'compounder' rather than a 'compound'. Only a <u>saṅkhata</u> is the result, that which is 'put together' or compounded. <u>Saṅkhāras</u> are generally mentioned in the plural and appear to act in concert, not singly. Moreover they combine two or more principles, e.g. consciousness and a sentient body at rebirth. They are objective, not subjective, not mere wishes or desires but like physical facts. Though they arise from voluntary actions they rarely correspond to the aim mistakenly foreseen, since they were done in ignorance of the true workings of nature and of causal laws. Thus a <u>saṅkhāra</u> is usually an unintended result of action, which might be described as unconscious or not present to consciousness, though it drives consciousness. But just as the physical momentum in a rolling wheel may be deliberately imparted to it by one who understands physics and has a well made wheel, so in meditation one who understands the workings of certain <u>saṅkhāras</u> can utilise them to maintain concentration as a kind of mental momentum. Thus there are two main aspects: momentum and the bringing together of physical or mental principles or combining of both

kinds. It is not just a random momentum but one as it were 'programmed' and attracting other principles into its orbit. It creates a field in which new events are focussed and bound. It may reproduce a previous event in a new context.

In English, terms such as force, energy, preparation and integration are much closer to saṅkhāra than other terms.*

The words synthesis, confection, composition, combination, and compounding have the basic meaning of saṅkhāra but they are passive, and they do not possess the driving force that the terms preparation and integration have.

Force is active, but it lacks the sense of 'together', the concept of combining. Energy may be purely potential or latent, as well as active; also it is more general: 'conservation of energy'. Saṅkhāra is not formed but fluid. But the terms integration and preparation appear to be closer than the terms force and energy. The term integration implies something that is integrating or unifying a combination of principles. Also it implies renewing or restoring and it does not imply a permanent entity.

In order to see whether or not the term preparation as has been commonly used in Vedic translation would

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* It appears that the words integrator and preparer imply an agent. Therefore we use the words preparation and integration.

give some help, let us translate various usages of sankhāra in the Tipiṭaka using these four equivalents.

anicca sabbe saṅkhārā (S. I. 200)

All forces are impermanent

All energies are impermanent

All integrations are impermanent

All preparations are impermanent.

Vaya-dhammā saṅkhārā (S. I. 158)

All forces have the principle of transience

All energies have the principle of transience

All integrations have the principle of transience

All preparations have the principle of transience

Sabbe te saṅkhārā atītā niruddhā vipariṇatā (D. II. 198)

All these forces are past, ended and changed

All these energies are past, ended and changed

All these integrations are past, ended and changed

All these preparations are past, ended and changed.

Katamā ca bhikkhave saṅkhārā (M. I. 54)

O'Bhikkhus, which (ones) are forces?

O'Bhikkhus, which (ones) are energies ?

O'Bhikkhus, which (ones) are integrations ?

O'Bhikkhus, which (ones) are preparations ?

Phassasamudayā saṅkhārasamudayo (S. III. 60)

From the origination of contact there is the origination of forces

From the origination of contact there is the origination of energies

From the origination of contact there is the origination of integrations

From the origination of contact there is the origination of preparations.

Phassanirodhā saṅkhāranirodho (S. III. 60)

From the ceasing of contact there is the ceasing of forces

From the ceasing of contact there is the ceasing of energies

From the ceasing of contact there is the ceasing of integrations

From the ceasing of contact there is the ceasing of preparations.

Ayaṃ eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo saṅkhāranirodhagāmini paṭipadā (D. II. 58-9)

This is the noble eightfold way, the path going to the ceasing of forces

This is the noble eightfold way, the path going to the ceasing of energies

This is the noble eightfold way, the path going to the ceasing of integrations

This is the noble eightfold way, the path going to the ceasing of preparations.

Sabbasaṅkhārasamatho (D. II. 36)

Tranquilization of all forces

Tranquilization of all energies

Tranquilization of all integrations

Tranquilization of all preparations.

Avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā (S. II. 7)

From ignorance as condition, there are forces

From ignorance as condition, there are energies

From ignorance as condition, there are integrations

From ignorance as condition, there are preparations.

Saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇam (S. II. 7)

From forces as conditions, there is conscicusness.

From energies as conditions, there is consciousness.

From integrations as conditions, there is consciousness.

From preparations as conditions, there is consciousness.

<u>Saṅkhāranirodhā</u> <u>viññāṇanirodho</u> (S. 11. 4)

From the cessation of forces, there is the cessation of consciousness

From the cessation of energies, there is the cessation of consciousness

From the cessation of integrations, there is the cessation of consciousness

From the cessation of preparations, there is the cessation of consciousness

<u>Avijjā</u> <u>apayantī</u> <u>saṅkhāre</u> <u>apayāpeti</u> (S. 11. 119)

Ignorance going away causes the forces to go away

Ignorance going away causes the energies to go away

Ignorance going away causes the integrations to go away

Ignorance going away causes the preparations to go away

<u>Saṅkhāre</u> <u>parato</u> <u>passa</u> <u>dukkhato</u> <u>mā</u> <u>ca</u> <u>attato</u> (S. 1. 188)

Look at forces as alien, as unhappiness, and not as a soul

Look at energies as alien, as unhappiness, and not as a soul

Look at integrations as alien, as unhappiness, and not as a soul

Look at preparations as alien, as unhappiness, and not as a soul

<u>Sankhatam abhisankharonti ti bhikkhave tasma sankhara ti vuccati</u>

(S. 111. 87)

Monks, they are called forces because they force what has been forced

Monks, they are called energies because they energize what has been energized

Monks, they are called integrations because they integrate what has been integrated*

Monks, they are called preparations because they prepare what has been prepared.*

<u>Rupam rupattaya sankhatam abhisankharonti</u> (S. 111. 27)

They force forced matter into the state of matter

They energize energized matter into the state of matter

They integrate integrated matter into the state of matter

They prepare prepared matter into the state of matter

<u>Ayusankhara khiyanti</u> (S. 11. 266)

Life forces pass away

Life energies pass away

Life integrations pass away

Life preparations pass away

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* This shows how in Buddhist texts, the word has been used in a new way. It has to be understood as a cause not as an agent in the ordinary everyday sense.

Jīvitasaṅkhāraṃ adhiṭṭhāya vihareyyan'ti (S. V. 152-3)

You should live holding onto life forces

You should live holding onto life energy

You should live holding onto life integrations

You should live holding onto life preparations

Tayo saṅkhārā: puññābhisaṅkhāro, apuññābhisaṅkhāro, āneñjābhisaṅkhāro (D. iii. 17)

There are three forces, force of merit, force of demerit, force of the imperturbable

There are three energies, energy of merit, energy of demerit, energy of the imperturbable

There are three integrations, integration of merit, integration of demerit, integration of the imperturbable

There are three preparations, preparation of merit, preparation of demerit, preparation of the imperturbable.

Katame ca bhikkhave saṅkhārā (M. 1. 54)

Monks, which are forces ?

Monks, which are energies?

Monks, which are integrations?

Monks, which are preparations ?

Tayo me bhikkhave saṅkhārā (M. 1. 54)

There are these three forces, monks

There are these three energies, monks

There are these three integrations, monks

There are these three preparations, monks

Kāyasaṅkhāro, vacīsaṅkhāro, cittasaṅkhāro (M. 1. 54)

Bodily force, verbal force, mental force

Bodily energy, verbal energy, mental energy

Bodily integration, verbal integration, mental integration

Bodily preparation, verbal preparation, mental preparation.

Assāsapassāsā kāyasaṅkhāro (S. IV. 293)

In breathing and outbreathing are bodily force

In breathing and outbreathing are bodily energy

In breathing and outbreathing are bodily integration

In breathing and outbreathing are bodily preparation.

Vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro (S. IV. 293)

Applied thought and sustained thought are verbal force

Applied thought and sustained thought are verbal energy

Applied thought and sustained thought are verbal integration

Applied thought and sustained thought are verbal preparation.

Saññā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāro (S. IV. 293)

Recognition and sensation are mental force

Recognition and sensation are mental energy

Recognition and sensation are mental integration

Recognition and sensation are mental preparation.

Atthi bhikkhave ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhataṃ (Udāna. p.80)

O bhikkhus, there is not born, not become, not made and not forced

O bhikkhus, there is not born, not become, not made and not energized

O bhikkhus, there is not born, not become, not made and not integrated

O bhikkhus, there is not born, not become, not made and not prepared

<u>Saṅkhārakkhandho</u>

The group of forces

The group of energies

The group of integrations

The group of preparations.

Now let us see which word is the best English equivalent for the term <u>saṅkhāra</u> on the basis of the following statements.

	Forces	Energies	Integrations	Preparations
1. Word does not imply a soul or an agent.	yes	yes	yes	yes
2. Word implies impermanence and unhappiness.	yes	yes	yes	yes
3. Does the word imply a condition and result ?	yes	yes	yes	yes
4. Can the word be used to imply something going from one life to another ?	yes	yes	yes	yes
5. Word can be used with another phrase or words to imply future births.	yes	yes	yes	yes
6. Does the word have an implication of working in concert?	no	no	yes	yes
7. Does the word imply accumulation?	no	yes	yes	yes

On page 268, the Pali term asaṅkhata has been translated in four different ways. Asaṅkhata means nibbāna and a translation must convey a similar meaning to not born, not made, not become etc. It seems that to use the English word 'not' in all these four English equivalents comes closer to the Buddhist concept than to use the prefix 'un'. The phrase 'not prepared' is preferable to 'unprepared' because it is a simple negation and does not imply a positive contrary. Although all four phrases not forced, not energized not integrated and not prepared convey some aspects of the meaning of asaṅkhata, we have decided to use the phrase 'not prepared' for the term asaṅkhata in order to maintain consistency as we shall find the best English equivalent for saṅkhāra as ' preparation'.

Force is active but it suffers heavily in the area of question numbers 6 and 7. Therefore the word force may not be used as the best English equivalent.

Energy is more general, also it cannot be used in the sense of concert or 'accumulation' as in the case of force. One cannot say energizing together. Apart from that, the above translations show that the phrases or sentences with energy or energizing are out of place. For example energy of merit or energy of demerit. etc. Now we are left with two words, integration and preparation.

The word integration has most of the contexts of the term saṅkhāra but when translating some of the Pali phrases or sentences it appears

to be cumbersome. For example, the sentence 'my *saṅkhāras* are impermanent' would be translated as 'my integrations are impermanent'.

Finally, we are left with the word preparation. According to the above chart, the word preparation meets the requirements of all the 8 statements. Therefore we think the word preparation is the best English equivalent for the Pali term *saṅkhāra*.

CONCLUSION

It has already been indicated in the introduction to this thesis that saṅkhāra is one of the least explored and most obscure terms in the philosophy of Buddhism. Our main purpose in this study is to find what saṅkhāra is on the basis of the primary sources, sutta, abhidhamma and aṭṭhakathās and if possible to discover whether there is a satisfactory English equivalent.

An attempt was made to start the quest by going through the only published dissertation on saṅkhāra, by Schumann in German, and the writer was encouraged to explore deeply into the matter as Schumann was unsuccessful in coming to grips with the highly complex and subtle theory of saṅkhāra. Schumann mainly confined himself to the suttas and he was strongly influenced by the interpretations of the secondary sources in German. There is no need to repeat our arguments as to why his conclusion is unacceptable as the full discussion is given in chapter 1 and the appendix A. Had he read some of the commentaries or at least the Visuddhimagga there was a good chance that he might have been able to come closer to understand at least what saṅkhāra primarily means, leaving aside the complexities involved with particular saṅkhāras and saṅkhārakkhandha.

Having reviewed the writings of numerous scholars in the field of Buddhism and related studies, an attempt has been made to pick out essential contexts where _saṅkhāra_ appears in the four _nikāyas_, _Khuddaka nikāya_, _Abhidhamma_ and _Aṭṭhakathās_ and to a lesser degree the commentaries on the _Paṭisambhidāmagga_ and on the _Visuddhimagga_. Then we tried to explore the relationship of _saṅkhāra_ with other concepts such as _kamma_, _cetanā_, _paṭiccasamuppāda_ and _dhamma_, which appear to overlap with it in meaning.

It has been observed that the Buddha used the term _saṅkhāra_ as a technical term in the sense of denoting a continuing force resulting from an action but without any substance or soul or entity. Thus we have causes and effects but no continuing entity, its effect is not the cause itself but nevertheless results from it.

Thus we conclude that _saṅkhāra_ as condition is the basic meaning, the other contexts or special meanings being mostly particular conditions or sets of conditions. Then we found that there are two main aspects, momentum and bringing together of physical or mental principles or combination or both kinds, in respect of reproducing a previous event in a new context. Finally after considering possible English equivalents such as force, energy, integration and preparation, it appears that the term _saṅkhāra_ should be untranslated if possible following Sir Charles Eliot's proposal due to its complexity and to avoid misrepresentation.

POSTSCRIPT

The term *saṅkhāra* was [illegible] the language prior to the advent of Buddhism. The Buddha using the same language added a new meaning and used it in a new sense. Hence, in the Vedic tradition a priest acts as an agent to prepare a new body in the next birth. Similarly in the absence of an agent *saṅkhāras* acting as non agential forces lead the preparation for rebirth. Hence the word 'preparation' is in a way adequate to convey that something is integrating or unifying from a combination of principles. We could follow the Pali texts in using the old word 'preparation' and in understanding it in a new way.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.	Aṅguttara Nikāya
AA.	Manorathapūraṇi: the commentary on the Aṅguttara Nikāya
Abhidhp.	Abhidhānappadīpikā
AK.	Abhidharmakośa
AKV.	Abhidharmakośavyākhyā
AmāV.	Amāvatura
ApA.	Visuddhajanavilāsinī nāma Apadānaṭṭhakathā
D.	Dīgha Nikāya
DA.	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī: the commentary on the Dīgha Nikāya
Dh.	Dhammapada
Dhk.	Dhātukathā
Dhs.	Dhammasaṅgaṇi
DhsA.	Atthasālinī: the commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇi
It.	Itivuttaka
ItA.	Paramatthadīpanī (Vii): Commentary on Cariyāpitaka.
M.	Majjhima Nikāya
MA.	Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā: the commentary on the Majjhimanikāya
Miln.	Milindapañho
NdI.	Niddesa I: Mahāniddesa
NdII	Niddesa II: Cullaniddesa
Pm	Paramatthamañjusā: the commentary on the Visuddhimagga
Ps	Paṭisambhidāmagga

PsA.	*Saddhammappakāsinī*: the commentary on the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*
PTS	Pali Text Society, London.
Pṭh	*Paṭṭhāna*
S.	*Saṃyutta Nikāya*
SA.	*Sāratthappakāsinī*: the commentary on the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*
Sn.	*Sutta Nipāta*
SBE.	Sacred Books of the East
TSWS.	Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna.
Ud.	*Udāna*
Vbh.	*Vibhaṅga*
VbhA.	*Sammohavinodanī*: the commentary on the *Vibhaṅga*
Vin.	*Vinaya*
Vism.	*Visuddhimagga*

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APPENDIX A

Group I (discussed by Schumann)

1. Beckh, H. : Unterbewusstsein, latente Bildekräfte (subconsciousness, powers of conceptualization)

2. Dahlke, P. : Strebungen, Veranlagungen, Unterscheidungsvermögen, Charakter, -Kraft, Gebilde, -Vorgang, Gestaltungen; (strivings, assessments, ability to differentiate, character, forces, power of making concepts, process, formations)

3. Davids, T. W. Rhys : Confections, potentialities, tendencies, exertions.

4. Dutoit, J. : Gestaltungen (nach Oldenberg); (formations (following Oldenberg)).

5. Franke, R. O. : Seinserscheinungen, illusorische Daseinserscheinungen, (āyusamkhāra:) was man 'Leben' nennt; (appearance of being, illusory appearance of existence, what one calls 'living')

6. Frauwallner, Eric : Gestaltungen (formations).

7. Geiger, W. : Gestaltungen, Kamma; (formations, kamma).

8. Glasenapp, H. von : Karma-gestaltende Kräfte, Triebkräfte, bedingte Daseinsfaktoren; (karma forming forces, motive forces, conditional circumstances of life).

9. Hardy, E. : Gestaltungen, strebungen, begehrungen, willen (formations, strivings, desires, volitions).

10. Hardy, S. : Powers of discrimination (including the moral faculties).

11. Keith, A. B. : the impressions resulting in dispositions, predispositions or latent tendencies which will bear

fruition in action in due course ... *Saṃkhāras* are the dispositions which lead to rebirth, precisely parallel to the *saṃskāras*, which in the Sāṃkhya system represent the predispositions of the individual resulting from the impressions left by former thoughts and deeds ... The ... man commits actions and so produces dispositions which lead on to fresh birth.

12. Kern, H. : Passing impressions, mental dispositions comprising both intellectual affections and sentiments.

13. Köppen, C. F. : Bewegung, Karman (movement, Karman)

14. Neumann, K. E. : Unterschiede, Unterscheidungen, Verbindung, Dasein; (distinctions, differences, connecting, existence)

15. Nyāṇaponika, Bhikkhu : -Funktion, Gestaltungen, karmisches Gestalten, das Gestalten; (function, formations, forms of karma, forming).

16. Nyāṇatiloka, Bhikkhu : Zusammengesetztes, Schwungkraft, Bildung, zum Dasein führende Tatenbildung, Geistesbildungen; (coming together, vibrating force, formation, forms of action leading to existence, mental formation of consciousness).

17. Oldenberg, H. : Gestaltungen; (formations).

18. Pischel, R. : Vorübergehende Eindrücke; (continuing impressions).

19. Seidenstücker, K. : (organische) Prozesse, Gestaltung, latenter Charakter, Gemütsregungen; (organic processes, formation, latent character, emotion).

20. Warren, H. C. : Karma.

21. Wassiljew, W. : handlung; (practise).

22. Winternitz, M. Willensakte und Betätigungen, bedingte Erscheinungen, latente Eindrücke; (voluntary actions and participations, conditioned appearances, latent impressions).

Group II (not discussed by Schumann)

23.	Davids, Caroline Rhys	: complexes, synergies, syntheses
24.	Edgerton, F.	: predispositions, the effect of past deeds and experience on conditioning a new state.
25.	Eliot, Sir Charles	: Synthesis, confection, predispositions, tendencies,
26.	Horner, I. B.	: inherent habitual tendencies, karma formations or formations, activity, properties, purposeful intellection.
27.	Johansson, Rune E. A.	: thing-constituting-process
28.	Lamotte, Etienne.	: formation
29.	Malalasekera, G.P.	: conditioned plastic forces
30.	Monier Williams	: putting together, forming well, making perfect, accomplishment, embellishment, adornment, preparation etc.
31.	Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu	: formation, determination
32.	Poussin, Louis de La Vallée	: l'état d'acte (statement of actions)

33.	Schumann, Hans Wolfgang	: intention
34.	Stcherbatsky, F. Th	: force, energy, volition, co-factors
35.	Thomas, E. J.	: aggregates
36.	Warder, Anthony K.	: force, energy, activity, combination process, instinct, habit (see above section VI)
37.	Woodward, F. L.	: effort

APPENDIX B

Tathāgato ca kho Vaccha arahaṃ sammāsambuddho na rūpaṃ attato samanupassati na rūpavantaṃ vā attānaṃ na attani vā rūpaṃ na rūpasmiṃ vā attānaṃ na vedanam attato samanupassati pe na saññaṃ na saṅkhāre na viññāṇaṃ attato samanupassati na viññāṇavantaṃ vā attānaṃ na attani vā viññāṇaṃ na viññāṇasmiṃ vā attānaṃ. Tasmā tathāgatassa evam puṭṭhassa na evaṃ vyākaraṇaṃ hoti. Sassato loko ti pi pe neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato param maraṇā ti pi ti.

Atha kho Vacchagotto paribbājako uṭṭhayāsanā yenāyasmā Mahā-Moggallāno tenupasaṅkami upasaṅkamitvā āyasmatā Mahā-Moggallānena saddhiṃ sammodi sammodanīyaṃ kathaṃ sārāṇīyaṃ vītisāretva ekam antaṃ nisīdi. (S.III. 396)

APPENDIX C

(For chapter 3)

(Pali passages in order of the texts of the Four Nikāyas)

D. I. 106

atha kho Bhagavā tathārūpam iddhābhisaṅkhāram abhisaṅkhāsi yathā addasā Ambaṭṭho māṇavo Bhagavato kosohitaṃ vatthaguyham. atha kho Bhagavā jivhaṃ ninnāmetvā ubho pi kaṇṇasotāni anumasi paṭimasi, ubho pi nāsika-sotāni anumasi paṭimasi, kevalam pi nalāṭamaṇḍalaṃ jivhāya chādesi.

D. I. 184

yato kho Poṭṭhapāda bhikkhu idha saka-saññi hoti, so tato amutra tato amutra anupubbena saññaggaṃ phusati. tassa saññagge ṭhitassa evaṃ hoti: cetayamānassa me pāpiyo, acetayamānassa me seyyo. ahañ ce va kho pana ceteyyaṃ abhisaṅkhareyyaṃ, imā ca me saññā nirujjheyyuṃ, aññā ca oḷārikā saññā uppajjeyyuṃ. yan nūnāhaṃ na ceteyyaṃ na abhisaṅkhareyyan ti. so na c'eva ceteti na abhisaṅkharoti. tassa acetayato anabhisaṅkharoto tā c'eva saññā nirujjhanti, aññā co oḷārikā saññā na uppajjanti. so nirodhaṃ phusati. evaṃ kho Poṭṭhapāda anupubbābhisaññānirodha-sampajāna-samāpatti hoti.

D. II. 36

idam pi kho ṭhānaṃ duddasaṃ, yadidaṃ sabba-saṅkhārā-samatho sabbūpadhi-paṭinissaggo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.

D. II. 66

sukhā pi kho Ānanda vedanā aniccā saṅkhatā paṭiccasamuppannā khaya-dhammā vaya-dhammā virāga-dhammā nirodha-dhammā.

D. II. 99

yan nunāhaṃ imam ābādhaṃ viriyena paṭippaṇāmetvā jīvitasaṅkhāraṃ adhiṭṭhāya vihareyyan'ti.

atha kho Bhagavā taṃ ābādhaṃ viriyena paṭippaṇāmetvā jīvitasaṅkhāraṃ adhiṭṭhāya vihāsi.

D. II. 106

atha kho Bhagavā Cāpāle cetiye sato sampajāno āyusaṅkhāram ossaji, ossaṭṭhe ca Bhagavato āyusaṅkhāre mahābhūmicalo ahosi bhiṃsanako lomahaṃsano, devadundubhiyo ca phaliṃsu.

D. II. 108

puna ca paraṃ Ānanda yadā Tathāgato sato sampajāno āyusaṅkhāraṃ ossajjati, tadā'yam paṭhavī kampati saṃkampati sampakampati sampavedhati.

D. II. 114

idān'eva kho Ānanda ajja Cāpāle cetiye Tathāgatena satena sampajānena āyusaṅkhāro ossaṭṭho'ti.

D. II. 118

yaṃ kho pan'etaṃ Ānanda Tathāgatena cattaṃ vantaṃ muttaṃ pahīnaṃ paṭinissaṭṭhaṃ ossaṭṭho āyusaṅkhāro.

D. II. 144

taṃ kut'ettha Ānanda labbhā? yan taṃ jātaṃ bhūtaṃ saṅkhataṃ paloka-dhammaṃ, taṃ vata mā paiujjīti n'etaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati.

D. II. 158

taṃ kut'ettha āvuso labbhā? yan taṃ jātaṃ bhūtaṃ saṅkhataṃ paloka-dhammaṃ taṃ vata mā palujjīti n'etam ṭhānaṃ vijjati. devatā āvuso ujjhāyantīti.

D. II. 214-5

puna ca paraṃ bho idh'ekaccassa oḷārikā kāyasaṅkhārā appaṭipassaddhā honti, oḷārikā vacīsaṅkhārā .... pe ... cittasaṅkhārā appaṭipassaddhā honti. so aparena samayena ariyadhammaṃ suṇāti, yoniso manasikaroti, dhammānudhammaṃ paṭipajjati. tassa ariyadhammasavanaṃ āgamma yonisomanasikāraṃ dhammānudhamma-paṭipattiṃ oḷārikā kāyasaṅkhārā paṭippassambhanti, oḷārikā vacīsaṅkhārā ... pe ... cittasaṅkhārā paṭippassambhanti.

D. II. 291

idha bhikkhave bhikkhu araññagato vā rukkhamūlagato vā suññāgāragato vā nisīdati pallaṅkaṃ ābhujitvā ujuṃ kāyaṃ paṇidhāya parimukhaṃ satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā. so sato va assasati, sato passasati. dīghaṃ vā assasanto dīghaṃ assasāmīti pajānāti, dīghaṃ vā passasanto dīghaṃ passasāmīti pajānāti. rassaṃ vā assasanto rassaṃ assasāmīti pajānāti, rassaṃ vā passasanto rassaṃ passasāmīti pajānāti. Sabbakāyapaṭisaṃvedī assasissāmīti sikhati sabbakāyapaṭisaṃvedī passasissāmīti **sikkhati** passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ assasissāmīti sikkhati, passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ passasissāmīti sikkhati.

D. II. 301-2

idha bhikkhave bhikkhu iti rūpaṃ, iti rūpassa samudayo, iti rūpassa atthagamo--iti vedanā, iti vedanāya samudayo iti vedanāya atthagamo-- iti saññā, iti saññāya samudayo, iti saññāya atthagamo--iti saṅkhārā, iti saṅkhārānaṃ samudayo, iti saṅkhārānaṃ atthagamo--iti viññāṇaṃ, iti viññāṇassa samudayo, iti viññāṇassa atthagamo ti .....[23]

D. III. 17

tayo saṅkhārā. puññābhisaṅkhāro, apuññābhisaṅkhāro, āneñjābhisaṅkhāro.

D. III. 104

puna ca paraṃ bhante idh'ekacco na h'eva kho nimittena ādisati, na pi manussānaṃ vā amanussānaṃ vā devatānaṃ vā saddaṃ sutvā ādisati, na pi vitakkayato vicārayato vitakkavipphārasaddaṃ sutvā ādisati, api ca kho avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhiṃ samāpannassa cetasā ceto paricca pajānāti-- yathā imassa bhoto manosaṃkhārā paṇihitā, tathā imassa cittassa anantarā amuṃ nāma vitakkaṃ vitakkessatīti. so bahuṃ ce pi ādisati--tath'eva taṃ hoti no aññathā, ayaṃ catutthā ādesanavidhā. etad ānuttariyaṃ bhante ādesanavidhāsu.

D. III. 211

katamo eko dhammo?
sabbe sattā āhāra-ṭṭhitikā, sabbe sattā saṅkhāra-ṭṭhitikā.
ayaṃ kho āvuso tena Bhagavatā jānatā passatā arahatā sammā-sambuddhena eko dhammo sammadakkhāto.

D. III. 221-222

cattāro iddhipādā. idh' āvuso bhikkhu chanda-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti. citta-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti. viriya-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti. vīmaṃsā-samādhi-padhāna saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti.

D. III. 228

catasso viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo. rūpūpāyaṃ vā āvuso viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭhati, rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasevanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjati. vedanūpāyaṃ vā āvuso viññāṇam ..... saññūpāyaṃ vā .... saṅkhārūpāyaṃ vā āvuso viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭhāti, saṅkhārārammaṇaṃ saṅkhārappati-ṭṭhaṃ nandūpavesanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjati.

D. III. 269

idh'āvuso bhikkhu pañcaṅgavippahīno hoti chaḷaṅgasamannāgato ekārakkho caturāpasseno panunnapaccekasacco samavayasaṭṭhesano anāvilasaṅkappo passaddhakāyasaṅkhāro suvimuttacitto suvimuttapañño. kathañ c'āvuso bhikkhu pañcaṅgavippahīno hoti? idh'āvuso bhikkhuno kāmacchando pahīno hoti, vyāpādopahīno hoti, thīna-middhaṃ pahīnaṃ hoti, uddhaccakukkuccaṃ pahīnaṃ hoti, vicikicchā pahīnā hoti. evaṃ kho āvuso bhikkhu pañcaṅgavippahīno hoti.

D. III. 278

katame pañca dhammā pariññeyyā? pañc'upādānakkhandhā, seyyathīdaṃ rūpūpādānakkhandho vedanūpādānakkhandho saññūpādānakkhandho saṅkhārūpādānakkhandho viññāṇupādānakkhandho. ime pañca dhammā pariññeyyā.

M. I. 54

katame ca bhikkhave saṅkhārā. tayo me bhikkhave saṅkhārā kāya-saṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro cittasaṅkhāro. ime vuccanti bhikkhave saṅkhārā.

katame pan'āvuso saṅkhārā, katamo saṅkhārasamudayo, katamo saṅkhāranirodho, katamā saṅkhāranirodhagāminīpaṭipadā: tayo'me āvuso saṅkhārā: kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro cittasaṅkhāro. avijjā-samudayā saṅkhārasamudayo, avijjānirodhā saṅkhāranirodho. ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo saṅkhāranirodhagāminipaṭipada, seyya-thidam: sammādiṭṭhi--pe--sammāsamādhi. yato kho āvuso ariyasāvako evaṃ saṅkhāraṃ pajānāti, evaṃ saṅkhārasamudayaṃ pajānāti, evaṃ saṅkhāranirodhaṃ pajānāti, evaṃ saṅkhāranirodhagāminipaṭipadaṃ pajānāti, so sabbaso rāgānusayaṃ pahāya--pe--ettāvatā pi kho... saddhamman ti — pe —.

M. III. 63

siyā, Ānanda. dve imā, Ānanda, dhātuyo: saṅkhatā ca dhātu asaṅkhatā ca dhātu. imā kho, Ānanda, dve dhātuyo yato jānāti passati, ettāvatā pi kho, Ānanda, dhātukusalo bhikkhū ti alaṃ vacanāyā ti.

S. I. 28

passa samādhisubhāvitaṃ cittaṃ ca vimuttaṃ. na cābhinataṃ

na cāpanataṃ na ca asaṅkhāraniggayha cāritavataṃ.

S. I. 100

thalaṃ ninnañca pūreti abhivassaṃ vasundharaṃ

tath-eva saddho sutavā abhisaṅkhacca bhojanaṃ

vanibbake tappayati anna-pānena paṇḍito.

S. I. 135

kinnu satto ti paccesi māra diṭṭhigataṃ nu-te.

suddhasaṅkhārapuñjo yaṃ nayidha sattūpalabbhati.

S. I. 188

saññāya vipariyesā. cittaṃ te pariḍayhati.

nimittaṃ parivajjehi subhaṃ rāgūpasaṃhitaṃ.

saṅkhāre parato passa dukkhato mā ca attato.

nibbāpehi mahārāgaṃ mā ḍayhittho punappunaṃ.

asubhāya cittaṃ bhāvehi ekaggaṃ susamāhitaṃ.

sati kāyagatā tyatthu nibbidā-bahulo bhava.

animittaṃ ca bhāvehi mānānusayaṃ ujjaha.

tato mānābhisamayā upasanto carissatī ti.

S. II. 4

katamā ca bhikkhave avijjā. yam kho bhikkhave dukkhe aññāṇam dukkhasamudaye aññāṇam dukkhanirodhe aññāṇam dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya aññāṇam. ayam vuccati bhikkhave avijjā.

iti kho bhikkhave avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā. saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇam. pe. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. avijjāya tveva asesavirāganirodhā saṅkhāranirodho. saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho. pe. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hotīti. dutiyam.

S. II. 7

iti hidam avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā. saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇam. pe. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

kimhi nu kho sati saṅkhārā honti kimpaccayā saṅkhārā ti. atha kho bhikkhave Vipassissa bodhisattassa yoniso manasikārā ahu paññāya abhisamayo: avijjāya kho sati saṅkhārā honti avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ti.

S. II. 28

avijjāya tveva asesavirāganirodhā saṅkhāranirodho saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho. pe. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hotīti. paṭhamam.

S. II. 40

sāmaṃ vā taṃ Ānanda vacīsaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti yaṃ paccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ. pare vāssa taṃ Ānanda vacīsaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharonti yaṃ paccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ.

sampajāno vā taṃ Ānanda. pe. asampajāno vā taṃ Ānanda vacīsaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti yaṃ paccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ. sāmaṃ vā taṃ Ānanda manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti yaṃ paccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ. pare vāssa taṃ Ānanda manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharonti yaṃ paccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ.

S.II. 58-59

tayo me bhikkhave saṅkhārā. kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro cittasaṅkhāro ti. ime vuccanti bhikkhave saṅkhārā. avijjāsamudayā saṅkhārasamudayo. avijjāsamudayanirodhā saṅkhāranirodho. ayaṃ eva ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo saṅkhāranirodhagāminī paṭipadā. seyyathidaṃ. sammādiṭṭhi. pe. sammāsamādhi.

S. II. 60

avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ti ñāṇaṃ. asati avijjāya natthi saṅkhārā ti ñāṇaṃ. atītam pi addhānaṃ avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ti ñāṇaṃ. asati avijjāya natthi saṅkhārā ti ñāṇaṃ. anāgatam pi addhānaṃ avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ti ñāṇaṃ. asati avijjāya natthi saṅkhārā ti ñāṇaṃ. yam pissa taṃ dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇaṃ taṃ pi khayadhammaṃ vayadhammaṃ virāgadhammaṃ nirodhadhammaṃ ti ñāṇaṃ.

S. II. 62

no kallo panho ti Bhagavā avoca. katame saṅkhārā kassa ca panime saṅkhārā ti iti vā bhikkhu yo vadeyya. aññe saṅkhārā aññassa ca panime saṅkhārā ti iti vā bhikkhu yo vadeyya. ubhayam etam ekattham vyañjanam eva nānam. tam jīvam tam sarīram ti vā bhikkhu diṭṭhiyā sati brahmacariyavāso na hoti. ete te bhikkhu ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammam deseti. avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ti.

S. II. 65

purāṇam idam bhikkhave kammam abhisaṅkhatam abhisañcetayitam vedaniyam daṭṭhabbam.

S. II. 82

avijjāgato yam bhikkhave purisapuggalo puññam ce saṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti. puññūpagam hoti viññāṇam. apuññam ce saṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti. apuññūpagam hoti viññāṇam. āneñjam ce saṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti. āneñjūpagam hoti viññāṇam.

yato kho bhikkhave bhikkhuno avijjā pahīnā hoti vijjā uppannā. so avijjavirāgā vijjūppādāneva puññābhisaṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti na apuññābhisaṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti. na āneñjābhisaṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti.

anabhisaṅkharonto anabhisañcetayanto na kiñci loke upādiyati. anupādiyam na paritassati. aparitassam paccattaññeva parinibbāyati. khīṇā jāti. vusitam brahamacariyam katam karaṇīyam nāparam itthattāyā ti pajānāti.

S. II. 83

tam kiṃ maññatha bhikkhave. api nu kho khīṇāsavo bhikkhu puññābhisaṅkhāraṃ vā abhisaṅkhareyya apuññābhisaṅkhāraṃ vā abhisaṅkhareyya āneñjābhisaṅkhāraṃ vā abhisaṅkhareyyā ti.

S. II. 101

kabaliṅkāro āhāro oḷāriko vā sukhumo vā phasso dutiyo manosañcetanā tatiyā viññāṇaṃ catutthaṃ. ime kho bhikkhave cattāro āhārā bhūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ ṭhitiyā sambhavesinaṃ vā anuggahāya. kabaliṅkāre ce bhikkhave āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandi atthi taṇhā patiṭṭhitaṃ. tattha viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ. yattha patiṭṭhitaṃ viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ. atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti. yattha atthi nāmarūpassa avakkanti tattha saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi. yattha atthi saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi atthi tattha āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti. yattha atthi āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti atthi tattha āyatiṃ jātijarāmaraṇaṃ. yattha atthi āyatiṃ jātijarāmaraṇaṃ sasokantaṃ bhikkhave sadaraṃ saupāyāsanti vadāmi.

S. II. 119

evam eva kho bhikkhave avijjā apayantī saṅkhāre apayāpeti. saṅkhārā apayantā viññāṇaṃ apayāpenti. viññāṇaṃ apayantaṃ nāmarūpam apayāpeti. nāmarūpam apayantaṃ saḷāyatanam apayāpeti. saḷāyatanam apayantam phassam apayāpeti. phasso apayanto vedanam apayāpeti. vedanā apayantī taṇhaṃ apayāpeti. taṇhā apayantī upādānaṃ apayāpeti. upādānaṃ apayantam bhavam apayāpeti. bhavo apayanto jātim apayāpeti. jāti apayantī jarāmaraṇam apayāpetī ti. navamam.

S. II. 252

evam etam yathābhūtam sammappaññāya passati. yā kāci vedanā. yā kāci saññā. ye keci saṅkhārā. yam kiñci viññāṇam atītānāgatapaccuppannam ajjhattam vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikam vā sukhumam vā hīnam vā paṇītam vā yam dūre santike vā. sabbam viññāṇam netam mama nesoham asmi na me so attāti evam etam yathābhūtam sammappaññāya passati.

S. II. 266

yathā ca bhikkhave tassa purisassa javo yathā ca candimasuriyānam javo yathā ca yā devatā candimasuriyānam purato dhāvanti tāsam devatānam javo. tato sīghataram āyusaṅkhārā khīyanti.

S. III. 13

rūpadhātuyā kho gahapati yo chando yo rāgo yā nandi yā taṇhā ye upāyupādānā cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusayā. tesaṃ khayā virāgā nirodhā cāgā paṭinissaggā cittaṃ suvimuttan ti vuccati.

vedanādhātuyā kho gahapati. pe.

saññādhātuyā kho gahapati.

saṅkhāradhātuyā kho gahapati.

viññāṇadhātuyā kho gahapati ....

S. III. 25

pañcupādānakkhandhā tissa vacanīyaṃ. katame pañca? seyyathīdaṃ rūpūpādānakkhandho vedanūpādānakkhandho saññūpādāna kkhandho saṅkhārūpādānakkhandho viññanupādānakkhando. ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave bhāro.

S. III. 26

katame ca bhikkhave pariññeyyā dhammā. rūpam bhikkhave pariññeyyo dhammo. vedanā pariññeyyo dhammo. saññā pariññeyyo dhammo. saṅkhārā pariññeyo dhammo. viññāṇaṃ pariññeyyo dhammo. ime vuccanti bhikkhave pariññeyyā dhammā.

S.111.45

rūpadhātuyā ce bhikkhave bhikkhuno cittaṃ virattaṃ vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsvehi. vedanādhātuyā ce. saññādhātuyā ce. saṅkhāra-dhātuyā ce. viññāṇadhātuyā ce bhikkhave bhikkhuno cittaṃ virattaṃ vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsvehi vimuttatā ṭhitaṃ. ṭhitattā santusitaṃ santusitattā na paritassati. aparitassaṃ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati. khīṇā jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyāti pajānātīti.

S.111.47

ye keci saṅkhārā atītānāgatapaccuppannā ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikā vā sukhumā vā. pa. ayaṃ vuccati saṅkhārakkhandhā.

S.111. 58

saṅkhārupāyaṃ vā bhikkhu viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya. saṅkhārārammaṇaṃ saṅkhārapatiṭṭhaṃ nandupasevanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyya.

S. III. 58-9

pañcime bhikkhave upādānakkhandhā.

katame pañca? seyyathīdaṃ rūpupādānakkhandho vedanupādānakkhandho saññupādānakkhandho saṅkhārupādānakkhandho viññāṇupādānakkhandho.

S. III. 87

kiñca bhikkhave saṅkhāre vadetha. saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharontīti bhikkhave tasmā saṅkhārā ti vuccanti. kiñca saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti. rūpaṃ rūpattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti. vedanaṃ vedanattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti. saññaṃ saññattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti. saṅkhāre saṅkhārattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti. viññāṇaṃ viññāṇatthāya saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti. saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharontīti kho bhikkhave tasmā saṅkhārā ti vuccanti.

S. III. 92

nisajja kho Bhagavā tathārūpaṃ iddhābhisaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkhāyi yathā te bhikkhu ekavihakāya sārajjāyamānarūpā yenāhaṃ tenupasaṅkameyyuṃ.

S. III. 98

sc pana saṅkhāro kiṃnidāno. la. kimpabhavo. avijjāsamphassajena bhikkhave vedayitena puṭṭhassa assutavato puthujjanassa uppannā taṇhā. tatojo so saṅkhāro. iti kho bhikkhave so pi saṅkhāro anicco saṅkhato paṭiccasamuppanno. sā pi taṇhā. pe sā pi vedanā. so pi phasso. sā pi avijjā aniccā saṅkhatā paṭiccasamuppannā. evam pi kho bhikkhave jānato evam passato anantarā āsavānaṃ khayo hoti.

S. III. 101-2

cattāro kho bhikkhu mahābhūtā hetu cattāro mahābhūtā paccayo rūpakkhandhassa paññāpanāya. phasso hetu phasso paccayo vedanākkhandhassa paññāpanāya. phasso hetu phasso paccayo saññākkhandhassa paññāpanāya. phasso hetu phasso paccayo saṅkhārakkhandhassa paññāpanāya.

S. III. 114

saṅkhataṃ rūpaṃ saṅkhataṃ rūpan ti yathābhūtaṃ na pajānāti. saṅkhataṃ vedanam. saṅkhataṃ saññaṃ. saṅkhate saṅkhāre. saṅkhataṃ viññāṇaṃ saṅkhataṃ viññāṇanti yathābhūtaṃ na pajānāti.

S. III. 140

vedanā bhikkhave loke lokadhammo. pe.
saññā bhikkhave loke lokadhammo.
saṅkhārā bhikkhave loke lokadhammo.
viññāṇam bhikkhave loke lokadhammo...

S. III. 150

seyyathāpi bhikkhave sā gaddulabaddho daḷhe khīle vā thambhe vā upanibaddho tam eva khīlam vā thambham vā anuparidhāvati anuparivattati. evam eva kho bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano ariyānam adassāvī. la. sappurisadhamme avinīto rūpam attato samanupassati. la vedanam. saññam. saṅkhāre. viññāṇam attato samanupassati. viññāṇavantam vā attānam attani vā viññāṇam viññāṇasmim vā attānam. so rūpaññeva anuparidhāvati anuparivattati. vedanaññeva. la. saññaññeva saṅkhāre yeva viññāṇaññeva anuparidhāvati anuparivattati. so rūpam anuparidhāvam anuparivattam. vedanam. la. saññam. saṅkhāre. viññāṇam anuparidhāvam anuparivattam na parimuccati rūpamhā. na parimuccati vedanāya. na parimuccati saññāya. na parimuccati saṅkhārehi. na parimuccati viññāṇamhā. na parimuccati jātiyā jarāmaraṇena sokehi paridevehi dukkhehi domanassehi upāyāsehi na parimuccati dukkhasmā ti vadāmi.

S. III. 158

katamo bhikkhave sakkāyanto. pañcupādānakkhandhātissa vacanīyam. katame pañca? seyyathīdam rūpupādānakkhandho vedanupādānakkhandho saññupādānakkhandho saṅkhārupādānakkhandho viññāṇupādānakkhandho. ayam vuccati bhikkhave sakkāyanto.

S. IV. 132

katamam bhikkhave purānakammam.

cakkhum bhikkhave purānakammam abhisankhatam abhisancetayitam vedanīyam datthabbam. pa. jivhā purānakammam abhisankhatā datthabbā. la. mano purānakammam abhisankhato abhisancetayito vedanīyo datthabbo.

idam vuccati bhikkhave purānakammam.

S. IV. 216-7

tam kho panetam bhikkhu mayā sankhārānam yeva aniccatam sandhāya bhāsitam yam kinci vedayitam tam dukkhasmin ti. tam kho panetam bhikkhu mayā sankhārānam yeva khayadhammatam vayadhammatam virāgadhammatam nirodhammatam viparināmadhammatam sandhāya bhāsitam yam kinci vedayitam tam dukkhasmin ti.

atha kho pana bhikkhu mayā anupubbam.sankhārānam nirodho akkhāto. pathamam jhānam samāpannassa vācā niruddhā honti. dutiyam jhānam samāpannassa vitakkavicārā niruddhā honti. tatiyam jhānam samāpannassa pīti niruddhā hoti. catuttham jhānam samāpannassa assāsapassāsā niruddhā honti. ākāsanancāyatanam samāpannassa rūpasannā niruddhā hoti. vinnānancāyatanam samāpannassa ākāsānancāyatanasannā niruddhā hoti. ākincannāyatanam samāpannassa vinnānancāyatanasannā niruddhā hoti. nevasannānāsannāyatanam samāpannassa ākincannāyatanasannā niruddhā hoti. sannāvedayita-nirodham samāpannassa sannā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti. khīnāsavassa bhikkhuno rāgo niruddho hoti. doso niruddho hoti. moho niruddho hoti.

S. IV 293

tayo kho gahapati saṅkhārā kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro citta-

saṅkhāro ti.

sādhu bhante ti kho Citto gahapati āyasmato Kāmabhussa bhāsitam

abhinanditvā anumoditvā āyasmantaṃ Kāmabhum uttaripañham apucchi.

katamo pana bhante kāyasaṅkhāro katamo vacīsaṅkhāro katamo

cittasaṅkhāro ti.

assāsapassāsā kho gahapati kāyasaṅkhāro. vitakkavicārā

vacīsaṅkhāro. saññā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāro ti.

S. IV. 359

asaṅkhatañca bhikkhave desissāmi asaṅkhatagāmiñca maggaṃ taṃ

suṇātha.

katamañca bhikkhave asaṅkhataṃ. yo bhikkhave rāgakkhayo

dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave asaṅkhataṃ.

katamo ca bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmi maggo. kāyagatā sati ayaṃ

vuccati bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmi maggo.

iti kho bhikkhave desitaṃ vo mayā asaṅkhataṃ desito asaṅkhatagāmi

maggo.

katamo ca bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmi maggo. samatho. ayaṃ vuccati

bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmi maggo.

katamo ca bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmi maggo. vipassanā. ayaṃ vuccati

bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmi maggo.

S. IV. 362-3

katamo ca bhikkhave asankhatagāmi maggo. savitakko savicāro samādhi. ayam vuccati bhikkhave asankhatagāmi maggo.

katamo ca bhikkhave asankhatagāmi maggo. avitakko avicāro samādhi. ayam vuccati bhikkhave asankhatagāmi maggo.[121]

S. IV. 368

katamo ca bhikkhave asankhatagāmi maggo. idha bhikkhave bhikkhu sammāsankappam bhāveti. la. sammāvācam bhāveti. la. sammākammantam bhāveti. la. sammā-ājīvam bhāveti. la. sammāvāyāmam bhāveti. la. sammāsatim bhāveti. la.

antañca vo bhikkhave desissāmi antagāminca maggam tam suṇātha. katamañca bhikkhave antam. pe. yathā asankhatam tathā vitthāretabbam.

S. IV. 373

yathā asaṅkhataṃ tathā vitthāretabbaṃ.

tatruddānaṃ.

asaṅkhataṃ antaṃ anāsavaṃ

saccañca paraṃ nipuṇaṃ sududdasaṃ.

ajajjarantaṃ dhuvaṃ [illegible]

anidassanaṃ nippapañcaṃ ca santaṃ

amataṃ paṇītañca sivañca khemaṃ.

taṇhakkhayo acchariyañca abbhutaṃ.

anītikaṃ anītikadhammaṃ nibbānaṃ etaṃ sugatena desitaṃ.

avyāpajjo virāgo ca.

suddhi mutti anālayo.

dīpaṃ leṇañca tāṇañca

saraṇañca parāyanan ti.

asaṅkhatasaṃyuttaṃ samattaṃ.

S. IV. 384

taṃ kiṃ maññasi Anurādha ayaṃ so arūpī avedano asaññī asaṅkhāro aviññāṇo Tathāgato ti samanupassasī ti.

S. IV. 397

aññatitthiyā kho Vaccha paribbājakā rūpaṃ attato samanupassanti. rūpavantaṃ vā attānaṃ attani vā rūpaṃ rūpasmiṃ vā attānaṃ. vedanaṃ. saññaṃ. saṅkhāre. viññāṇaṃ attato samanupassanti. viññāṇavantaṃ vā attānaṃ attani vā viññāṇaṃ viññāṇasmiṃ vā attānaṃ. tasmā aññatitthiyānaṃ paribbājakānaṃ evaṃ puṭṭhānaṃ evaṃ vyākaraṇaṃ hoti. sassato loko ti vā. pe. neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā ti vā.

S. V. 56

tisso imā bhikkhave dukkhatā. katamā tisso? dukkhadukkhatā saṅkhāradukkhatā vipariṇāmadukkhatā. imā kho bhikkhave tisso dukkhatā. imāsaṃ kho bhikkhave tissannaṃ dukkhatānaṃ abhiññāya pariññāya parikkhayāya pahānāya. la. ayaṃ ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo bhāvetabbo ti.

S. V. 152-3

atha kho Bhagavato etad ahosi. na kho pana me taṃ paṭirūpaṃ yo haṃ anāmantetvā upaṭṭhāke anapaloketvā bhikkhusaṅghaṃ parinibbāyeyyaṃ. yan nūnāhaṃ imaṃ ābādhaṃ viriyena paṭipaṇāmetvā jīvitasaṅkhāraṃ adhiṭṭhāya vihareyyan'ti. atha kho Bhagavā taṃ ābādhaṃ viriyena paṭipaṇāmetvā jīvitasaṅkhāraṃ adhiṭṭhāya vihāsi.

S. V. 201

imesaṃ kho bhikkhave pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ samattā paripūrattā arahaṃ hoti. tato mudutarehi antarāparinibbāyī hoti. tato mudutarehi upahaccaparinibbāyī hoti. tato mudutarehi asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. tato mudutarehi sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. tato mudutarehi uddhaṃsoto hoti akaniṭṭhagāmī. tato mudutarehi sakadāgāmī hoti. tato mudutarehi sotāpanno hoti. tato mudutarehi dhammānusārī hoti. tato mudutarehi saddhānusārī hotīti.

S. V. 204-5

imesaṃ kho bhikkhave pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ samattā paripūrattā arahaṃ hoti. tato mudutarehi antarāparinibbāyī hoti. tato mudutarehi upahaccaparinibbāyī hoti. tato mudutarehi asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. tato mudutarehi sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. tato mudutarehi uddhaṃsoto hoti akaniṭṭhagāmī. tato mudutarehi sakadāgāmī hoti. tato mudutarehi ekabījī hoti. tato mudutarehi kolaṃkolo hoti. tato mudutarehi sattakkhattuparamo hoti. tato mudutarehi dhammānusārī hoti. tato mudutarehi saddhānusārī hoti ti.

S. V. 213

idha bhikkave bhikkhuno appamattassa ātāpino pahitattassa viharato uppajjati dukkhindriyam. so evam pajānāti uppannaṃ kho me idaṃ dukkhindriyam. tam ca kho sanimittaṃ sanidānaṃ sasaṅkhāraṃ sappaccayam. tañca animittam anidānaṃ asaṅkhāram appaccayaṃ dukkhindriyaṃ upajjissatīti netaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati. so dukkhindriyañ ca pajānāti dukkhindriyasamudayañca pajānāti dukkhindriyanirodhañca pajānāti. yattha cuppannaṃ dukkhindriyam aparisesaṃ nirujjhati. tañca pajānāti.

S. V. 311

sabbakāyapaṭisaṃvedī assasissāmī ti sikkhati. sabbakāyapaṭisaṃvedī passasissāmī ti sikkhati. passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ assasissāmī ti sikkhati. passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ passissāmī ti sikkhati.

S. V. 312

cittasaṅkhārapaṭisaṃvedī assasissāmī ti sikkhati. cittasaṅkhārapaṭisaṃvedī passasissāmī ti sikkhati. passambhayaṃ cittasaṅkhāraṃ assasissāmī ti sikkhati. passambhayaṃ cittasaṅkhāraṃ passasissāmī ti sikkhati. cittapaṭisaṃvedī passasissāmī ti sikkhati.

S. V. 314

diṭṭheva dhamme paṭihacca aññaṃ ārādheti. no ce diṭṭheva dhamme paṭihacca aññaṃ ārādheti. atha maraṇakāle aññaṃ ārādheti. no ce maraṇakāle aññaṃ ārādheti atha pañcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā antarāparinibbāyī hoti. upahaccaparinibbāyī hoti. asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. uddhaṃsoto hoti akaniṭṭhagāmī.

S. V. 449

ye hi keci bhikkhu samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā idaṃ dukkhan ti yathābhutaṃ nappajānanti. ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo ti yathā nappajānanti. ayaṃ dukkhanirodho ti yathā nappajānanti. ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāmini paṭipadā ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānanti. te jātisaṃvattanikesu saṅkhāresu abhiramanti. jarāsaṃvattanikesu saṅkhāresu abhiramanti. maraṇasaṃvattanikesu saṅkhāresu abhiramanti. sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsasaṃvattanikesu saṅkhāresu abhiramanti. kesu saṅkhāresu abhiratā maraṇasaṃvattanikesu saṅkhāresu abhiratā sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsasaṃvattanikesu saṅkhāresu abhiratā jātisaṃvattanike pi abhisaṅkharonti. jarāsaṃvattanike pi saṅkhāre abhisaṅkharonti. maraṇasaṃvattanike pi saṇkhāre abhisaṅkharonti. sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsasaṃvattanike pi saṅkhāre abhisaṅkharonti. te jātisaṃvattanike pi saṅkhāre abhisaṅkharitvā jarāsaṃvattanike pi saṅkhāre abhisaṅkharitvā sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsasaṃvattanike pi saṅkhāre abhisaṅkharitvā jātipapātam pi papatanti. jarāpapātam pi papatanti. maraṇapapātam pi papatanti.

A. I.82

sasaṅkhārā bhikkhave uppajjanti pāpakā akusalā dhammā no asaṅkhārā. tesaṃ yeva saṅkhārānaṃ pahānā evaṃ te pāpakā akusalā dhammā no honti ti.

A. I.83

saṅkhatārammaṇā bhikkhave uppajjanti pāpakā akusalā dhammā no asaṅkhatārammaṇā. tass'eva saṅkhatassa pahānā evaṃ te pāpakā akusalā dhammā na honti ti.

A. I.112

ko nu kho samma rathakāra hetu ko paccayo yaṃ idaṃ cakkaṃ chahi divasehi niṭṭhitaṃ taṃ pavattitaṃ samānaṃ. yāvatikā abhisaṅkhārassa gati tāvatikaṃ gantvā ciṅgulāyitvā bhūmiyaṃ papati. ko pana samma rathakāra hetu ko paccayo yaṃ idaṃ cakkaṃ chahi māsehi niṭṭhitaṃ chārattūnehi taṃ pavattitaṃ samānaṃ yāvatikā abhisaṅkārassa gati tāvatikaṃ gantvā akkhāhataṃ maññe aṭṭhāsi ti.

A. I. 122-3

tayo 'me bhikkhave puggalā santo saṃvijjamānā lokasmiṃ. katame tayo?

idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo savyāpajjhaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti savyāpajjhaṃ vacīsaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti savyāpajjhaṃ manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti. so savyāpajjhaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā savyāpajjhaṃ vacīsaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā savyāpajjhaṃ manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā savyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ uppajjati. taṃ enaṃ savyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ uppannaṃ samānaṃ savyāpajjhā phassā phusanti. so savyāpajjhehi phassehi phuṭṭho samāno savyāpajjhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati ekanta-dukkhaṃ, seyyathāpi sattā nerayikā.

idha pana bhikkhave ekacco puggalo avyāpajjhaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti... pe ... avyāpajjhaṃ manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti. so avyāpajjhaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā ... pe ... mano-saṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā avyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ uppajjati. taṃ enaṃ avyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ uppannaṃ samānaṃ avyāpajjhā phassā phusanti. so avyāpajjehi phassehi phuṭṭho samāno avyāpajjhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati ekantasukhaṃ, seyyathāpi devā subhakiṇṇā.

idha pana bhikkhave ekacco puggalo savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti ... pe ... savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti. so savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā ... pe ... savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi lokaṃ uppajjati. taṃ enaṃ savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi lokaṃ uppannaṃ samānaṃ savyāpajjhā pi avyāpajjhā pi phassā phusanti. so savyāpajjhehi pi avyāpajjhehi pi phassehi phuṭṭho samāno savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi vedanaṃ vediyati vokiṇṇaṃ [saṅkiṇṇaṃ] sukhadukkhaṃ, seyyathāpi manussā ekacce ca devā ekacce ca vinipātikā.

A. I. 152

tīṇ'imāni bhikkhave saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni.

katamāni tīṇi?

uppādo paññāyati vayo paññāyati ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññāyati. imāni kho bhikkhave tīṇi saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni ti.

tīṇ'imāni bhikkhave asaṅkhatassa asaṅkhatalakkhaṇāni. katamāni tīṇi?

na uppādo paññāyati na vayo paññāyati na ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ paññāyati. imāni kho bhikkhave tīṇi asaṅkhatassa asaṅkhatalakkhaṇāni ti.

A. I. 177

avijjāpaccayā saṅkhāraṃ

saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ.

A.II.155-6

cattāro'me bhikkhave puggalā santo saṃvijjamānā lokasmiṃ. katame cattāro?

idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo diṭṭh'eva dhamme sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyī hoti. idha pana bhikkhave ekacco puggalo kāyassa bhedā sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. idha pana bhikkhave ekacco puggalo diṭṭh'eva dhamme asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. idha pana bhikkhave ekacco puggalo kāyassa bhedā asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. kathañ ca bhikkhave puggalo diṭṭh'eva dhamme sasaṅkhārapari-nibbāyī hoti?

idha bhikkhave bhikkhu asubhānupassī kāye viharati, āhāre paṭikkūlasaññī sabbaloke anabhiratasaññī sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccā-nupassī maraṇasaññā kho pan'assa ajjhattaṃ sūpaṭṭhitā hoti. so

imāni pañca sekhabalāni upanissāya viharati— saddhābalaṃ ... paññābalaṃ, tass' imāni pañcindriyāni adhimattāni pātubhavanti— saddhindriyaṃ ... paññindriyaṃ—so imesaṃ pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ adhimattattā diṭṭh'eva dhamme sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti.

kathañ ca bhikkhave puggalo kāyassa bhedā sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti?

idha pana bhikkhave bhikkhu asubhānupassī viharati ... maraṇa-saññā kho pan' assa ajjhattaṃ sūpaṭṭhitā hoti. so imāni pañca sekhabalāni upanissāya viharati—saddhābalaṃ ... paññābalaṃ, tass' imāni pañcindriyāni mudūni pātubhavanti-saddhindriyam ... paññindriyam— ... mudattā kāyassa bheda sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyī hoti. evam kho bhikkhave puggalo kāyassa bheda sasaṅkhārapari-nibbāyī hoti.

kathañ ca bhikkhave puggalo diṭṭh'eva dhamme asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti?

idha bhikkhave vivicc'eva kāmehi ... pe ... catutthajjhānam upasampajja viharati. so imāni pañca sekhabalāni ... adhimattāni pātubhavanti ... adhimattattā diṭṭh'eva dhamme asaṅkhārapari-nibbāyī hoti. evam kho bhikkhave ekacco puggalo diṭṭh'eva dhamme sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti.

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A. II. 231

katamañ ca bhikkhave kammaṃ kaṇhaṃ kaṇhavipākaṃ?

idha bhikkhave ekacco savyāpajjhaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti ... savyāpajjhaṃ manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti. so savyāpajjhaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā savyāpajjhaṃ vacīsaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā savyāpajjhaṃ manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā savyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ uppajjati. taṃ enaṃ savyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ uppannaṃ samānaṃ savyāpajjhā phassā phusanti. so savyāpajjhehi phassehi phuṭṭho samāno savyāpajjhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati ekantadukkhaṃ, seyyathāpi sattā nerayikā. idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave kammaṃ kaṇhaṃ kaṇhavipākaṃ.

katamañ ca bhikkhave kammaṃ sukkaṃ sukkavipākaṃ?

idha bhikkhave ekacco avyāpajjhaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti... pe ... avyāpajjhaṃ manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti. so avyāpajjhaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā ... pe ... manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā avyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ uppajjati. taṃ enaṃ avyāpajjhaṃ lokaṃ uppannaṃ samānaṃ avyāpajjhā phassā phusanti. so avyāpajjhehi phassehi phuṭṭho samāno avyāpajjhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati ekantasukhaṃ, seyyathāpi devā subhakiṇhā.

idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave kammaṃ sukkaṃ sukkavipākaṃ.

katamañ ca bhikkhave kammaṃ kaṇhasukkaṃ kaṇhasukkavipākaṃ?

idha bhikkhave ekacco savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti .... savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā .... savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi manosaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharitvā savyāpajjhaṃ pi avyāpajjhaṃ pi lokaṃ uppajjati.

A. III. 24

ayam samādhi paccuppannasukho c'eva āyatiñ ca sukhavipāko'ti paccattam yeva ñāṇam uppajjati, ayam samādhi ariyo nirāmiso'ti paccattam yeva ñāṇam uppajjati, ayam samādhi akāpurisasevito'ti paccattam yeva ñāṇam uppajjati, ayam samādhi santo paṇīto paṭippassaddhiladdho ekodibhāvādhigato na ca sasaṅkhāraniggayha-vāritāvaṭo ti paccattam yeva ñāṇam uppajjati, so kho pahānam imam samādhim sato'va samāpajjāmi sato'va vuṭṭhahāmī'ti paccattam yeva ñāṇam uppajjati.

A. III. 82

chandasamādhipadhānasaṅkhārasamannāgatam iddhipādam bhāvesim, viriyasamādhi-cittasamādhi-vīmamsāsamādhi-padhānasaṅkhāra-samannāgatam iddhipādam bhāvesim, ussoḷhim yeva pañcamim.

idha bhikkhave bhikkhu chandasamādhipadhānasaṅkhārasamannāgatam iddhipādam bhāveti, viriyasamādhi-citta-samādhi-vīmamsāsamādhi-padhānasaṅkhārasamannāgatam iddhipādam bhāveti, ussoḷhim yeva pañcamim.

A. III. 370

atha kho brāhmaṇa Dhammika Sakko devānam indo tathārūpam iddhābhi-saṅkhāram abhisaṅkhāsi, yathā bhusā vātavuṭṭhi āgantvā Suppati-ṭṭham nigrodharājam pātesi ummūlam akāsi. atha kho brāhmaṇa Dhammika Suppatiṭṭhe nigrodharāje adhivatthā devatā dukkhī dummanā assumukhī rudamānā ekamantam aṭṭhāsi.

A. IV. 72

idha pana bhikkhave bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti no c'assa, no ca me siyā'... pe ... so pañcannam orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. seyyathā pi bhikkhave divasasantatte ayokapāle haññamāne papaṭikā nibbattitvā uppatitvā paritte tiṇapuñje vā kaṭṭhapuñje vā nipateyya, sā tattha aggim pi janeyya dhūmaṃ pi janeyya, aggim pi janetvā dhūmaṃ pi janetvā tam eva parittaṃ tiṇapuñjaṃ vā kaṭṭhapuñjaṃ vā pariyādiyitvā anāhārā nibbāyeyya, evaṃ eva kho bhikkhave bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti no c'assa, no ca me siyā ... pe ... so pañcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti.

A. IV. 146

puna ca param bhikkhave idh'ekacco puggalo cakkhusmiṃ aniccānupassī viharati aniccasaññī aniccapaṭisaṃvedī satataṃ samitaṃ abbokiṇṇaṃ cetasā adhimuccamāno paññāya pariyogāhamāno. so pañcannam orambhāgiyānaṃ saññojanānaṃ parikkhayā antarāparinibbāyī hoti ... upahaccaparinibbāyī hotī ... asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti... sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti ... uddhaṃsoto hoti akaniṭṭhagāmī.

A. IV. 311

atha kho Bhagavā Cāpālacetiye sato sampajāno āyusaṅkhāraṃ ossaji.

A. IV. 312

tulam atulañ ca sambhavam bhavasaṅkhāram avassaji muni
ajjhattarato samāhito abhindi kavacam iv' attasambhavan ti.

A. IV. 313

puna ca param Ānanda yadā Tathāgato sato sampajāno āyusaṅkhāram ossajati, tadāyam paṭhavī kampati saṃkampati sampakampati.

A. IV. 380

puna ca param Sāriputta idh'ekacco puggalo sīlesu paripūrakārī hoti samādhismim paripūrakārī, paññāya na paripūrakārī. so pañcannam orambhāgiyānam saṃyojanānam parikkhayā upahaccaparinibbāyī hoti ... asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti ... sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti ... uddhaṃsoto hoti akaniṭṭhagāmī. ayam Sāriputta pañcamo puggalo saupādiseso kālam kurumāno parimutto nirayā parimutto tiracchānayoniyā parimutto pittivisayā parimutto apāyaduggativinipātā.

A. IV. 428

evam vutte aham āvuso Jaṭilāgāhiyam bhikkhunim etad avocam yāyam bhagini samādhi na cābhinato na cāpanato na sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritavato vimuttattā ṭhito ṭhitattā santusito santusitattā no paritassati, ayam bhagini samādhi aññāphalo vutto Bhagavatā'ti.

A. V. 88

sītam uṇham jighacchā pipāsā uccāro passāvo kāyasaṃvaro. vacīsaṃvaro ājīvasaṃvaro ponobhaviko bhavasaṅkhāro.

A. V. 120

antarāparinibbāyissa, upahaccaparinibbāyissa, asaṅkhāraparinibbāyissa, sasaṅkhāraparinibbayissa, uddhaṃsotassa akaniṭṭhagāmino: imesaṃ pañcannaṃ idha vihāya niṭṭhā.

A. V. 180

atha kho Sīhassa senāpatissa yo ahosi gamiyābhisaṅkhāro Bhagavantaṃ dassanāya, so paṭippassambhi.

A. V. 187

sa kho pan'esa diṭṭhi bhūtā saṅkhatā cetayitā paṭiccasamuppannā yaṃ kho pana kiñci bhūtaṃ saṅkhataṃ cetayitaṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ, tad aniccaṃ, yad aniccaṃ, taṃ dukkhaṃ, yaṃ dukkhaṃ, tad eva so āyasmā allīno, tad eva so āyasmā ajjhūpagato.

END

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